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ABSTRACT 
Dominant approaches in International Political Economy treat inflows of foreign 
direct investments (FDI) only as a material fact, a physical flow of capital. The 
analysis of the perceptions of inward FDI presented in this research, however, 
reveals that the meaning that policymakers and analysts attribute to FDI inflows goes 
far beyond that. What is more, the predominant interpretation of the meaning of FDI 
inflows has changed dramatically over time: While they were perceived primarily as 
a threat to national economic development from the 1950s to the 1980s, they came to 
be gradually re-interpreted as a sign of economic success in the 1990s. Focusing on 
these developments in the major OECD economies, this research aims to make sense 
of this stunning transformation in the social interpretation of inward FDI and to 
examine the implications of these ideational evolutions for policy outcomes. To do 
so, the research adopts a mixed methods research design, which combines 
quantitative approaches with the insights gained from qualitative historical analysis: 
After providing a nuanced theoretical discussion of the significance of economic 
narratives in international economic affairs and a broad overview of the key 
developments in FDI policies and relevant policy discourses in the six largest 
advanced economies during the post-war era, the research subjects the theoretical 
argument to two quantitative tests at large cross-national samples using data from 
public opinion surveys and general election results; finally, a qualitative comparison 
of relevant developments in the United Kingdom and France analyses the impact of 
these ideational changes on FDI policy-making processes in empirical depth. 
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PREFACE 
On 31 December 2010 I arrived in Vientiane, the capital of Laos, as a tourist. I was 
excited to have set foot on officially communist land for the first time in my life. On 
the same night, at the public New Year’s celebration on the capital’s main square, an 
odd detail caught my attention: the beautiful historic surroundings were decorated 
not only with national flags, sickles, hammers and red stars, but, most prominently, 
with orange-blueish advertisements for Tiger, a popular Asian beer brand owned by 
Heineken Asia Pacific, a Singapore-based subsidiary of the famous Dutch brewing 
company. It was not exactly the promotion I had expected self-declared Marxist-
Leninist party officials to be supportive of. And the youth of Vientiane, presumably 
having been taught the evils of foreign capitalists throughout their formative years, 
didn’t hesitate to add their endorsement to the powerful multinational. With 
excitement and pride they held their Tiger bottles (which, as I came to learn later, 
were produced and distributed by the Lao Asia Pacific Brewery, a joint venture 
between Heineken International and the communist government of Laos) high up into 
the night sky. The crowd’s enthusiasm about their bland, overpriced and politically 
incorrect drinks left me confused at first; but suddenly it all made sense as I started 
to realize that the ugly Tiger signs all over the beautiful square were not simply 
advertisements; they carried an important message: “We are part of the global 
economy now and that is ‘cool’”, roared the Tiger. 
Two years later, when I started familiarizing myself with the existing literature on 
foreign direct investments in the International Political Economy literature at the 
beginning of my PhD studies, I had long forgotten the excitement of Vientiane’s 
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youth. Reading my way through the field in long hours at the bustling LSE library I 
realized that nearly all of the recent literature had strongly focused on examining 
how political factors influence a country’s attractiveness to foreign multinationals, 
but – in contrast to the classic literature on the topic of the 1970s – it gave very little 
attention to the question why countries want FDI. That FDI is ‘good’ and that 
governments would want it seemed to be largely taken as an obvious fact, which 
wouldn’t need much explaining. However, to my own surprise, I realized at the 
same time that this conclusion was not supported by the empirical literature 
examining the economic effects of FDI, which seemed in effect fairly sceptical and 
ambivalent about the question whether they are a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ thing. It wasn’t 
that clear, after all, if the Tiger’s arrival in Laos was really so great… Puzzled by this 
apparent divergence between what the economics literature said about FDI and 
what almost everyone seemed to believe it said, I decided at some point to dedicate 
my PhD studies to an attempt to better understand why governments around the 
world were so keen to attract FDI. And when – trying to get a better grasp of the 
political history of global FDI - I started reading through historical documents, the 
puzzle just kept becoming more puzzling. I was intrigued to learn that it wasn’t only 
Lenin and his disciples who used to condemn multinationals, but that not too long 
ago respected members of Thatcher’s Conservative party in the United Kingdom, a 
Democratic presidential nominee in the USA (long before the rise of Trumpism well 
understood…) and even the editors of the Financial Times seemed honestly worried 
about FDI inflows and sharply articulated the case for more regulations and 
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restrictions on multinationals. The puzzle then was not only why governments were 
so keen to attract FDI, but also why they used to hate what they now love.  
After wrestling with this two-layered puzzle for four long years, I think I have an 
answer, which – although not successfully explaining every detail of FDI politics of 
the last six decades – I believe makes some sense. And although it has almost 
nothing to do with Laos (or beer), it is based to a large extent on the powerful 
symbolism of FDI that seemed so obvious in Vientiane on 31 December 2010 and 
which has regularly come back to haunt me since then.  
Angling for the sometimes seemingly elusive answer to this puzzle has not always 
been an easy undertaking, but it was overall a hugely rewarding experience. Mostly 
so thanks to the many wonderful people I had the chance to encounter during this 
journey. I acknowledge that life is too short to read long prefaces, but nonetheless I 
wish to express my gratitude to a number of individuals who made these last four 
years a period of my life, which I will keep in very good memories. 
Without any doubt, my largest intellectual debt goes to my supervisor at the London 
School of Economics, Professor Jeffrey Chwieroth. I am very glad that I don’t need to 
engage in speculations about the potential counterfactual outcome of this research 
project in absence of Jeff’s continuous input and guidance, for it is obvious that it 
would be so much worse. I wish to express my gratitude for his inspiration, 
friendship, generous support and wise advice throughout these four years and for 
the many pointed and always constructive criticisms, which have kept me focused 
and the thesis on track. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The transformation of government policies and attitudes towards foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows over the past few decades has been nothing short of 
dramatic. In the 1960s-70s national governments in advanced as well as developing 
economies adopted a great variety of screening mechanisms and other restrictive 
measures aimed at regulating FDI inflows and minimizing their perceived negative 
impact on the domestic economy. Concerns about the harmful effects of inward FDI 
for national economic development were widespread and pronounced. For example, 
commenting on the sharp increases in FDI inflows from the USA in the early 1960s, 
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson warned that there was “no future for Europe, 
or for Britain, if we allow American Business … so to dominate the strategic growth 
industries of our individual countries, that they, and not we, are able to determine 
the pace and direction of Europe’s industrial advance”1. And views that inward FDI 
constituted an economic ‘problem’ of some sorts were by no means restricted to Mr 
Wilson or his Labour Party; they came close to being a consensus. Even the Financial 
Times, stern advocate of liberal internationalist principles, called for regulatory 
action to reduce levels of foreign company ownership in an editorial published in 
the mid-1960s2. Yet, by the early 2000s, most governments had not only removed 
nearly all restrictive measures on FDI inflows, but had simultaneously created large-
scale government programs aimed at attracting and promoting foreign investment 
projects. Fears about negative long-term implications of foreign ownership had 
                                                          
1 Quoted in: Michael Hodges, Multinational Corporations and National Government : A Case Study of the 
United Kingdom's Experience, 1964-1970  (Lexington, Mass.: Saxon House, 1974), 228. 
2 "The General Makes One Valid Point," Financial Times, 8 February 1965. 
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dissipated to a large extent. In contrast, UK politicians now celebrated the relatively 
high levels of inward investment as one of “this country’s greatest success stories”3 
and both main parties assiduously elaborated strategies how to attract more FDI. 
The financial press was no less enthusiastic about the promise and opportunities 
brought about by more inward FDI, which were variously described as “a boon to 
the British economy”4, a “vote of confidence”5 by global markets or a “source of 
national pride”6. In the 1960s-70 (well understood, a period when the value of the 
global stock of FDI as a share of global GDP remained below five per cent) policy 
elites around the world thus tended to worry that they were receiving ‘too much’ 
FDI; but three decades later (when the relative value of the global FDI stock had 
grown at least fourfold to over twenty per cent of GDP) they seemingly couldn’t get 
enough of it… This is somewhat puzzling. How can this sea change in government 
attitudes and international economic policy be explained? 
Existing explanations in IPE and related literatures emphasize the importance of 
underlying structural changes in the nature of FDI and shifts in political power 
among groups with differing economic interests. As I will elaborate in more detail, 
although these factors are helpful, they ultimately seem unable to account for the 
depth or the timing of this transformation in a satisfactory way. To better 
understand it, I argue, it is necessary to expand the theoretical focus. For, as I will 
illustrate in much more detail in subsequent chapters, what has truly changed over 
the past decades is not so much the material reality of inward FDI but the perceptions 
                                                          
3 Tim Eggar, Minister of Energy and Industry, in: UK Hansard, "Debates in the House of Commons." 
(28 October 1994), vol 248 cc1115-84. 
4 "Britain's Many Options," The Economist, 6 April 1996. 
5 "Sunshine, with a Chance of Showers," The Economist, 8 July 2000.  
6 "Foreign, Redirected Investment," The Economist, 29 May 2004. 
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thereof. The thrust of this thesis thus consists of the contention that the observed 
changes in government attitudes and policies towards inward FDI have been driven 
to an important extent not by changes in the balance of political power or the 
material reality of FDI but by transformations in the social interpretation of the 
economic meaning and significance of FDI inflows – evolutions which have 
unfolded partly independently of the simultaneous changes in the underlying 
material reality - that profoundly affected the ways in which individuals and social 
groups defined their interests towards inward FDI. 
A great majority of scholarly work in IPE has shown relatively little interest in the 
role of perceptions in the world economy, which – following rationalist lines of 
theorizing – are generally considered as mere reflections of underlying material 
trends. As I aim to show throughout this thesis, however, they deserve to be studied 
more seriously because they can be much more than that. Dominant perceptions of 
economic ‘things’ – such as FDI inflows – are not just mental mirrors of ‘real’ things, 
but colourful images that are constructed (or, to follow through the metaphor, 
‘painted’) intersubjectively through complex processes of social interaction. And as 
such, they form integral parts of broader intersubjectively shared interpretive 
frameworks. More specifically, the empirical investigation to be unfolded focuses on 
the role of a type of interpretive frameworks that I conceptualize as economic 
narratives. As socially shared cognitive devices, the primary function of these 
narratives is not to accurately describe the complexities of the workings of the world 
economy, but to make sense of them through the provision of intuitively compelling 
but deliberately simplifying accounts, which emphasize some aspects and downplay 
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others. What they emphasize and what they downplay is consequential, in turn, 
because – as I aim to illustrate - it affects how individuals and social groups define 
their economic interests and preferences.  
The key development at the heart of this investigation consists of the evolution in 
predominant economic narratives from the narrative of statism to the narrative of 
globalization. In a nutshell, the economic narrative of statism that was predominant in 
the 1960s-70s described the world economy as a system consisting of partly 
autonomous units of national economies. Albeit participation in the world economy 
was generally described in favourable terms, it was the strength of domestically 
owned national industries that were considered to be the key actors determining the 
economic prosperity of nations in the long run. Accordingly, although many 
observers acknowledged the potential of FDI to add to the domestic stock of capital 
and to transfer technological and managerial know-how, FDI was generally 
considered with scepticism because it was seen as a threat that may undermine the 
development of home-grown industries. In stark contrast, the narrative of 
globalization that rose to prominence in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War 
depicted the world economy as an integrated economic market in which nationality-
less and globally mobile companies figure as the main drivers of innovation and 
long-term prosperity. Accordingly, the globalization narrative’s assessment of the 
meaning and significance of FDI inflows for national economic development was 
strongly positive. Levels of FDI inflows came to be seen not only as a driver of 
domestic economic progress, but at the same time also as a symbol of a nation’s 
competitiveness and economic success. 
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The remainder of this thesis examines these developments in much more depth. In 
order to do so, it focuses on developments in advanced economies, with a particular 
focus on Britain and France. The temporal focus is on the period starting roughly 
around 1960 – when the increasing expansion of US MNCs abroad led the 
foundations for a new period in the history of global FDI - and ends before the 
Financial Crisis in advanced economies of 2007-097. Developments in non-OECD 
economies as well as trends emerging in the aftermath of the crisis are only touched 
upon briefly in the conclusion chapter; systematic investigations of these issues must 
be left to future research.  
The first part of the remainder of this introduction chapter will review existing 
explanations for the trend towards the liberalization of inward FDI policies and 
assess their relative strengths and weaknesses. The second part elaborates my own 
argument and presents an overview of the thesis. 
 
Existing explanations 
Despite the breath-taking growth in importance of FDI in the global economy over 
the past decades, the number of studies that have systematically investigated the 
political origins of inward FDI policies remains small. With some important 
exceptions8, a majority of the scholarship on FDI in the field of International Political 
                                                          
7 The crisis is commonly called ‘global’ financial crisis; historiographically, this term may conceal the 
fact that the crisis originated strictly in advanced economies and that the repercussions were 
generally less dramatic in emerging markets 
8 Beth A. Simmons, Andrew T. Guzman, and Zachary Elkins, "Competing for Capital: The Diffusion 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000," International Oganization 60, no. 4 (2006); Sonal S. Pandya, 
"Labor Markets and the Demand for Foreign Direct Investment," International Organization 64, no. 03 
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Economy (IPE) has focused on the supply side of FDI politics (that is, how changes 
in political variables affect levels of FDI inflows9) rather than the politics behind the 
demand for FDI in host economies. Nonetheless, taking into account a wider body of 
scholarly work that in addition to IPE also includes work undertaken in the fields of 
international economics, economic history and international business studies, we can 
identify at least four distinct existing hypotheses about the potential drivers of this 
change: (i) a process of learning, (ii) structural changes in the nature of FDI, (iii) 
shifts in political power, and (iv) the international competition for capital. 
The first potential explanation for this observed change in attitudes and policies rests 
on the idea of a process of learning through which policymakers gradually came to 
recognize the economic benefits of FDI inflows. The argument, which is often made 
implicitly, seems intuitively compelling. However, the nature of the empirical 
evidence on the economic effects of inward FDI is much less clear than one might 
think. Although FDI inflows are generally believed to add capital and technology to 
a host economy, empirical research has suggested that these positive impacts may be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(2010); Trading Spaces: Foreign Direct Investment Regulation, 1970-2000  (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014); "Democratization and Foreign Direct Investment Liberalization, 1970–2000," 
International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 3 (2014). 
9 Investigating questions such as how changes in political regime types or other political evolutions 
affect FDI inflows. For example: Nathan Jensen finds that countries with a democratic political regime 
attract more FDI than their authoritarian counterparts, see Nathan M. Jensen, "Democratic 
Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct 
Investment," International Organization 57, no. 3 (2003); Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: 
A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment  (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2006). In contrast, Quan Li and Adam Resnick find that democratic institutions reduce FDI inflows 
once democratic institutions’ positive effect through stronger property rights is accounted for, see 
Quan Li and Adam Resnick, "Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct 
Investment Inflows to Developing Countries," International Oganization 57, no. 1 (2003). Pablo Pinto 
finds that, ceteris paribus, left party governments attract higher levels of FDI than right-wing 
governments, see Pablo M. Pinto, Partisan Investment in the Global Economy: Why the Left Loves Foreign 
Direct Investment and Fdi Loves the Left  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Rachel 
Wellhausen finds that acts of expropriation by governments deters FDI inflows from MNCs of the 
same nationality, see Rachel L. Wellhausen, The Shield of Nationality : When Governments Break 
Contracts with Foreign Firms  (Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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partly undermined by other simultaneous dynamics. In particular, the positive effect 
on the capital stock may be reduced substantially by MNCs’ tendency to raise large 
parts of their total investments in local capital markets10 and the technological 
spillover effects may be smaller than expected because foreign investors have strong 
incentives to protect their know-how from domestic competitor firms. In any case, 
the findings of econometric studies assessing the economic impact of inward FDI are 
highly mixed. An authoritative review of the empirical research at the macro-level 
by Robert Lipsey11 notes that there is no obvious consistent relation between the size 
of inward FDI stocks or flows and GDP growth12. Similarly, a meta-analysis of the 
findings of research undertaken at the micro-level by Klaus Meyer and Evis Sinani13 
shows that the evidence of the existence of positive spillover effects is ambiguous 
and seems to depend crucially on host economies’ ‘absorptive capacities’14. 
                                                          
10 See Edward M. Graham and Paul R. Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States  
(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1989); Charles Poor Kindleberger, American 
Business Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct Investment  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969). 
11 Robert Lipsey, "Home and Host Country Effects of Fdi," NBER Working Paper Series (2002). 
Particularly influential studies in this regard are E. Borenzstein, J. De Gregorio, and J-W. Lee, "How 
Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth," Journal of International Economics 45(1998); 
Maria Carkovic and Ross Levine, "Does Foreign Direct Investment Accelerate Economic Growth?,"  
Working Papers(2002). 
12 It is interesting to note that albeit some countries pursuing an explicitly liberal FDI policy, e.g. 
Ireland or Singapore, grew rapidly in the late twentieth century, some of the other star performers, 
e.g. Japan, Korea or China more recently, adopted explicitly hostile approaches towards inward FDI. 
13 Klaus E. Meyer and Evis Sinani, "When and Where Does Foreign Direct Investment Generate 
Positive Spillovers? A Meta-Analysis," Journal of International Business Studies 40(2009).For example, 
Hanson finds that the evidence for the existence of spillovers is ‘weak’. See Gordon H. Hanson, Should 
Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment? , ed. Group of Twenty-Four (New York: United Nations, 
2001). Blomstroem and Kokko find that spillovers are ‘not automatic.’ See Magnus Blomström and 
Ari Kokko, "Multinational Corporations and Spillovers," Journal of Economic Surveys 12, no. 3 (1998). 
Goerg and Greenaway even find net effects to often be negative. See Holger Goerg and David 
Greenaway, "Much Ado About Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit from Foreign Direct 
Investment?," The World Bank Research Observer 19, no. 2 (2004). Finally, Javorcik (2009) finds that they 
are absent horizontally, but present vertically. Beata Smarzynska Javorcik, "Does Foreign Direct 
Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers through Backward 
Linkages," American Economic Review 94, no. 3 (2004). 
14 Such as the ‘policy environment’, human capital or local financial markets. See V. 
Balasubramanyam, M. Salisu, and David Sapsford, "Foreign Direct Investment and Growth in Ep and 
Is Countries," The Economic Journal 106, no. 434 (1996); Borenzstein, De Gregorio, and Lee, "How Does 
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Generally, the empirical findings are somewhat more encouraging for advanced 
than for emerging and developing economies. Nonetheless, given the ambiguity of 
these findings and the absence of a clear change in trend over time, it seems rather 
unlikely that progress in economic knowledge played a major role in the unfolding 
of the observed events. 
A second potential explanation, which is prominent in the international business 
literature, refers to potential structural transformations in the nature of FDI inflows. 
This aspect has at least three distinct relevant dimensions. Firstly, global FDI flows 
became increasingly diversified in terms of their geographic origins between the 1960s-
70s and the 1990s-2000s. While US MNCs accounted for the bulk of FDI flows going 
to other advanced economies in the immediate post-war era, European as well as 
Japanese MNCs started to play an increasingly important role from the 1970s 
onwards. In developing economies, patterns of FDI inflows had historically been 
strongly associated to their colonial past, with large amounts of FDI typically coming 
from companies of the former metropolis. From the mid-1970s onwards these links 
became gradually less obvious as companies from across the developed world 
increasingly expanded their activities around the world, thereby possibly diluting 
interpretations of FDI inflows as incorporations of patterns of economic imperialism. 
A second dimension consists of the gradual changes in the sectoral composition of FDI 
inflows. While the political implications of the gradual shift from manufacturing to 
services FDI in advanced economies are less obvious, the decline in importance of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Foreign Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth; Laura Alfaro et al., "Fdi and Economic Growth: 
The Role of Local Financial Markets," ibid.64, no. 1 (2004); "Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote 
Growth? Exploring the Role of Financial Markets on Linkages," Journal of Development Economics 91, 
no. 2 (2010). 
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FDI in natural resources industries and the relative rise of manufacturing FDI in the 
developing world might plausibly have played a role15. Most importantly, the 
dynamics of manufacturing FDI are less likely to be perceived as ‘exploitative’ than 
investments by MNCs targeting the excavation of commodities. Finally, a third 
dimension, relatively more important for advanced economies, refers to perceived 
changes in the quality of economic activities associated with FDI inflows. Many 
scholars have argued that the organization of MNCs has changed fundamentally in 
the late twentieth century as they gradually transformed from centralized 
hierarchical command-and-control organizations into increasingly flexible and de-
centralized knowledge-seeking networks16. As a result of these transformations, 
some of these scholars argue, MNCs that used to keep decision-making and R&D 
activities at the enterprise’s centre in their home economy and only assigned lower-
value adding activities to their subsidiaries abroad, now turned to delegating 
increasingly higher-value adding activities to their foreign affiliates. The existing 
research that assesses these questions empirically suggests that there is some truth to 
these claims, but that these transformations are less significant than one may 
assume: on the one hand, MNCs were not as centralized in the 1960s-70s as it is often 
                                                          
15 See Andrew Walter and Gautam Sen, Analyzing the Global Political Economy  (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2009), 192. 
16 These developments are described particularly vividly in Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations: 
Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism  (New York: Vintage Books, 1992). 
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assumed17 and, on the other hand, they were rather more centralized in the 1990s-
2000s than the portrayal of MNCs as globally integrated units suggests18. 
Although trends towards a gradually increasing role of R&D activities as a share of 
total FDI flows seem to be real, these constitute relatively small and marginal 
changes rather than a radical break with the past. As a whole, these hypotheses 
about changes in the nature of FDI flows thus do seem to be useful to understand the 
easing of government attitudes towards FDI. In the context of advanced economies, 
especially the diversification of FDI inflows away from the USA and incremental 
increases in high-value-adding FDI may indeed have played a role in these political 
developments. However, although they might constitute reasons for governments to 
adopt a more favourable stance towards inward FDI, the nature of these evolutions –
which clearly refer to transformations in degree rather than in kind - seems to be far 
too moderate to explain the rather radical change in attitudes and policies. 
Closer to the literature in political economy, interest group politics and their 
potential lock-in in international institutions are a third potential explanation to 
consider. In the developing world, FDI inflows are generally believed to increase 
demand for labour while bringing more competition for domestic business and 
capital owners19. Accordingly, applying a class-based model of interest group 
                                                          
17 See John Cantwell, "The Globalisation of Technology: What Remains of the Product Cycle Model?," 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 19, no. 1 (1995). 
18 See Alan M. Rugman, The Regional Multinationals : Mnes and "Global" Strategic Management  
(Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Pankaj Ghemawat, World 3.0: Global 
Prosperity and How to Achieve It  (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2011). 
19 Pinto, Partisan Investment in the Global Economy: Why the Left Loves Foreign Direct Investment and Fdi 
Loves the Left; Pandya, Trading Spaces: Foreign Direct Investment Regulation, 1970-2000. 
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politics, it has been shown that, all else equal, left party governments20 and more 
democratic regimes21 in the developing world tend to impose relatively fewer 
restrictions on FDI inflows. The distributional consequences of FDI inflows in 
advanced economies are less clear22, however, and the argument of the political 
empowerment of labour groups in the late twentieth century as a cause of the 
liberalization of FDI policies seems chronologically less relevant in this context. 
Alternatively, an industry-based model of interest groups behaviour may provide a 
more compelling explanation. In particular, it seems plausible that the economic 
interests of key constituents in advanced democracies, especially those of home-
based MNCs and financial investors, have become increasingly internationalized 
during the late twentieth century23. Although such developments would seemingly 
relate more directly to the facilitation of outward rather than inward FDI, they may 
still have incentivized business groups and capital owners with international 
interests - for example, due to reciprocity concerns - to lobby domestic governments 
to push for the creation of a liberal international investment regime more generally. 
Furthermore, there is fairly clear evidence that international institutions dominated 
                                                          
20 Pinto, Partisan Investment in the Global Economy: Why the Left Loves Foreign Direct Investment and Fdi 
Loves the Left. 
21 Pandya, "Democratization and Foreign Direct Investment Liberalization, 1970–2000." 
22 Although MNCs of course do create jobs in their affiliates in advanced economies, FDI to advanced 
economies is typically more technology-intensive (compared to the labour-intensive FDI in 
developing countries) and MNCs tend to have a higher import-propensity than local firms (which can 
lead to job losses in supplier industries); therefore the net effect of FDI on employment in the OECD 
context is unclear. Similarly, the effect of more FDI for domestic capital and business owners in 
advanced economies is also ambiguous: Advanced economies are typically part of globally integrated 
capital markets and, moreover, MNC affiliates in developed economies frequently raise capital 
locally. As a result, the net effect of more FDI on the domestic availability of capital is not clear. The 
effect of more FDI for business owners is industry-specific; although FDI may crowd out direct local 
competitors, it can also generate opportunities for local firms in supplier industries (e.g. professional 
services). 
23 See Jeffry Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of 
Global Finance," International Oganization 45, no. 4 (1991). 
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by the governments of large advanced economies indeed did play an important role 
in the global process of liberalization24. Yet, although such interest group dynamics 
may certainly have played a role, they seem insufficient to explain the shift in FDI 
policy on their own. On the one hand, the actual importance of business group 
lobbying in these processes is not clear. In fact, the most detailed study to date in 
these regards, finding hardly any evidence that business groups actively sought to 
influence EU or national-level policymakers on issues of international investment 
policy, summarized the role of business groups as “uninformed, unorganized and 
uninterested”25. This strongly suggests that policymakers’ preference for a liberal 
investment regime stems at least partly from other - including ideational - sources 
rather than pure interest group lobbying. On the other hand, although international 
institutions certainly did play a role in pushing national governments to remove 
restrictions on FDI inflows26, there is no evidence – at least in the OECD context27 -
that they coerced nation-sates to actively attract and promote inward investments. 
Finally, a prominent explanation for the liberalization of FDI policies emerging from 
the International Relations literature revolves around dynamics of international 
                                                          
24 In the world of advanced economies, the European Commission (EC), the OECD as well 
preferential trade agreements such as NAFTA played crucial roles in these regards. At the same time, 
the World Bank, IMF as well as the signing of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) fulfilled a similar 
function in the developing world. 
25 See Johann Robert Basedow, "The European Union's International Investment Policy: Explaining 
Intensifying Member State Cooperation in International Investment Regulation" (The London School 
of Economics, 2014), 20-21. For similar evidence in trade policy, see Cornelia Woll, Firm Interests: How 
Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). 
26 See Beth A. Simmons, "Bargaining over Bits, Arbitrating Awards: The Regime for Protection and 
Promotion of International Investment," World Politics 66, no. 1 (2014). 
27 In the developing world, the World Bank and various NGOs have encouraged countries to create 
IPAs and have frequently supported such initiatives financially. Yet, such ‘carrots’ were largely 
absent in advanced economies.  
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competition for scarce capital28. The main argument of these studies is that in a 
world with an increasingly transnationally integrated capital market, national 
governments frequently have no other option than to offer ever more attractive 
conditions for capital owners to restrain capital from moving elsewhere. The 
empirical evidence that such dynamics matter is fairly strong. There is some 
qualitative evidence that policymakers carefully observe the policies peer countries 
adopt29 and at least two sophisticated statistical analyses30 have shown that the 
likelihood that a government signs a BIT or DTT with a third country increases when 
countries with a similar economic profile do so. The competition for capital 
hypothesis thus provides an important and highly plausible explanation for the 
‘bidding wars’-dynamics observed in the diffusion of FDI-attraction policies in the 
1990s and 2000s31. But it is less able to explain the timing of these dynamics. 
Crucially, the competition for capital hypothesis alone seemingly struggles to 
explain why these dynamics only became salient in the 1990s and 2000s and not 
before32. An important reason for this pattern, the present investigation suggests, 
                                                          
28 See Susan Strange, John Stopford, and John S. Henley, Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World 
Market Shares, ed. Steve Smith, Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 18 (Cambridge, UK 
1991); Charles Oman, Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Competition among 
Governments to Attract Fdi, ed. Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD) (Paris: OECD, 2000); Simmons, Guzman, and Elkins, "Competing for 
Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000; Fabian Barthel and Eric Neumayer, 
"Competing for Scarce Foreign Capital: Spatial Dependence in the Diffusion of Double Taxation 
Treaties," International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 4 (2012). 
29 For example, Strange, Stopford, and Henley, Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market 
Shares; Oman, Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Competition among 
Governments to Attract Fdi. 
30 Simmons, Guzman, and Elkins, "Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 1960-2000; Barthel and Neumayer, "Competing for Scarce Foreign Capital: Spatial 
Dependence in the Diffusion of Double Taxation Treaties." 
31 See Kenneth P. Thomas, Competing for Capital  (Washington C.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2000); Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital  (London: Palgrave, 2010). 
32 At least theoretically, a reduction in the supply of capital could provide a structural explanation for 
the timing of the emergence of the CfC. In practice, however, the emergence of the ‘race for FDI’ 
coincides with a period during which global capital markets were in rapid expansion, and access to 
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may be that governments in the 1960s-70s were generally not very interested to 
attract foreign capital, which they considered primarily as a problem rather than an 
opportunity for national economic policy. In other words, I argue that for these 
competition dynamics to play out, foreign capital had to be defined as a desirable 
object in the first place. 
As a whole, existing explanations focusing on structural transformations in the 
nature of FDI and the internationalization of economic interests of politically 
powerful groups thus provide several hypotheses that are useful to understand why 
governments have gradually removed restrictions on capital inflows, but they 
appear insufficient to make sense of the profundity of the observed transformations 
in attitudes and policy. I thus argue – and aim to demonstrate in the remainder of 
this thesis - that to fully grasp this key evolution at the heart of the global political 
economy, we need to consider not only the changes in the nature of FDI and the 
preferences towards them, but also the deeper and more radical changes in the 
perceptions of inward FDI, which changed the ways in which these preferences were 
constructed. 
 
Overview of the thesis 
The thesis is structured into four parts. The first part in Chapter 1 elaborates the 
argument theoretically and situates it within broader debates in IPE and the social 
sciences. The chapter elaborates my key contention that in order to understand and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
capital, for advanced as well as developing economies, was in principle more readily available than in 
previous decades. 
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make sense of the dramatic transformations in the predominant perceptions and 
interpretations of the economic meaning of FDI inflows, it is necessary to 
conceptualize inward FDI not simply as an objective material reality, but as a 
phenomenon that is deeply embedded in the social world. In particular, I focus on 
the important role of economic narratives as widely used intersubjectively constructed 
cognitive devices that simplify the complexity of economic systems in specific ways 
in order to enable individuals to interpret the economy and make sense of their role 
within it. I argue that they are important units of analysis for social scientists because 
they are not merely reflections of economic realities, but stories that make sense of it 
in a particular way and, by doing so, affect how individuals construct their economic 
interests. After reflecting upon the social mechanisms that lead to the emergence of 
new narratives, and the diffuse social processes through which they are constructed, 
spread and adopted, the second half of the theoretical chapter focuses on the content 
of the specific narratives that are at the focus of attention in the remainder of the 
thesis. Against the background of dominant scholarship in ideational political 
economy, much of which centres on a perceived ‘shift’ in economic thinking from 
Keynesianism to monetarism in the early 1980s, I argue for a more nuanced 
understanding of the evolution of predominant economic narratives in the post-war 
era and identify three stages in their development, which I deem to be particularly 
relevant to understand the empirical phenomenon under investigation: the ‘statist’ 
period of the 1960s-70s; the ‘neoliberal’ period in the 1980s; and the period of 
‘globalization’ in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
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The remainder of the thesis is empirical and focuses on assessing how this evolution 
in narratives affected predominant social representations of inward FDI and, 
ultimately, policy outcomes. To do so, the investigation applies a mixed-methods 
research design that combines quantitative methods with the insights gained from 
qualitative historical analysis. The empirical investigation consists of three 
components. The first empirical element illustrates how this evolution in economic 
narratives affected the social understanding and interpretation of FDI inflows 
(Chapters 2 and 3). The second element performs two quantitative tests to assess the 
effect of this ideational evolution on individual attitudes and voting behaviour at 
large-n cross-national samples (Chapters 4 and 5). The third element analyses these 
developments in more depth through a comparative case study of the UK and 
France (Chapter 6). 
Quantitative and qualitative methods each have distinct strengths and weaknesses33. 
Qualitative research is better able to take the complexities of observed social 
phenomena into account and it can typically draw from refined contextual 
knowledge in order to evaluate the operation of causal mechanisms; however, the 
external validity of qualitative findings is usually limited because the extent to 
which processes that are observed in one case are also present in other contexts can 
be difficult to assess (in short: the ‘too many variables, not enough cases’ problem). 
In contrast, quantitative research methods can be a powerful tool to evaluate the 
degrees of presence of specific dependent and independent variables of interest 
                                                          
33 See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry : Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Henry E. Brady and David 
Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry : Diverse Tools, Shared Standards  (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2004); Gary Goertz and James Mahoney, A Tale of Two Cultures : Qualitative and Quantitative Research in 
the Social Sciences  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
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across a large number of cases and they are well suited to adjudicate the strength 
and robustness of the relationship between these variables; instead, quantitative 
analyses frequently rely on proxy variables, findings are based on an analysis of 
patterns of degrees of joint presence or absence of causes and outcomes that 
generally gives little consideration to the causal mechanisms that connects the two, 
and they are less able to take deeper contextual dynamics into account (in short: the 
‘too many cases, not enough variables’ problem). A combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods per se does not necessarily solve either of these problems34. But it 
can at least increase the confidence in empirical findings through strategies of 
triangulation and cross-validation.  
The first part of the empirical research presented in Chapters 2 and 3 elaborates the 
evolution of the predominant social representation of inward FDI during the post-
war era by sketching the key developments in relevant discourses and policy efforts 
in the six major advanced economies. The aims of the section are to distil the key 
characteristics in these developments while crudely assessing the observed 
similarities and differences across a set of fairly diverse ‘mini-case-studies’. In 
particular, the analysis focuses on the United States, United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, Canada and Japan, which together account for a substantial share of total 
global FDI inflows. For the sake of conceptual clarity and in order to facilitate 
subsequent analyses, the chapters as a whole suggest differentiating between two 
contrasting ideal-typical epitomizations of predominant social representations of 
                                                          
34 For potential problems, see, for example, Ingo Rohlfing, "What You See and What You Get: Pitfalls 
and Principles of Nested Analysis in Comparative Research," Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 11 
(2008). 
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inward FDI. The ‘old’ image, predominant in the 1960s-70s (developed in Chapter 2), 
considered FDI inflows as potentially beneficial in the short-run, but harmful and 
anti-developmental in the long term. Although FDI inflows were considered as a 
valuable addition to a country’s balance of payments and a potential source for the 
transfer of technological and managerial know-how, they were primarily seen as a 
threat to the development of home-grown industrial sectors, which could risk 
undermining the long-term prosperity of a national economy. As the chapter 
develops in more detail, in the 1960s and early 1970s (the period of le défi américain) 
these views appeared to be particularly pronounced in France, Canada and Japan; in 
comparison, policymakers’ assessment of the effects of inward FDI appeared to be 
slightly more positive in the UK and Germany, but also the latter two uttered deep 
concerns and undertook serious efforts aimed at regulating FDI inflows. Not 
surprisingly perhaps, the USA - whose volumes of FDI outflows outstripped inflows 
by an order of magnitude at the time - was the only country among the six which 
refrained from undertaking any notable regulatory action. However, these patterns 
started being reversed in the aftermath of the oil-and-dollar double-shock of 1973 
when European and Japanese MNCs began expanding more aggressively abroad. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s (which may analogously be described as the period 
of le défi japonais), FDI inflows turned into an increasingly controversial political 
issue on Capitol Hill, while governments in the three major European economies as 
well as in Canada had started to adopt more positive approaches towards foreign 
multinationals. 
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In the 1980s, dominant perceptions of inward FDI visibly changed and more positive 
interpretations of their meaning and significance spread first in Europe and after the 
end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Japanese boom economy also in the USA 
and, with some delay, in Japan. By the early 1990s, concerns about the negative long-
term consequences of inward FDI seem to have largely evaporated. As the 
elaboration of the configuration of the ‘new’ social representation of inward FDI in 
Chapter 3 describes, the rise of the globalization narrative profoundly changed the 
way FDI inflows were seen as they came to be viewed primarily as an ‘opportunity’ 
or economic ‘solution’ rather than a ‘challenge’ or ‘problem’. Throughout the 1990s 
and early 2000s FDI inflows sky-rocketed to unprecedented levels in all six major 
economies in absolute as well as in relative terms, dwarfing the levels of foreign 
company ownership observed in previous decades. And yet, in sharp contrast to the 
political stirs inward FDI had caused in the 1960s-70s these dramatic developments, 
quite remarkably, barely received any political attention. Foreign ownership had 
become, it seems, by and large uncontroversial. Rather than as a sign of weakness of 
domestic industries, higher levels of foreign ownership even came to be interpreted 
as a sign of strength, as commentators described FDI inflows variedly as 
‘globalisation in its most potent form’, the ‘embodiment of a nation’s 
competitiveness’, global markets’ ‘seal of approval’ or simply a reason for ‘national 
pride’. Simultaneously, governmental FDI policy in all six major economies had 
decisively shifted its focus away from how to regulate or restrict inward FDI to how 
to attract and promote them. Politicians ‘boasted’ about increases in FDI inflows, 
and, tellingly, the most heated FDI policy debates now centred on how to avoid the 
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escalation of dynamics of inter-state competition for the attraction of FDI rather than 
disagreements about whether or how to regulate them. 
The second empirical part presents quantitative tests of two implications of this 
argument at large-n cross-national samples. The first test, presented in Chapter 4, 
examines the evolution of public opinion towards foreign companies through an 
analysis of the results of two waves of the International Social Survey Programme’s 
(ISSP) study of national identity. Building on earlier work in sociology and social 
psychology, which suggests that individuals’ political-economic core beliefs are 
formed primarily during early adulthood, I hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, 
respondents who passed their prime period of socialization in the 1990s and early 
2000s – that is, during a time-period when the globalization narrative was prominent 
– express more positive views of the role of inward FDI than older peers. Taking 
potential alternative age-related influences on individuals’ attitudes towards inward 
FDI into account and controlling for other determinants of individual attitudes 
towards FDI established in previous literature, the combination of a multi-level 
probit analysis with a method of graphical visualization reveals strong evidence in 
support of this hypothesis and further analyses corroborate the claim that the 
observed generational difference in FDI attitudes is more strongly driven by the 
hypothesized mechanism of socialization and narrative change rather than potential 
alternative mechanisms such as structural changes in the nature of FDI. 
Chapter 5 then shifts the focus on the political-electoral implications of this observed 
change in public sentiments towards inward FDI. In accordance with the observation 
that FDI inflows were a hotly debated political topic while the statist narrative was 
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prominent in the 1960s-80s, but then became largely politically uncontroversial with 
the rise of the globalization narrative in the early 1990s, I analyse the association 
between relative increases in FDI inflows and voter support for incumbent 
governments at general elections held before and after 1990, using the currently most 
extensive dataset of its kind provided by Jeffrey Chwieroth and Andrew Walter35. 
Across a range of different specifications, I consistently find that relative increases in 
FDI inflows were associated with a small but consistent drop in voter support for 
incumbent governments in elections held before 1990, but that this negative 
association largely disappeared in elections held in the 1990s and 2000s, as predicted 
by the theoretical argument. 
The final third component of the empirical research complements these statistical 
findings with a qualitative historical investigation of these dynamics in the United 
Kingdom (which serves as the ‘primary case’) and France (the contrasting ‘shadow 
case’). The aims of the comparative case study design are to empirically ‘ground’ the 
ideational dynamics at the heart of this investigation and, at the same time, to 
contrast their trajectory in two distinct cultural-institutional environments. A 
comparison of the developments in the UK and France appears as particularly 
promising because although the two countries find themselves in structurally similar 
positions in the global political economy, the relative embrace of the narratives of 
statism and globalization in national intellectual environments has been rather 
different (that is, in methodological terms, the two cases exhibit unmistakable 
variation on the independent variable): while French policymakers strongly 
                                                          
35 Jeffrey Chwieroth and Andrew Walter, "From Low to Great Expectations: Banking Crises and 
Partisan Survival over the Long Run," (2013). 
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embraced the statist narrative in words as well as actions in the 1960s-70s, their UK 
counterparts were more hesitant to adopt these interpretive frames. In contrast, in 
the 1990s and 2000s, when the globalization narrative had become highly salient at 
the transnational level, policy elites in the UK were among the most fervent 
advocates for the domestic adoption and implementation of the associated frames 
and policies, while the political discourse in France remained ambivalent. As a 
whole, by showing the very ‘real’ impact of the evolution of predominant economic 
narratives on policymakers’ actions in two rather different cultural-institutional 
economic environments, the case study illustrates the political power and 
importance of transnational economic narratives. Albeit starting at rather different 
points in terms of the pre-existing cultural-institutional environment, the salience of 
the statist narrative in the 1960s-70s as well as the rise to prominence of the 
globalization narrative in the 1990s had a visible impact in France (a country with a 
famously proud statist legacy) as well as in the UK (the birthplace of liberal 
economic thought). At the same time, however, the analysis also illustrates that 
transnational economic narratives are not directly imposed upon nation-states and 
that national cultural-institutional environments constitute an important mediating 
force in the translation of transnationally formulated principles into domestic 
policies; although these dynamics cannot be assessed in all its nuances within this 
thesis project, they point to promising avenues for future research. 
* 
As a whole, the research aims to show the value that the adoption of a broader 
theoretical perspective can add to our understanding of key dynamics in the global 
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political economy. Although there seems to be little disagreement about the 
importance of economic ideas among practitioners, a significant part of political 
economy research stubbornly chooses to ignore such issues. By no means do I intend 
to suggest that economic ideas always matter or that they are ‘more important’ than 
interests. But, as I hope this thesis demonstrates, they can play a crucial role in 
defining those interests and the mere analytical acknowledgement of their existence 
may ultimately contribute to a richer, more nuanced and probably more realistic 
understanding of what actors in the global political economy want and why they 
want what they want. 
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PART I. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Chapter 1 . HOW WE SEE WHAT WE SEE: ECONOMIC NARRATIVES AS 
REFLECTIONS AND DRIVERS OF CHANGE 
“Globalization is not just a phenomenon. It is also a story.”  
Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan1 
 
”The basis of competitive strategies is always and necessarily an ‘imagined’ economy. 
For the real economy is so unstructured and complex in its operation that it cannot be 
an object of management, governance or guidance.” 
Bob Jessop2 
 
Sitting in a café at a major port anywhere in the world, we can readily observe the 
international flow of goods. And the services provided by multinational 
corporations such as Starbucks or McDonalds can be touched, bought and tasted in 
towns and cities around the globe. In this sense, the world economy is a system that 
is of course very ‘real’ in a materialist sense of the word. Yet, at the same time, it is 
also an abstraction. Although we find ourselves continuously observing, buying, 
touching and tasting components of the world economy, we cannot actually see ‘the 
world economy’ as such. Based on our everyday shopping experiences, it seems safe 
to infer that a thing like the ‘world economy’ exists. But it is not possible to have a 
look at the entirety of actors, relationships and processes that constitute it, let alone 
                                                          
1 Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan, The Imagined Economies of Globalization  (London: SAGE 
Publications Ltd, 2004), 3. 
2 Bob Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State, Capitalist State (Malden, MA: Polity, 2003), 119-20. 
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understand the actual operation of the system in all its complexities. And yet, 
despite this rather obvious epistemological truth3, we still need to have some form of 
understanding - a working knowledge at least - of the unintelligibly complex 
processes that surround us, in order to talk about them, to situate ourselves in the 
world and to define our interests and preferences. 
Just as scientists develop models that simplify the complex realities that they study 
in order to make them intelligible, so do we need stories – which may be 
conceptualized as more ‘popular’ versions of the scientists’ models for the purposes 
of this thesis - that help us make sense of our everyday economic experiences and 
interactions. This is the primary function that economic narratives fulfil: they provide 
a deliberately simplifying account of the socio-economic macro-structure that 
surrounds us in order to allow us making (some) sense of our position and activity 
within this highly complex system. But, as such, economic narratives are not just 
‘innocent’ reflections of reality. Even in cases that they do not willingly misconstrue 
economic reality, they necessarily emphasize certain aspects of economic 
phenomena and downplay others. What they emphasize and what they downplay, 
in turn, is consequential because it can shape how individuals who use them as 
interpretive frameworks perceive economic realities, what they consider as 
‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ and how they define their interests. Ultimately, if the 
adoption of a narrative encourages individuals to behave according to the script that 
it provides, narratives can even turn out to be self-fulfilling to some extent4. 
                                                          
3 Echoing the ‘allegory of the cave’ formulated by Plato over two thousand years ago. 
4 On self-fulfilling prophecies in economics see Robert K. Merton, "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy," The 
Antioch Review 8, no. 2 (1948); Michel Callon, "What Does It Mean to Say That Economics Is 
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This thesis examines such dynamics with regards to inward FDI. While a significant 
existing literature in IPE has analysed how the pursuit of political interests affect 
governments’ FDI policies, the materialist ontology underlying much of this 
literature has meant that it has so far neglected the crucial question of how these 
interests are constructed. To start filling this gap, this thesis investigates the key 
evolutions in narratives about the world economy predominant in advanced 
industrial economies during the post-war period, and how these ideational 
transformations affected individuals’ perception of inward FDI and the definition of 
their interests towards them. The remainder of this chapter, which aims to introduce 
and discuss the principal theoretical concepts underlying the subsequent empirical 
investigation, is organized in three parts. The first part situates the theoretical 
argument within the broader IPE literature through a brief discussion of the basic 
agreements and points of contention of rationalist and constructivist approaches. 
The second part then develops the theoretical argument in more depth through the 
theorization of some of the social mechanisms driving the emergence, formulation, 
spread and adoption of economic narratives. The third part extends this discussion 
empirically through a synthesis of the key evolutions in the economic narratives that 
are the driving force behind the empirical story to be unfolded in subsequent 
chapters: the transformations in predominant economic understandings from a 
narrative of economic sovereignty to free-marketism and, finally, globalization. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Performative?," IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc (2006); Donald A. MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a 
Camera : How Financial Models Shape Markets  (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006); Donald A. 
MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa, and Lucia Siu, Do Economists Make Markets? : On the Performativity of 
Economics  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
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MATERIALIST AND SOCIAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 
The contemporaneous emergence of debates about the internationalization and 
increasing interdependence of the world economy and the discipline of IPE in the 
1970s is no coincidence. ‘Globalization’ is the phenomenon at the very heart of the 
development of IPE as a scholarly discipline5. In this sense, the core questions that 
this thesis addresses lie right at the heart of IPE’s substantive field of research. But at 
the same time, it treats the phenomenon of globalization from an ontological angle 
that is quite different from the approach that is preferred in a substantial part of the 
existing literature.  
Dominant approaches in IPE – alternatively described as ‘Open Economy Politics’6 
(OEP) by David Lake or the ‘American School’ by Benjamin Cohen7 - treat 
globalization as a material structural phenomenon, more precisely formulated by Jeff 
Frieden and Ron Rogowski as the “exogenous easing of international exchange”8. 
Accordingly - as reviewed in the introduction to this thesis - mainstream studies of 
IPE treat FDI inflows, in many ways the epitome of globalization, as a physical 
capital inflow with consequences that are self-evident to individual agents. The 
                                                          
5 David Lake’s influential writing on the discipline of IPE defines IPE as the field of enquiry which 
investigates essentially two questions: when and why countries allow globalization and how, in turn, 
globalization affects domestic politics. See David Lake, "Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review," 
Rev Int Organ 4, no. 3 (2009): 221. See also Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, Internationalization 
and Domestic Politics, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
6 Lake, "Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review." 
7 Benjaminj Cohen, "The Transatlantic Divide: Why Are American and British Ipe So Different?," 
Review of International Political Economy 14, no. 2 (2007). 
8 Jeffry A. Frieden and Ronald Rogowski, "The Impact of the International Economy on National 
Policies: An Analytical Overview," in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. Robert O. Keohane 
and Helen V. Milner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 25.  
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preferences of the latter towards more or less inward FDI are characterized as being 
determined by individuals’ interests, which are in turn understood as deriving from 
their objective position within the material economic structure9. 
The adoption of the materialist ontology that underlies these investigations is a 
theoretical choice that has analytical benefits, but also costs. It represents, essentially, 
a choice to focus on certain aspects of the world while bracketing out others in order 
to investigate the relationships among a few variables while treating most of the 
complexities of the real world as residuals. In other words, it is a choice to look at the 
world through lenses that filter the material factors in our surroundings, thereby 
enlightening one specific dimension of social reality, but excluding other factors that 
contemporaneously affect the social processes under investigation. Although such a 
research strategy can generate significant analytical pay-offs, its deliberate 
reductionism also means that it willingly excludes other social forces from its 
framework of analysis. The aim of this thesis thus is to look at the phenomenon of 
inward FDI through a different pair of lenses, which emphasize the social dimension 
of reality instead10. As such, it adopts a theoretical approach that is closely 
associated with perspectives that have come to be known as constructivist in the 
                                                          
9 David Lake describes the general approach as follows: “OEP begins with individuals, sectors, or 
factors of production as the unit of analysis and derives their interests over economic policy from 
each unit’s position within the international economy. (…) That both the relevant political actors and 
their interests are defined by their production profile or position in the international economy is the 
‘hard core’ of the … paradigm.” Lake, "Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review," 225-27. 
10 I do, however, attempt to also acknowledge the important role of material factors. Unfortunately, 
many debates in IR and political science depict the relationship between ideas and interests, 
rationalist and constructivist approaches as mutually opposed. In contrast, this research 
conceptualizes them as being in a mutually constitutive relationship. As any moment of self-reflection 
about one’s own individual behaviour almost certainly would reveal, our actions are continuously 
driven by both interests and ideas. In this sense, the interesting questions refer to how they interact 
and how they complement each other rather than somewhat sterile questions about which one is 
more important. 
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International Relations literature. The key tenets of this research tradition are briefly 
summarized in the following paragraphs. 
 
Rationalism and Constructivism 
Sociological perspectives have traditionally played an important role in European 
International Relations Theory11. In particular the writings of so-called ‘English 
School’ and ‘French School’ international theorists such as Martin Wight, Hedley 
Bull or Stanley Hoffmann show a strong interest in how shared world-views and 
intersubjective beliefs are shaping the constellation of the inter-state system12. 
American International Relations Theory, in contrast, from its early days adopted an 
explicitly materialist ontology and was more strongly influenced by economic rather 
than sociological theory. Although the work of the ‘Stanford School’ led by John 
Meyer as well as the writings by John Ruggie, Friedrich Kratochwil, Nicholas Onuf 
and many others made significant contributions to the creation of the research 
tradition nowadays known as ‘constructivism’13, dominant scholarship in the US in 
the 1970s and 1980s firmly centred on the debates between liberalism, realism and 
Marxism. 
                                                          
11 See Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "'International Organization' 
and the Study of World Politics," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998). 
12 Martin Wight, Power Politics  (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946); Hedley Bull, 
The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics  (London: Macmillan, 1977); Stanley 
Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics  (New York: 
Praeger, 1965). 
13 John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in 
the Postwar Economic Order," International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982); John W.  Meyer and Brian 
Rowan, "Insititutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," American Journal 
of Sociology 83, no. 2 (1977); Friedrich Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An 
Inquiry into the Formation of the State System," World Politics 39, no. 1 (1986); Nicholas Greenwood 
Onuf, World of Our Making : Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations  (Columbia, S.C.: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1989). 
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The profound changes in the international system in the late 1980s and the difficulty 
of dominant approaches to explain these developments – a recurrent topic in this 
thesis that we will encounter again in other disguises -, however, opened a space for 
the emergence of a different type of international theorizing, which gives greater 
analytic attention to the role of ideas and common knowledge in world politics. 
Particularly influential in this regard was the work by scholars such as Martha 
Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink, Peter Katzenstein and Alexander Wendt that led the 
groundwork for so-called constructivist IR theory in the US academy14. 
As Emanuel Adler argued in an influential article15, constructivist IR theory 
represents a ‘middle ground’ in IR theory in the sense that it shares some of the 
ontological preferences of interpretivist and critical social theoretical approaches, but 
remains much closer to rationalist mainstream theories in terms of its interest in 
explanation and questions of causality. Despite this relative proximity, rationalist 
and constructivist approaches to world politics, however, differ markedly in their 
conceptualization of interests, as well as the importance that they assign to structural 
and agentic factors as drivers of policy change. The following two paragraphs 
elaborate these points of contention in some more detail. Finally, the third paragraph 
very briefly addresses questions about the (in)compatibility of a social ontology with 
a positivist epistemology. 
                                                          
14 Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security : Norms and Identity in World Politics  (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996); Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, Cornell 
Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996); Alexander Wendt, 
Social Theory of International Politics  (Cambridge University Press, 1999); Margaret E. Keck and 
Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
15 Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of 
International Relations 3(1997). 
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Interests and ideas. Individual interests are the principal building blocks of 
rationalist approaches, which essentially investigate the outcomes of strategic 
interactions among individuals pursuing their self-interest under specific 
institutional constraints. Despite their centrality in these frameworks, rationalist IR 
theory, however, typically does not problematize the origins or content of 
individuals’ interests; instead, they are taken as exogenously given and as something 
that can be derived from an individual’s position within the material structure. 
Although the majority of constructivist theories – or at least the ones that are being 
followed here -  do not question the existence or importance of individual interests, 
they do contest the assumption that they are exogenously given. Rather than to 
deduct or impute actors’ preferences, constructivist approaches suggest to investigate 
their construction by analysing the intersubjective origins of interests, such as shared 
beliefs that assign meaning to certain ‘things’. In Mark Blyth’s famous formulation, 
“structures do not come with an instruction sheet”16; that is, individuals do not 
necessarily know their exact position in the material structure nor is it always 
obvious to them how certain complex changes in the material environment could 
possibly affect their self-interest. To define their interests, individuals have to 
interpret their surroundings. And to do so, to assign meaning to material things, they 
rely on cognitive frames, which, in turn, are social structures that are constructed and 
shared intersubjectively. 
Structure and agency. The nature of the relationships between structure and agency 
represents a longstanding debate in social theory. Although materialist or 
                                                          
16 Mark Blyth, "Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas, and Progress in 
Political Science," Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 4 (2003). 
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ideationalist ontologies are not in principle tied to privileging one or the other17, 
rationalist explanatory frameworks have generally focused more on agency, while 
constructivist approaches, at least initially, emphasized structural elements. 
Although structure and agency both play a role in constructivist as well as rationalist 
approaches, the relationship among the two is conceptualized rather differently. 
While rationalist approaches generally understand the material structure as an 
external constraint, constructivists conceptualize the relationship between actors and 
structures as mutually constitutive. The OEP framework, for example, generally does 
not problematize the structural element in their theories18: structure is understood as 
the pre-existing material environment within which agents interact, but upon which 
the latter have no influence. It is taken as an exogenous fact. Early constructivist 
theories – and most explicitly Alexander Wendt in his seminal challenge to realist IR 
theory19 – forcefully identified the shortcomings of these assumptions, arguing 
instead that the structure within which actors act is not just ‘given’, but partly 
constructed by them. They highlighted the fact that structural elements by 
themselves have no obvious meaning that is attached to them and that the way in 
which structural elements affect the behaviour of individuals always depends on 
how agents interpret them.  
                                                          
17 For example, Marxism and structural dependency theory offer structural but materialist 
explanation of world politics while some constructivist approaches emphasize agency. Cf. Jeffrey M. 
Chwieroth and Timothy J. Sinclair, "How You Stand Depends on How We See: International Capital 
Mobility as Social Fact," Review of International Political Economy (2013): 461. 
18 And typically chooses to ignore macro-processes. See the critique by Thomas Oatley, "The 
Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy," International Organization 65, 
no. 2 (2011). 
19 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 
ibid.46(1992). 
 43 
 
Due to their strong interest in the intersubjectivity of socially constructed structural 
forces, early constructivist approaches emphasized the constraining force of 
structures and downplayed the role of agents20. ‘Second-generation’ constructivist IR 
theory - although agreeing on the power of ideational factors and the logic of 
appropriateness in world politics - has challenged this emphasis and criticized these 
approaches for conveying a too passive image of the role of agents in processes of 
ideational change21. Although this vein of scholarship has persuasively shown how 
ideational entrepreneurs can strategically use social constructions to build political 
coalitions, it has been criticized for its apparent inability to explain where 
entrepreneurs’ ideas come from and why audiences would buy their ideational 
‘products’22. Trying to avoid either of the pitfalls, this thesis adopts an 
understanding of the relationships between structures and agents that Hun Joon 
Kim and Jason Sharman describe as the ‘middle-of-the-road’ version of 
constructivism and which “begins with structure and then incorporates agency”23. 
Ontology and Epistemology. While rationalist approaches strongly and almost 
uniformly embrace the principles of positivism, ideational scholars are more divided 
on the question. In particular, proponents of critical and postmodern approaches to 
IR theory privilege interpretivist research methods, arguing that a social ontology is 
                                                          
20 Meyer and Rowan, "Insititutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony; 
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 
21 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders; Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and 
Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Vivien A. 
Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse," Annual Review 
of Political Science 11, no. 1 (2008); Nicolas Jabko, Playing the Market : A Political Strategy for Uniting 
Europe, 1985-2005  (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
22 Hun Joon Kim and Jason C. Sharman, "Accounts and Accountability: Corruption, Human Rights, 
and Individual Accountability Norms," International Oganization 68, no. 2 (2014): 425. 
23 Ibid. 
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irreconcilable with a positivist epistemology. In contrast, adopting the view of 
scientific realism, more conventional versions of constructivism explicitly address 
questions of causality, investigate causal mechanisms and self-consciously adopt 
positivist research methodologies to test their hypotheses24. Although I do 
acknowledge the meta-theoretical tensions that the combination of a social ontology 
with a positivist epistemology can give rise to, this thesis follows the latter tradition. 
It thus takes a pragmatist and problem-driven approach that privileges scientific 
accumulation over meta-theoretical harmony, as suggested by the proponents of 
analytic eclecticism25. 
 
Having situated some of the theoretical key aspects of the research traditions that 
this thesis builds on, the next section of this chapter focuses on developing in more 
depth the central theoretical concepts that underlie the empirical argument that 
follows. 
 
ECONOMIC NARRATIVES AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS: THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF COMMON SENSE 
The theoretical concept at the centre of the argument of this thesis are economic 
narratives, which are understood as intersubjectively shared interpretive frames of 
                                                          
24 See Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, "'International 
Organization' and the Study of World Politics," 675; Henry Farrell and Martha Finnemore, "Ontology, 
Methodology, and Causation in the American School of International Political Economy," Review of 
International Political Economy 16, no. 1 (2009). 
25 Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, Beyond Pardigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics  
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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reference26 that individuals use to make sense of the economic relationships and 
events that surround them27. As such, they are a relational concept that mediates 
structure and agency, allowing individuals to “(re)construct visions of the world that 
allow them to (re)situate themselves in the world”28. In other words, they are 
socially constructed and socially shared stories that provide plausible and 
commonsensical accounts of how the economy works. To do so, they typically define 
a set of desirable outcomes (ends) and hypothesize patterns of cause and effect that 
are suggestive of how to achieve these outcomes (means). In an iterative process 
described as objectification, these narratives give rise to specific social representations - 
“collective elaborations” defining the key characteristics of the social objects at the 
centre of the narrative’s plot -, which are then re-inserted or anchored back into the 
narrative29. Economic narratives thus refer to the broader stories – such as the 
narratives of economic statism, free-marketism or globalization outlined below30 – 
and social representations to the more specific objects within these stories – such as 
‘FDI’ or ‘multinational companies’. Analytically, economic narratives (and social 
                                                          
26 See Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis : An Essay on the Organization of Experience  (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1974). 
27 For alternative conceptualizations of the term narratives in international relations, see Hidemi 
Suganami, "Agents, Structures, Narratives," European journal of international relations 5, no. 3 (1999); 
Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse, "'This Is My Eutopia...': Narrative as Power," Journal of 
Common Market Studies 40, no. 4 (2002); Ronald R. Krebs, Narrative and the Making of Us National 
Security, Narrative and the Making of United States National Security (Cambridge University Press, 
2015). 
28 Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse," 306. 
29 Serge Moscovici, La Psychanalyse, Son Image Et Son Public, 2nd ed. (Paris: Presses universitaires de 
France, 1976). 
30 The remainder of this thesis focuses on predominant economic narratives. It is worth emphasizing 
that economic narratives are never hegemonic and that almost always different types of narratives - 
very frequently mutually contradicting ones - co-exist. By stating that a narrative of ‘economic 
sovereignty’ was predominant in the 1960s, I thus by no means imply that no other narratives - 
including narratives that strongly contradict the core principles of what I identify as the narrative of 
‘economic sovereignty’ - existed in the 1960s. But I claim that during that specific time-period the 
narrative of ‘economic sovereignty’ was on average more widespread in a specific place than 
alternative versions. 
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representations) are important units of analysis because they are not simply ‘neutral’ 
or ‘objective’ reflections of economic reality, but inherently biased “discursive 
simplifications”31 of the latter, which affect how individuals perceive their roles and 
interests within the economic system and, as a result, how they behave. 
The following two sections will clarify the concept of economic narratives by 
delineating its principal traits in comparison to other related theoretical concepts and 
reflect on the audience of the type of economic narratives that are investigated here. 
Subsequently, the chapter will turn to discuss the social mechanisms driving the 
creation and dissemination of new economic narratives. 
 
Economic narratives and related concepts 
This thesis focuses in particular on those narratives that describe, make sense and 
thereby construct seemingly ‘natural’ and taken for granted accounts of the 
relationships between states and markets and national economies and the world 
economy. As such, my conceptualization of economic narratives is similar to other 
theoretical constructs such as economic ‘ideas’32, ‘paradigms’33, or ‘discourses’34. Yet, 
at the same time, it emphasizes some subtle differences to these alternative concepts. 
The term narratives is somewhat more specific than ideas. Although most if not all 
narratives could also classify as ideas, the reverse is not necessarily true. The 
                                                          
31 Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State. 
32 Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century. 
33 Peter A. Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations  (Princeton University 
Press, 1989); "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in 
Britain," Comparative Politics 25, no. 3 (1993). 
34 Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse." 
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conceptualization of narratives that is used here refers specifically to those ideas that 
provide a more or less coherent and ‘popular’ story about the relationships between 
states and markets at the national and global scale. It refers to the type of ideas that 
provide an accessible account of world economic macro processes rather than more 
specific economic ideas (such as, for example, the introduction of a ‘Tobin tax’ or the 
distribution of ‘helicopter money’, which are also economic ideas, but too specific to 
be narratives). The concept of narrative is also closely related to the notion of policy 
paradigms. Yet, the former are explicitly less ‘scientific’ than the latter. Deriving from 
Thomas Kuhn’s seminal work on the philosophy of science35, paradigms refer 
primarily to the interpretive frameworks that are predominant among epistemic 
communities of scientists. Applied to the field of economic policy, they thus aptly 
capture the notion of the cognitive frameworks that are predominant in the 
economics discipline at any particular moment in time, such as ‘Keynesianism’ in the 
1960s or ‘monetarism’ in the 1980s. Predominant economic narratives are typically 
closely related to such ideational evolutions among epistemic communities of 
academic economists, but they more aptly capture the reflection of the latter in more 
‘popular’ (as opposed to scientific) understandings of how the economy works. As 
such, the notion of narratives is also closely related to the concept of discourse, and in 
particular to a Schmidtien36 understanding of the latter. Yet, Vivien Schmidt’s 
conceptualization emphasizes in particular the interactive nature of discourses - the 
process of conveying ideas - and is thereby more closely aligned to agent-centred 
versions of constructivism. At the same time, the theoretical approach that is 
                                                          
35 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed., enl. ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1970). 
36 Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse." 
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preferred here is also different from Foucauldian approaches to International 
Relations in which discourse typically also plays a very prominent role, but in which 
it is used to refer to a distinct type of investigating ideational dynamics. 
 
The audience of economic narratives 
A great variety of narratives about a diversity of political topics constantly struggle 
for political attention. The narratives that are at the focus of attention here are those 
that shape the predominant understandings about the relationships between 
national economies and the world economy and the goals of national economic 
policy that derive from them. Rather obviously, not all narratives matter to everyone 
all the time. Most narratives speak to a certain audience. Who belongs to the audience 
and who doesn’t arguably depends primarily on a narrative’s substantive coverage. 
As such, the type of economic narratives that are at the focus of attention here are 
particularly relevant to individuals whose day-to-day activities focus on the analysis 
of international economic events, such as economic policymakers, financial analysts, 
journalists, international business leaders as well as some academics. Yet, although 
this type of social groups constitutes the primary audience of economic narratives 
that are examined here, they are by no means the exclusive one. Not only elites have 
a need for some sort of understanding of how the economy works. To some extent, 
everyone trying to make a living does. And unlike more scientific economic theories, 
the resonance of economic narratives among non-specialists is one of their key 
defining features. Trying to provide a corrective to the elite-centrism that is present 
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in much of the constructivist IPE research agenda37, the concept of economic 
narratives as it is used here thus refers to interpretive frameworks in which non-
specialists and non-elites are involved in the process of creation – an aspect that is 
elaborated in the next section - as well as being an important part of the audience 
that they are targeted at. 
 
The process of narrative creation and diffusion 
To better understand the role of economic narratives in international affairs, it is 
essential to theorize the social mechanisms through which new narratives emerge, 
how they are formulated, how they spread and if, when and how they are adopted 
by actors. These four stages in the process of diffusion of economic narratives will be 
discussed in this section. Figure 1.1 gives an overview of the key points of analysis38. 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 For a critique, see Leonard Seabrooke, "The Everyday Social Sources of Economic Crises: From 
"Great Frustrations" to "Great Revelations" in Interwar Britain," International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 4 
(2007); John M. Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke, Everyday Politics of the World Economy  (Cambridge, 
UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
38 The theoretical account I offer follows in many respects the seminal exposition of the ‘norm life 
cycle’ by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change," International Oganization 52, no. 4 (1998). But it differs from it in a number of respects: First, I 
offer an explanation that is more firmly embedded in structure and in which the space within which 
ideational entrepreneurs operate is more strictly delimited by structural features as well as cultural 
beliefs and preferences of non-elites. Rather than as ‘creators’ of issues (ibid., 897.), I understand the 
role of ideational entrepreneurs primarily as ‘responders’. Second, I understand processes of narrative 
diffusion as primarily a societal phenomenon driven by diffuse social interactions rather than 
exchanges between states under the purposeful leadership of state leaders and norm entrepreneurs. 
Third, I conceptualize narrative change as a process of layering rather than replacement. And, lastly, I 
aim to distinguish more clearly between processes of ‘socialization’ and ‘diffusion’ and the 
relationships among them. 
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Figure 1.1. The process of narrative diffusion: overview 
 
 
 
Two prior clarifications about the scope and ambition of this theoretical exercise 
merit mention. Firstly, cultural phenomena such as the rise and diffusion of 
economic narratives are processes in which multiple and diffuse mechanisms 
typically operate simultaneously39. Although I do attempt to describe the 
hypothetical social mechanisms at work as clearly as possible in the paragraphs that 
follow, it is important to acknowledge this complexity and to avoid temptations to 
be either over-specific in the identification of these mechanisms or over-ambitious in 
efforts to disentangle them from each other empirically. Secondly, the political 
function of economic narratives is not analogous to the function of actors’ interests. 
Although I do interpret transformations in economic narratives as events that can 
have a causal impact on policy outcomes, they are not deterministic forces. Their 
importance as causal factors derives primarily from their role as intermediary 
                                                          
39 Cf. Evan Schofer et al., "Sociological Institutionalism and World Society," in The Wiley-Blackwell 
Companion to Political Sociology, ed. Edwin Amenta, Kate Nash, and Alan Scott (Chichester, UK; 
Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 65. 
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variables (they are in this sense more similar to institutions): they do not directly 
determine outcomes, but they play an important role in channelling political action 
by helping individuals to construe their interests. 
 
How do economic narratives emerge? 
Attempting to explain the origins of norms and ideas, the constructivist literature 
differs in its emphasis of agency and structure. Agent-centred constructivist 
accounts highlight the centrality of ideational entrepreneurs in the process40. Yet, 
although these approaches are useful to explain the emergence of certain ideas in 
specific instances of political struggle, they are somewhat less satisfactory to explain 
the evolution of ideas and norms in a longer term macro-perspective, as structure-
oriented theorists have pointed out. In particular, the observation that rather 
frequently similar ideas and narratives seem to emerge from geographically as well 
as socially dispersed sources at roughly the same time seems to be difficult to 
reconcile with agent-focused explanations about the origins of norms and ideas41. 
To explain the long-term evolution of the economic narratives that are traced in this 
project, I adopt a framework of inhabited structures42 that borrows extensively from 
                                                          
40 See Chwieroth and Sinclair, "How You Stand Depends on How We See: International Capital 
Mobility as Social Fact." 
41 See Kim and Sharman, "Accounts and Accountability: Corruption, Human Rights, and Individual 
Accountability Norms." 
42 This expression is an adaptation of the conceptualization of ‘inhabited institutions’ by Tim Hallett 
and Marc Ventresca, "Inhabited Institutions: Social Interactions and Organizational Forms in 
Gouldner’s Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy," Theory and Society 35, no. 2 (2006). 
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Kim and Sharman’s ‘middle-of-the-road’ version of sociological institutionalism43. In 
essence, I pursue an approach in which structural evolutions are conceptualized as 
being temporally as well as ontologically prior to agency, while at the same time 
granting a somewhat greater role to ideational entrepreneurs (and their interactions 
with mass publics) than classical sociological institutionalist approaches. In other 
words, like Kim and Sharman44, I conceptualize structural changes as the forces that 
indicate the direction of ideational change and ideational agency and story-telling as 
defining the particular instantiations thereof. Structural changes thus play an 
important role as triggers of narrative shifts45 – in particular in cases in which they 
undermine key principles of previously predominant narratives, thereby generating 
a fertile ground for meaning-creation - as well as delimiters of the ideational space 
from which possible new narratives can be drawn from. In some sense, they thus 
indicate the timing and genre of new narratives, but not the specific plot thereof. 
 
Formulation of narratives 
The specific plot of new narratives is constructed in an interactive process of 
theorization46 led by ideational entrepreneurs. The term ideational entrepreneurs refers 
                                                          
43 Kim and Sharman, "Accounts and Accountability: Corruption, Human Rights, and Individual 
Accountability Norms." 
44 Ibid. 
45 An important implication of this intimate relationship between structural changes and economic 
narratives is that the appeal of economic narratives to the wider public is more strongly shaped by 
their ability to make sense of change rather than their ability to understand or explain continuity and 
stability. Conceivably, this may lead to a more general and systematic bias in the shape of 
predominant economic narratives towards accounts that neglect continuity and exaggerate the 
perceived degree of change. 
46 Understood as the “development and specification of abstract categories and the formulation of 
patterned relationships such as chains of cause and effect”. Kim and Sharman, "Accounts and 
Accountability: Corruption, Human Rights, and Individual Accountability Norms," 430. 
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here to a vaguely discernible group of people who actively contribute to the 
formulation and dissemination of economic narratives. It includes journalists, think 
tanks, scholars and other opinion leaders in economic affairs47. Typically, ideational 
entrepreneurs thus belong to social groups that can be defined as intellectual elites. 
In contrast to other agent-centred constructivist accounts, I emphasize, however, the 
social embeddedness of these ideational entrepreneurs. They do not ‘stand above’ 
society; they are very much a part of it. In consequence, processes of economic 
narrative-creation are endogenous to deeper societal dynamics. Ideational 
entrepreneurs do not formulate new frameworks ‘outside’ of society and then 
supply their finished products to a public desperately waiting for someone to make 
sense of their economic environment. Instead, I conceptualize the formulation of 
narratives as an interactive and iterative process of exchange among ideational 
entrepreneurs and wider societal groups. As such, the formulation of new economic 
narratives is not a one-way street leading from clairvoyant ideational entrepreneurs 
to the rest of the world. Although (successful) ideational entrepreneurs undoubtedly 
do affect how people interpret economic events, I contend that the reverse is also 
true. Non-elites and non-ideational entrepreneurs do not simply accept any 
narrative that the former propose. They will only consider those that make sense and 
are useful to them. Such factors strictly delimit the intellectual space within which 
ideational entrepreneurs operate - a dynamic that can be usefully described as 
                                                          
47 Analyzing the construction of the globalization narrative, Cameron and Palan note that “authors 
who are neither social scientists nor business theorists produce the vast majority of such accounts. By 
far the greater number of accounts of globalization are generated by journalists, policy analysts, 
policy-makers, management consultants and other commentators for whom the reality of 
globalization is simply a fact to be reported on, adapted to or coped with.” Cameron and Palan, The 
Imagined Economies of Globalization, 34. 
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audience filtering -, and to succeed, ideational entrepreneurs who actively seek to 
provide narratives that resonate among the wider public will need to take the 
cultural and economic beliefs of the latter into account. Ideational entrepreneurs thus 
do not just supply ready-made interpretive frameworks to a passive public, but 
instead lead the efforts of narrative-construction in interaction with the wider public 
in an iterative process of trial and error. 
 
Determinants of the social appeal of economic narratives 
The fact that typically a great variety of ideational entrepreneurs propose a number 
of economic narratives that suggest conflicting interpretations of economic events 
naturally raises the question about the characteristics that make some narratives 
more successful than others. Due to the complexity of narrative bodies as well as the 
structural changes that they interpret it is not feasible to answer this question 
comprehensively in general terms. Nonetheless, it appears possible to at least 
identify some of the typical attributes of successful economic narratives. The core 
argument that emerges from the preceding discussion is that the resonance of 
economic narratives depends as much on its fit within the configuration of social 
relations at a specific point in time as it depends on the veracity and empirical 
accuracy of the account that it provides (that is, its epistemic quality). This does not 
mean that narratives’ substantive content is unimportant. Quite obviously, to be 
successful a narrative has to provide an explanation of economic events that directly 
relates to the observed events and offer an interpretation of the latter that is deemed 
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to be plausible at the very least48. However, I argue that - given that a narrative meets 
a certain threshold of plausibility -, its success or failure depends primarily on how 
its content relates to deeper social dynamics rather than the veracity of the precise 
empirical or theoretical claims it makes.  
Among a large variety of such social factors, two stand out in particular: a 
narrative’s compatibility with the dominant zeitgeist or world cultural beliefs, and its 
instrumental usefulness for politically powerful groups. As socially constructed 
phenomena, economic narratives transmit not only neutral economic knowledge, 
but they are deeply imbued with cultural and normative meaning. Therefore, a 
narrative’s appeal is not only determined by the economic considerations that it 
forwards, but also the cultural and normative values that it transmits, such as for 
example views about the socio-political legitimacy of nation-states, the rights and 
obligations of individuals, the desirability of different life-styles, etc.49 At the same 
time, narratives are more likely to be actively diffused if the frames of reference that 
it provides are useful for politically powerful groups - who notably shape public 
debates through their influence on media and think tanks - in order to justify the 
                                                          
48 In the words of Cameron and Palan, “[f]or a particular discourse to be persuasive, to play a 
powerful mediating role in human practice, it must correspond in some way to the active experience 
of participants: it must, in other words, be subject to what Freud would describe as a ‘reality check’. 
The plausibility of a narrative relies on this reality check, though this does not mean that the narrative 
must correspond to some crude positivist or empiricist criteria of truth in order to be plausible.” Ibid., 
8-9. Or in other words: “The problem with the belief that social scientific rigour can bring us closer to 
the truth about globalization – can ‘demistify’ it – is that empirical rigour and theoretical 
sophistication do not necessarily seem to have anything to do with plausibility.” Ibid., 29. 
49 In the words of Kim and Sharman, “cultural structure favours theorizations that are more 
congruent with the culture of modernity while tending to winnow out those that are further 
removed”. Kim and Sharman, "Accounts and Accountability: Corruption, Human Rights, and 
Individual Accountability Norms," 431. 
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pursuit of their constructed interests50. Paraphrasing Robert Cox, it seems evident 
that narratives too ‘are always for someone and for some purpose’51.  
 
Dynamics of socialization and the diffusion of economic narratives 
Once that a specific narrative has been formulated, the question becomes how it can 
spread among social groups. To better understand the diffuse social processes 
underlying the spread of norms, ideas or narratives I propose to distinguish between 
two dimensions that are intimately related but analytically distinct: individuals’ 
internalization of new norms and ideas and the social diffusion of the latter. 
Importantly, in practice these two processes happen simultaneously, feeding and 
reinforcing each other. However, for presentational reasons, I here distinguish 
between them conceptually. This section aims to discuss the operation of these 
mechanisms in general; the following section will reflect on some of the scope 
conditions that can reinforce or hinder the unfolding of these processes. To better 
understand the processes through which economic narratives spread and are 
adopted, I differentiate between social learning and social influence as the two main 
mechanisms of internalization, and three distinct types of social isomorphisms 
(normative, mimetic and coercive) as the principal mechanisms of diffusion. Again, 
the operation of these mechanisms overlaps in practice and they are better 
                                                          
50 Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations; Blyth, Great Transformations: 
Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century; Jabko, Playing the Market : A Political 
Strategy for Uniting Europe, 1985-2005. 
51 Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Theory," Millennium 10, 
no. 2 (1981). 
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understood as complementary rather than mutually exclusive forces. The 
distinctions are made here primarily for the sake of conceptualization.  
The mechanism of social learning, also referred to as ‘persuasion’52  - or, less 
poetically, ‘Type II internalization’53 -, describes processes of socialization through 
which individuals adapt and internalize new systems of social beliefs due to their 
epistemic usefulness. In contrast to mechanisms of social influence, learning-based 
mechanisms of socialization are primarily cognitive or informational and less driven 
by concerns about social status. In contrast to more rationalist versions of learning, 
such as Bayesian updating54, social learning refers to processes that are more strongly 
intersubjective and bounded rational rather than individualist and fully rational. It 
describes processes in which individuals are motivated to adopt new belief systems 
or interpretive frameworks because they help them make sense of their environment 
and their role within it through the (at least apparent) reduction of uncertainty that 
they provide. The two processes of social learning that are most relevant for the 
dissemination and internalization of economic narratives are formal as well as 
informal educational practices. Formal education refers to the social dissemination of 
concepts and interpretive frameworks through institutes of education, such as high 
school and university curricula. Informal education refers to less institutionalized 
practices of learning in which the media plays a crucial role as a common source and 
                                                          
52 See Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," International 
Studies Quarterly 4(2001). 
53 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework," International Organization 59, no. 4 (2005). 
54 See Covadonga Meseguer, Learning, Policy Making, and Market Reforms  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
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distributor of information and belief systems, as well as think tanks, international 
organizations or specialist knowledge firms such as management consultancies. 
In contrast, mechanisms of social influence - Checkel’s ‘Type I internalization’55 - refer 
to processes of socialization that are primarily driven by agents’ concerns about 
social legitimacy. These dynamics are thus less strongly shaped by individuals’ 
desire to stabilize their cognitive environments, but instead by agents’ pursuit of 
social status. In short, they describe a variety of motivations that individuals may 
have to adopt a certain narrative even if they do not deem the latter to be 
particularly useful to make sense of their environment. Most prominent among them 
is their desire to signal their belonging to a specific social group. The logic of the 
operation of these mechanisms is well illustrated by Paul Krugman who described 
these dynamics as follows: 
 “Endless rounds of meetings [and] speeches … occupy much of the time of the economic 
opinion leaders. Such interlocking social groupings tend at any given time to converge on a 
conventional wisdom, about economics among other things. People believe certain stories 
because everybody important believes them. Indeed, when a conventional wisdom is at its 
fullest strength, one’s agreement with that conventional wisdom becomes almost a litmus test of 
one’s suitability to be taken seriously”56 
The mechanisms of social learning and social influence thus describe a variety of 
ways through which individuals can become socialized into new economic 
narratives or ideas once that they have been formulated. They are, however, not 
                                                          
55 Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework." 
56 In Matthew Watson and Colin Hay, "The Discourse of Globalisation and the Logic of No 
Alternative: Rendering the Contingent Necessary in the Political Economy of New Labour," Policy and 
Politics 30, no. 4 (2004): 291. 
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sufficient to explain the diffusion of the latter among wider sections of societies. To 
better understand the commonly observed clustering of similar beliefs and practices 
among social groups, the sociological institutionalist literature proposes an 
understanding of diffusion processes that is based on three distinct types of social 
processes of homogenization, which are dubbed, respectively, as mimetic, normative 
and coercive isomorphism57. As Table 1.1 intends to illustrate, this typology of social 
isomorphisms is useful in making explicit specific aspects of processes of 
socialization that can lead to the diffusion of ideas, norms or narratives. 
Table 1.1. Mechanisms of socialization and diffusion 
 SOCIALIZATION 
How do individuals and institutions internalize new 
narratives/ideas/norms? 
Social learning Social influence 
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of behaviour  
Benchmarking and 
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57 DiMaggio and Powell define isomorphism as the “constraining process that forces one unit in a 
population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions”. See Paul J.  
DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Insititutional Isomorphism and Collective 
Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48, no. 2 (1983): 149. 
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Mimetic isomorphism refers to individuals’ or institutions’ strategy to imitate their 
peers under conditions of uncertainty. Attempting to reach a goal, but unsure how 
to proceed, individuals and institutions frequently opt to copy the practices or 
discourses of those peers they deem having already achieved that goal. Thereby, by 
imitating the means in the hopes of achieving an end, ideas and practices can spread 
among peer groups who pursue the same goal. Dynamics of mimetic isomorphism 
can be found in processes of social learning, such as when individuals or institutions 
unsure about how to reach a vaguely defined goal (such as economic prosperity) 
start seeking advice or cognitive orientation from the same textbooks or consultants 
that their peers who appear to be successful in reaching that goal are using. Similar 
dynamics can also be observed in processes of social influence; for example, if 
individuals or institutions imitate the discourse or practices of their seemingly 
successful peers not primarily in order to learn from them, but to ‘look’ like them. 
Normative isomorphism, also described as professionalization58, describes situations of 
normative sanctioning through the establishment of specific social standards, which 
agents or individuals need to acquire in order to be recognized as a member of a 
professional or other type of social group. The nature of such standards or social 
conventions can be either formal (e.g. educational degrees or professional 
certificates) or informal (e.g. the adoption of specific habits or discourses). Again, 
such processes of homogenization can be present in instances of social learning or 
social influence. For example, the recruitment of staff for some organization may 
prioritize graduates of specific degree programs and thereby incentivize students to 
                                                          
58 Ibid; Kim and Sharman, "Accounts and Accountability: Corruption, Human Rights, and Individual 
Accountability Norms." 
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enrol in a specific course (such as an MBA program), which in turn will transmit a 
specific world-view and discourse among those students. Similarly, prospective as 
well as current members of a social group can feel pressures to adopt a certain 
discourse not because it helps them to make sense of their environment but merely 
to signal to their peers that they are willing to comply with the groups’ norms (as 
described in Paul Krugman’s quote above). 
Lastly, coercive isomorphism characterizes situations in which an external agent 
imposes rules of behaviour. In contrast to normative isomorphism - which refers 
primarily to dynamics of social groups’ self-regulation -, it describes situations in 
which the source of regulation exists more or less independently from the social 
group which it aims to regulate. Outside authorities can influence how social groups 
behave by triggering dynamics of social learning or social influence. For example, it 
can lead to dynamics of social learning if the rules established by an outside 
authority are recognized and gradually internalized as the ‘proper’ way of doing 
things by the members of a targeted social group. It can also lead to dynamics of 
social influence, in particular if the outside authority resorts to tactics of 
benchmarking and naming and shaming in order to encourage members of a social 
group to comply with the imposed rules even if they are resistant to internalizing 
them59. 
                                                          
59 As recent research has started to uncover, such tactics have truly flourished in international affairs 
in recent years as a wide range of NGOs and IGOs started to use country rankings to publicly identify 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ performers in a great variety of policy issues. Andre Broome and Joel Quirk, "The 
Politics of Numbers: The Normative Agendas of Global Benchmarking," 41, no. 5 (2015); Jack L. 
Snyder and Alexander Cooley, Ranking the World : Grading States as a Tool of Global Governance  
(Cambridge University Press, 2015); Judith G. Kelley and Beth A. Simmons, "Politics by Number: 
Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations," American Journal of Political Science 59, no. 1 
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The spread of norms, narratives and policy ideas is thus a complex social process, in 
which dynamics of socialization or internalization interact with social isomorphic 
processes that reinforce each other: the internalization of new norms or ideas by 
some members of a social group positively affects the likelihood that they will also 
be adopted by their peers, while the likelihood of compliance is at the same time a 
function of how widespread the norm or idea is among relevant peers. Altogether, 
the mechanisms described constitute powerful social forces pushing towards 
convergence and homogenization once that a narrative has started to diffuse. The 
likelihood of adoption of new norms and ideas is, however, not identical for all 
social groups. The following section will very briefly outline some of these 
considerations. 
 
Adoption: diversity in commonalities 
The probability that the members of a specific social group adopt a new narrative 
depends primarily on the shared cognitive priors of the individuals constituting the 
group. In general terms, the adoption of new narratives is facilitated if the members 
of a social group either have no strong prior beliefs, or if their prior beliefs and 
constructed interests are compatible with the principles advocated by the newly 
emerging narrative. If, in contrast, prior beliefs conflict with key elements of the new 
narrative, three outcomes are possible: the new narrative can be rejected, the process 
of narrative adoption can be delayed and/or the narrative’s figurative core can be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(2015). Two notable examples of such processes in the area examined here are the World Economic 
Forum’s Competitiveness Reports or the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Rankings. 
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adopted in modified form. As mentioned in the introduction, the focus of this thesis 
is primarily on the commonalities rather than differences in outcomes, which are 
only touched upon and not fully elaborated (neither empirically nor theoretically). 
Nonetheless, the obvious importance of such differences merits some more 
consideration. 
Analysing the diffusion of global narratives across countries from a macro-social 
perspective, as it is the case here, two types of differences constitute relevant scope 
conditions for the social processes of narrative dissemination: individual-level 
attributes and cross-national cultural-institutional factors. At the individual level, 
three factors in particular are important in co-determining the speed and degree of 
adoption of economic narratives: individuals’ age, constructed interests and more 
general socio-political and cultural attitudes. Age is important because, as research 
in social psychology has shown60, younger people generally are more susceptible to 
the adoption of new beliefs because they have not yet internalized strong prior 
beliefs. Independently of age, individuals’ constructed economic self-interests and 
socio-political and cultural attitudes are equally crucial mediating factors, which can 
facilitate the adoption of a new narrative if they are aligned with its principles (or 
hinder it otherwise). These differences are useful predictors not only of differences in 
the adoption of a narrative across social groups within a nation, but, to the extent 
that prior beliefs derive from intersubjective frameworks that are shared at the 
                                                          
60 See Norval D. Glenn, "Aging and Conservatism," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 415, no. 1 (1974); Duane F. Alwin, Ronald L. Cohen, and Theodore M. Newcomb, The 
Bennington Women after Fifty Years  (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991). 
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national level, also differences across countries61. For analyses of the diffusion of 
global norms and narratives such differences become particularly salient. As several 
studies have illustrated62, to be implemented at the domestic level, global norms, 
narratives or policy prescriptions have to be ‘translated’; that is, they have to be 
modified in such a way that the global narrative’s figurative core can be seamlessly 
inserted into the domestic discursive order. Accordingly, national adoption 
processes can unfold relatively quickly and smoothly if the principles of an 
emerging global discourse or norm are aligned with traditional domestic beliefs in 
the same issue area, or prolonged and complicated in case that they are not. 
 
To sum up: the aim of this section was to reflect more thoroughly on the social 
processes through which global ideas, norms or narratives emerge and circulate in 
an interdependent and culturally connected world. I have suggested that economic 
narratives are deeply embedded within the structural transformations that they 
imbue with meaning and that ideational entrepreneurs play an important role in the 
formation of new narratives, but that the space within which they act is quite strictly 
delimited by structural factors as well as the prior beliefs, practices and preferences 
of mass publics. I have emphasized that the epistemic quality of the narratives that 
                                                          
61 On how national cultural differences influence economic thinking, see Frank Dobbin, Forging 
Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain, and France in the Railway Age  (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994); Marion Fourcade, Economists and Societies: Discipline and Profession in the 
United States, Britain, and France, 1890s to 1990s  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
62 See Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations; Thomas Risse-Kappen, 
"Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold 
War," International Oganization 48, no. 2 (1994); Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms 
Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," International Organization 
58, no. 2 (2004). 
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ideational entrepreneurs propose is only one out of a number of other, 
predominantly social, factors determining an economic narrative’s public appeal. I 
have discussed a variety of powerful mechanisms of social homogenization that can 
exert strong pressures towards convergence once that an economic narrative has 
been formulated and socially selected for diffusion. But I have also highlighted the 
importance of social groups’ cognitive priors as scope conditions, which can either 
hinder or facilitate the unfolding of these mechanisms. Applying some of these 
concepts, the following section will elaborate the key transformations in the 
substantive content of predominant economic narratives in the post-war era. The 
remainder of the thesis will then demonstrate how these narrative evolutions led to a 
profound reconceptualization of the dominant social representation of inward FDI, 
and how the latter affected individual attitudes, voting behaviour and government 
policies through cross-national quantitative analyses as well as a comparative 
qualitative investigation of these issues in Britain and France. 
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FROM ECONOMIC STATISM TO FREE MARKETISM TO COMPETITIVENESS 
A large majority of ideational scholarship in IPE has focused attention on the great 
‘shift’ in economic ideology from Keynesianism to neoliberalism, which is typically 
situated in the decade of the 1980s63. The key insight offered by this literature is that 
the predominant ways of thinking about the role and responsibilities of the state as 
an economic actor changed substantially from before to after the 1980s; in particular, 
the argument goes, neoliberal ideology managed to move the locus of authority for 
economic coordination away from the state and towards markets (whose operation 
shall be as ‘free’ as possible from state intervention, according to the advocates of 
neoliberal ideas). The contribution of this literature to our understanding of 
economic policy has been fundamental and – as the daunting amount of scholarship 
in this vein attests - its key insight has been found to resonate throughout a great 
variety of areas of public policy. And to an important extent the argument is also 
mirrored in the empirical investigation that is presented in subsequent chapters. 
However, at the same time, the well-established account of the ‘shift’ in economic 
thinking from Keynesianism to neoliberalism is not entirely satisfactory and misses 
important nuances in the development of predominant social representations of 
inward FDI throughout the post-war era. The investigation unveils two theoretical 
shortcomings in dominant ideational political economy scholarship in particular: its 
overly reductionist dichotomous categorization of economic ideas and its nearly 
exclusive focus on the dimension of the responsibility for economic coordination 
                                                          
63 See for example, Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations; Blyth, Great 
Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century; Jeffrey M. Chwieroth, 
Capital Ideas: The Imf and the Rise of Financial Liberalization  (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2010). 
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between states and markets in its examination of the relationships of political-
economic authority64.  
Firstly, under different disguises dominant constructivist political economy 
scholarship has portrayed the historical trajectory of economic ideas essentially as a 
battle between two well defined camps: Keynes vs. Hayek, statism vs. liberalism, 
states vs. markets. In consequence, the development of dominant ideologies has 
been depicted as a sort of ‘winner-takes-all’ contest marked by shifts and ruptures 
giving rise to ‘jumps’ in predominant economic thinking from one camp to the other. 
Although this dichotomous classification of economic ideas may be useful for 
analytic purposes, it also promotes a problematic understanding of the evolution of 
economic ideas65. Ideas don’t ‘shift’, ‘switch’ or ‘jump’, they evolve. This distinction 
is not merely semantic, but underlines the gradualism of ideational change and, 
importantly, the fact that economic ideas, rather than replacing each other, are 
layered upon each other. That is, even if new economic ideas commonly challenge 
previously held beliefs, they at the same time borrow from and feed upon its 
precedents. For example, as I will elaborate in the following paragraphs, the 
neoliberal rhetoric, although challenging recipes of state intervention, at the same 
time borrowed heavily from the statist narrative. Most fundamentally, the very idea 
of a ‘national economy’ as an object to be freed from state intervention is itself a 
                                                          
64 Although a systematic assessment of the significance of these shortcomings for other phenomena 
than inward FDI is beyond the scope of this thesis, these are general points that I believe to be 
pointing towards fruitful avenues for further research in the field of constructivist political economy. 
65 The shortcomings of such an interpretation of the history of economic thought was most forcefully 
demonstrated in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis of 2007-08 when armies of analysts inside and 
outside of academia speculated about an imminent ‘return to Keynesianism’, as if nothing had 
changed since the 1930s (aside from Thatcher’s and Reagan’s capture of the public economic mind in 
the meantime).  
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construct that was legitimized by the statist narrative66. Similarly, it is erroneous to 
conceptualize the rise of the neoliberal narrative as some sort of ‘end point’ in the 
evolution of economic thinking. As I will elaborate below, the free markets narrative 
itself evolved substantially over time, giving rise to new narratives that at the same 
time build upon and challenge neoliberal ideas67. 
The second shortcoming of dominant ideational political economy scholarship, 
related to the first one, is its narrow focus on one particular ideational dimension, 
namely the relative distribution of authority between state and market institutions. 
Economic narratives are multi-faceted and multi-dimensional. Although the 
distribution of economic power between states and markets is certainly a key issue, 
it is not the only one. A different aspect of economic ideas - which previous 
ideational scholarship has given only scant attention to but plays a decisive role in 
the empirical story that is uncovered in the remainder of this thesis - is the 
distribution of authority between national and supranational market forces. As I will 
illustrate, predominant economic narratives have changed notably on this dimension 
after the supposed ‘shift’ to neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s68. 
To better track and understand the transformation of the meaning attributed to 
inward FDI from the 1960s to the 2000s, I thus propose a framework of ideational 
                                                          
66 See William Davies, The Limits of Neoliberalism : Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of Competition  
(Los Angeles: SAGE, 2014), 5; Timothy Mitchell, "Fixing the Economy," Cultural Studies 12, no. 1 
(1998); Tomo Suzuki, "The Epistemology of Macroeconomic Reality: The Keynesian Revolution from 
an Accounting Point of View," Accounting, Organizations and Society 28, no. 5 (2003). 
67 For a subtle treatment of the complex relationships between economic nationalism and 
neoliberalism, see Eric Helleiner and Andreas Pickel, Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World  
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
68 Some analysts interpret this movement as simply a part – or a confirmation - of the shift towards 
‘neoliberalism’. This, however, risks making the notion of ‘neoliberalism’ so broad that it becomes 
unclear what constitutes a departure, or at least a transformation, of the narrative’s initial 
formulation. 
 69 
 
evolution that is somewhat more dynamic and multi-dimensional than the dominant 
story of one shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism. It is summarized graphically 
in Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2. The evolution of dominant economic narratives, 1960s-2000s 
 
It suggests that the key evolution in dominant economic narratives in the second half 
of the twentieth century unfolded in three stages. The narrative of economic statism - 
prevalent roughly from the 1930s to the early 1970s69 - on the one hand emphasized 
the responsibility of the state in managing the coordination of economic expectations 
and regulating the operation of markets. On the other hand, it also underlined the 
                                                          
69 See Cameron and Palan, The Imagined Economies of Globalization, 15. 
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national character of the economy. In the words of Cameron and Palan, national 
economic systems were understood as “servant[s] to the nation”70 and market forces 
were clearly subordinated to the goals of the state71. The ‘world economy’, in 
consequence, was perceived as an “aggregate [of] discrete ‘national’ economies 
separated along political boundaries”72. In sum, dominant understandings of how 
economies work reflected a commitment to a deeper assumption that systems of 
authority and sovereignty were primarily organized on a national territorial scale73. 
The rise of the free-markets narrative advocated by monetarist or ‘neoliberal’ 
ideology in the late 1970s and early 1980s, in turn, was a direct attack on the first 
principle. Its advocates called for the state’s withdrawal from economic 
management, which they argued should be operated by market mechanisms rather 
than state actors. However, free-marketism did not explicitly challenge the primacy 
of the national spatial scale. Well understood, the advocates of ‘neoliberalism’ were 
strongly opposed to any protectionist measures to shelter domestic producers and 
they clearly did embrace international economic competition and the free flow of 
global capital in this sense, yet the primary goal of their agenda was to create free 
markets at the national level. The taken-for-grantedness of the national scale only 
came to be challenged in a subsequent ideational transformation towards the end of 
the Cold War when a narrative of globalization and competitiveness rose to 
prominence among political elites and business leaders. The narrative argued, in a 
                                                          
70 Ibid., 12. 
71 Ibid., 13. 
72 Ibid., 12. 
73 “It may be debated at length whether there was indeed ever a ‘nation’, let alone a ‘national 
economy’, that corresponded to the ideal of closure (we would argue that there was not), however, 
the imperative of the logic of the nation legitimized a particular political economy centred on the 
closure of the state.” Ibid., 13. 
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nutshell, that the world economy was now globally integrated and that, accordingly, 
the priorities for ‘national’ economic policies increasingly derive from the forces of 
the global economic system rather than domestic (national) considerations. 
Underlying this evolution is a deeper reconceptualization of the idea of the state per 
se, which is “no longer based on territorial, cultural, social, linguistic, or any other 
form of identity associated with the territory or demography of the nation-state, but 
on particular types of economic participation” in the (supposedly) global market-
place74. The narrative of globalization and national competitiveness thus synthesizes 
fundamental transformations in two deeper-lying principles on the relationship 
between states and markets, and nations and the world economy: that markets 
control the state rather than the reverse and that the imperatives of the global 
economy dominate the priorities for the national economic system.75 
The two remaining sections of this chapter will elaborate these developments in 
some more detail, giving particular prominence to the rise of the globalization 
discourse, which lies at the core of the thesis’s empirical argument. 
 
From Narratives of Economic Statism to Free Markets 
The rise of the narrative of economic statism is usually situated in the 1930s76 and 
interpreted as a consequence of the experience of the Great Depression77, the 
                                                          
74 Ibid., 110. 
75  “The Fordist principle that the economic activity was subordinate to and controlled by the state has 
given way to the post-Fordist principle that the state is effectively controlled by (…) the needs of 
economic actors.” Ibid., 116. 
76 Ibid; Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State. 
77 Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century, 127. 
 72 
 
political empowerment of working classes through their gradual enfranchisement78 
as well as the adoption of an informal social contract – first in the United States – 
facilitating the move towards a Fordist regime of mass production and mass 
consumption79. In essence, it represented a renunciation to the liberal internationalist 
economic order of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and in particular 
of the gold standard, which subjected national economic policy priorities to the 
maintenance of exchange rate parities. The experiences with economic planning 
during the Second World War further reinforced these tendencies and finally led to 
the formal institutionalization of an international economic order based on the 
principles of economic statism at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. John 
Maynard Keynes who, as is well known, played an important role at the conference 
as the British lead negotiator, strongly argued for an international economic system, 
which gives precedence to national priorities over international obligations, in 
particular to allow the pursuit of close to full employment levels through policies of 
demand management, as he had advocated in his magnum opus The General Theory 
of Employment, Interest and Money (1931)80. 
A variety of factors arguably contributed to the resonance of such views: The war 
experiences and the nationalist political discourse had accentuated national 
identities and the political legitimacy of nation-states; politically empowered 
                                                          
78 See Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin, "The Gold Standard and the Great Depression," 
Contemporary European History 9, no. 2 (2000); Beth A. Simmons, Who Adjusts? : Domestic Sources of 
Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
79 Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State. 
80 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, 11th ed. (London : 
New York: Macmillan St. Martin's, 1957 [1931]). 
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working classes were increasingly unwilling to bear the ‘costs of adjustment’81 and 
had adopted new social conventions and practices expressing increased expectations 
about the economic responsibilities of their governments82; at the same time, liberal 
economic elites had realized the political dangers of sticking with economic rules 
that are biased against the interests of working classes, which risk delegitimizing the 
principles of capitalism among these increasingly politically powerful constituents83; 
the war economy had fomented closer collaborations among domestic business elites 
and their national governments84; and governments, business leaders and working 
classes alike were keen to move towards a Fordist regime of mass production similar 
to the example set in the United States85. 
A key characteristic of the arrangement of ‘embedded liberalism’86 that was formally 
institutionalized at Bretton Woods is the precedence of national over international 
economic priorities. Both Keynes as well as his US counterpart Harry Dexter White 
were explicit in their views about the crucial importance of national economic policy 
autonomy. Rejecting the principles of the gold standard, Keynes famously stated to 
“let finance be primarily national”, arguing that “the whole management of the 
domestic economy depends upon being free to have the appropriate rate of interest 
without reference to the rates prevailing elsewhere in the world.”87 White similarly 
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opined that capital flows should not be permitted to “operate against what the 
government deemed to be in the interests of any country”88. In accordance with such 
views, the Bretton Woods agreement explicitly allowed the use of restrictive 
economic practices – in particular the use of capital controls – in order to defend 
national policy autonomy89, thereby instituting the international institutional 
foundations for a ‘golden era’ of economic statism, which lasted roughly from the 
1950s to the 1970s and was characterized by the emergence of a relatively stable 
social order in advanced economies whose main features Bob Jessop characterized as 
those of a ‘Keynesian National Welfare State’90. Arguably, the omnipresent external 
security threat in the context of the Cold War further strengthened the legitimacy of 
the nation-state and the importance assigned to national economic sovereignty. It 
appears fairly clear that the joint principles of the economic statism narrative - an 
actively intervening state and the precedence of national over international economic 
imperatives - were widely accepted in that period. The idea of a relatively closed 
Keynesian welfare state was adopted across the advanced economies. At the same 
time, narratives of ‘economic nationalism’ were widespread among developing 
countries as well as the UN institutions and accompanied by a “dramatic secular 
growth of state economic capabilities and a corresponding increase in the scope of 
public policy”91 around the world. According to the narrative’s principles, the world 
economy was not perceived as an integrated system, but as the aggregate of flows of 
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economic exchange between separated units. As Bob Jessop observed, “[a] complex 
multiscalar field of economic relations was handled as if it were divided into a series 
of relatively closed national economies”92. Even among international economists, 
considering “global free trade as an instrument of ‘national’ economic growth and 
welfare maximization”93, such views were widespread and largely considered as 
unproblematic. Tellingly, one of the first major scholarly contributions to the study 
of FDI, the doctoral dissertation by Stephen Hymer (submitted in 1960), was entitled 
‘The International Operation of National Firms’ [emphasis added]94. Similarly, the 
product life-cycle theory developed by Raymond Vernon and Louis Wells, a highly 
influential explanation of the process of internationalization of multinational 
companies, strongly reflects a view of the world economy as being separated into 
several distinct national units following their own logics95. 
As subsequent chapters will elaborate in more detail, the portrayal of FDI inflows in 
this narrative was shaped by a highly sceptical view of the economic and political 
consequences of the presence of foreign multinational companies in an economy, 
fearing in particular that they will weaken or undermine national industries, which 
were considered as key actors in the pursuit of long-term prosperity. 
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According to Bob Jessop, the decade of the 1960s, a period of relative economic 
prosperity and stability among advanced economies, marked “the highest stage of 
the national state form … as an economic, political and social power container”96. In 
the 1970s, the narrative of economic statism gradually came to be challenged. The 
productivity gains from reconstruction and the transition to economic regimes of 
mass production started to fade out, making it more costly for governments to 
pursue close to full employment levels. At the same time, large companies, 
struggling to maintain their profitability in their home markets, increasingly 
expanded internationally, thereby gradually undermining the informal social 
contract between national big businesses and working classes that had been 
paramount for the creation of national welfare state regimes97. Ultimately, these 
dynamics opened a space for the formulation of a different understanding of the 
economy. Although economic discontent was widespread, the ultimate shape of the 
emerging discourse was not clear a priori. In particular, socialist interpretations of the 
economic slug initially received a lot of popular support in a variety of countries, as 
David Harvey has noted98. Yet ultimately - as is well known - the dominant 
narrative to emerge from the crisis of the 1970s was a liberal narrative of free 
markets that forcefully challenged the notion of an interventionist state. Strongly 
appealing to the value of individual freedom99, the proponents of the free markets 
narrative argued that state intervention was harmful for economic efficiency and, 
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ultimately, economic prosperity. They advocated for a greater reliance on market 
mechanisms and the private sector rather than the state in coordinating economic 
expectations. More specifically, their narrative emphasized the beneficial economic 
effects that derive from a reduction of the economic role of the state through the 
privatization of state-owned companies and some public services, cuts in 
government spending to allow lowering tax rates and the stimulation of private 
sector activities through the removal of regulations (while at the same time strictly 
enforcing market competition). As such, the free market narrative represents clearly 
and explicitly a direct attack on the first principle of the economic statism narrative, 
the taken-for-granted responsibility of the state to actively manage the economy. Yet, 
its positioning towards the second principle, the precedence of the national over the 
international scale, is more ambivalent. The free markets narrative strongly favoured 
the removal of any restrictions on the cross-border flow of goods and capital100, 
which were seen as forces enhancing economic efficiency by stimulating competition 
and ensuring an efficient allocation of capital101. Yet, at the same time these 
measures were only seen as a means to an end: the creation of free and efficient 
markets at the national level. In other words, the justification for the free flow of 
goods and capital was based on a view that they will contribute to improve the 
efficiency of national industries, but firms were still considered as national 
constructs. Although they firmly believed that the international economy should be 
as free as possible, it was still understood as a system constituted of several national 
subunits. As subsequent chapters will show, the portrayal of inward FDI in this 
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narrative was notably more favourable than it had been in the narrative of economic 
statism, but at the same time notably less enthusiastic than it was to be conceived of 
subsequently in the globalization and competitiveness narrative. In a nutshell, the 
free market narrative advocated a neutral policy towards FDI, which does not 
discriminate against foreign firms, yet at the same time it did not describe the 
attraction of FDI as being particularly desirable. As global trade and capital flows 
more generally, FDI was primarily seen as a means to an end (to make the national 
economy more efficient by stifling competition in domestic markets), but not an end 
in itself. As is well known, the free market narrative – advocated by monetarist 
economists, think tanks (e.g. the Mont Pelerin Society, the Institute of Economic 
Affairs or the Heritage Foundations) as well as popular media outlets102 - was most 
prominently adopted by Reagan and Thatcher in the 1970s and promoted in 
continental Europe through the institutions of the European Commission. By the 
mid-1980s, most governments in advanced economies, including France, had 
adopted economic policies that were imbued with the principles of the free market 
narrative103. Yet, at the same time, the period during which this particular narrative 
was predominant was also relatively short. As I will argue in the following section, 
the abrupt end of the Cold War led to a subtle but important transformation in the 
predominant economic narrative with regards to the second principle of the 
economic statism narrative: the predominance of the national scale as a principle of 
economic organization. 
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The Narrative of Globalization and National Competitiveness 
Although the implications of the end of the Cold War take centre place in 
international security studies, it is generally seen as an event of only secondary 
importance in most studies of political economy, which put much greater emphasis 
on the rise of neoliberalism and the associated institutional transformations of the 
1970s and 1980s in their historiography. This study suggests that this relative neglect 
is somewhat misguided. As I aim to show in the remainder of this thesis, the 
dramatic geopolitical changes and the Western triumphalism at the end of the 1980s 
– expressed most eloquently in Francis Fukuyama’s End of History (1992)104 – gave 
rise to a new powerful economic narrative that was rooted in business schools. It 
promoted a new vision of how the world economy works and applied the tools of 
management theory to develop a new ideal-type of the role of nation-states in the 
world economy. Most importantly, the emerging narrative of globalization and 
competitiveness started unravelling the national economy’s “taken-for-grantedness 
as the primary object of economic management”105. Rather than as a network of 
independent national economic units, its advocates portrayed the world economy as 
a “singular emergent globalizing flow-based economy”106. This transformation from 
an internationalist to a globalist conceptualization, in which the global rather than 
the national is understood as the “natural scale of economic processes”107 is 
illustrated schematically in Figure 1.3. 
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Figure 1.3. The inter-national and the global view of the world economy and the 
economic relationships between states 
 
 
 
Tore Fougner aptly describes the differences among the two as follows: 
“An ‘inter-nationalist’ conception implies a world economy characterised by relationships 
among relatively autonomous national economies, and within which the principal private 
agents (multinational corporations) and capital more generally are ‘nationally embedded’. 
In contrast, a ‘globalised’ conception implies a world economy characterised by economic 
relationships that exist above and autonomously from national economies, and within 
which the principal private agents (transnational corporations) and capital more generally 
are ‘globally footloose’”108. 
The implications of this transformation in the interpretation of the nature of the 
world economy for the perceived role of nation-states as economic actors are 
profound. Some early formulations of the globalization narrative stretched them to 
their extreme. For example, Kenichi Ohmae, proclaiming the “end of national 
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interest”109, argued that “national borders have disappeared and, along with them, 
the economic logic that made them useful lines of demarcation in the first place”110. 
Peter Drucker announced the emergence of ‘post-sovereign states’111. And similar 
notions also resonate in Francis Fukuyama’s bestseller, in which he claimed that 
“economic forces are now encouraging the breakdown of national barriers through 
the creation of a single, integrated world market”112. Such extreme views were, 
however, largely discarded soon after. Instead, more moderate (but no less 
consequential) formulations, which acknowledged the continuing importance of 
nation-states as economic units but re-framed them as being clearly subordinated to 
the forces of the global economy, became very popular and widely spread113. Two of 
the most persuasive early proponents of this perspective were Robert Reich114 and 
Michael Porter115. 
Reich and Porter both argued that the integration of the global economy had 
fundamentally altered the rules of the game and that national economies could not 
anymore succeed in isolation of the global economy116; but they ascertained that 
national borders will continue to be important, or come to be even more important 
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than before117. Reich argued that even though MNCs are increasingly disconnected 
from the traditional logic of national sovereignty, the largely immobile workforce 
remains profoundly national. Accordingly, in his view, a national economic interest 
still exists, but its content has changed fundamentally: it is no longer equivalent to 
the interests of national corporations – which, Reich argues, have become 
‘nationality-less’118 - , but now increasingly consists of the economic interests of the 
national workforce within the global economy119. Reasoning along similar lines, the 
very influential work of Michael Porter suggested that to foster the long-term 
prosperity of nations in the global economy, governments have to focus its economic 
policy on creating and sustaining an attractive ‘business environment’. In this view, 
the goal of a state’s economic activity thus becomes to provide the infrastructure and 
a highly skilled workforce that fosters the emergence of home-grown multinationals 
as well as the attraction of internationally competitive firms from abroad. 
Underlying such views is a profound and rather peculiar re-thinking of the concept 
of the nation-state as platforms of production for globally mobile companies; a 
notion that social theorists usefully conceptualized as ‘competition states’ (in 
contrast to ‘welfare states’)120. As they acknowledge, the globalization narrative’s 
emphasis of competition per se is deeply ingrained in (neo)liberal political-economic 
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theory121 and thus nothing ‘new’, but its application to nation-states (rather than 
national firms) as units in competition is both novel and consequential122. Mirroring 
Bill Clinton’s insistence that “[e]ach nation is like a big corporation competing in the 
global marketplace”123, William Davies stylized the significance of this ideational 
move as “[a] new vision of political authority (…), in which the nation (or city, 
region etc.) was comparable to a corporation, of which the political leader was the 
CEO and the citizens were employees“. Emphasizing that “western economies could 
no longer compete internationally on price, but now needed to compete on quality, 
innovation and differentiation”124, the globalization narrative depicts economic 
development not merely as a contest among national firms, but, significantly, as an 
economic contest among political systems and entire societies125 for the key 
resources considered to drive innovation, such as leading scientists, artists and – 
crucially for the analysis of FDI - firms. Consistent with such depictions, FDI came to 
be increasingly framed as a source of innovation and prosperity and the levels of FDI 
inflows accordingly as an indicator of the attractiveness of a country’s business 
environment or its economic success more generally. 
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Importantly, this competitiveness narrative did not call for the withdrawal of the 
state from economic affairs. In contrast, in comparison to its neoliberal 
predecessors, it called for more rather than less state activity. It prescribed, 
however, a radically different type of state activity than the one usually 
associated with Keynesian policies. It demanded an active state in pursuit of 
what Phil Cerny, Georg Menz and Susanne Soederberg aptly describe as pro-
market regulation126. That is, governments should not intervene in order to 
produce a particular economic outcome, but instead to establish and enforce the 
rules and to provide the resources for an attractive business environment, 
primarily through investments into infrastructure and education and the 
adoption of business-friendly legislation. Rather than to protect national citizens 
from the volatility of economic forces through demand management (as 
prescribed by Keynesian theory and advocated by the economic statism 
narrative), the globalization narrative thus defined the task of national 
governments as maximizing a national economy’s attractiveness for globally 
mobile firms and capital through supply-side measures aimed at improving the 
business environment by enhancing conditions for economic entrepreneurialism 
and innovation. 
 
An intriguing aspect of the remarkable popularity that this world-view has 
achieved is the fact that many of its core claims have been soundly rejected by 
                                                          
126 Susanne Soederberg, Georg Menz, and Philip G. Cerny, Internalizing Globalization : The Rise of 
Neoliberalism and the Decline of National Varieties of Capitalism  (Basingstoke, UK; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 17. 
 85 
 
empirical analyses127. In-depth investigations of the degree of integration of 
global markets over longer time periods have shown that events in the late 
twentieth century are more usefully understood as an internationalizing trend 
rather than a rupture or radical break with the past128. At the same time, the 
operations of supposedly globally mobile firms have been found to remain 
strongly biased towards their home economies129, etc. More generally, a great 
variety of economic, political, social and financial indicators suggest that the 
world economy is far less ‘globalized’ than the globalization narrative would 
make one believe130. This mismatch between the popularity of the globalization 
narrative as a framework to understand the world economy and the inaccuracy 
of its empirical core claims hints to several factors that contribute to the appeal of 
economic narratives other than their ability to provide an accurate description of 
reality, which merit some discussion. 
In terms of its content, the narrative proposes a theory of change rather than 
stability. As discussed, ideational evolutions are frequently triggered by the 
increased uncertainty about the future course of events that structural changes 
can induce. As a result, a narrative’s ability to make sense of these changes is 
crucial. This was certainly one strength of the globalization narrative, which 
provided a “clear-sighted view of the global competitive landscape that 
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regulated the uncertainty and anxiety of leaders in all sectors”131. Although the 
empirical bases for its claims were doubtful, it presented an account of changes 
that was deemed to be plausible with seemingly great confidence. At the same 
time, it offered a rather peculiar mix of liberal and nationalist economic 
theories132 that was attractive to individuals as it managed to rescue deeper-lying 
nationalist sentiments into the ‘global age’. The appeal to nationalist feelings, in 
turn, proofed useful for politicians in order to legitimize their political-economic 
actions, while its emphasis on international competition was vague enough so as 
to serve as a potential justification for economic and social policies of all political 
colours. Right-leaning political or business leaders referred to the globalization 
narrative to argue in favour of the need to pursue market-friendly policies, while 
left-leaning elites used it to demand more public investments into education or 
infrastructure133. 
In terms of its carriers, the narrative was primarily diffused via business schools, 
management consultancies and think tanks. Interestingly, the globalization 
narrative provides an ‘economic theory’ that was, at least initially, forcefully 
rejected by mainstream economists who despised it for its ‘nationalist’ or 
‘mercantilist’ underpinnings, describing the idea of national competitiveness as 
“meaningless” and “dangerous”134. As discussed, the globalization narrative is 
much more strongly rooted in management theory rather than economics and 
was advocated primarily by business school scholars rather than economists. Its 
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ultimate success in becoming one of the dominant economic world-views despite 
its rejection by mainstream economists is interesting on its own and calls for a 
somewhat more differentiated analysis of the much-advertised role of 
‘economists’ as the common source of economic paradigms. It may even suggests 
that the strong focus on the influence of academic economists in the ideational 
political economy literature may be biased due to its relative neglect of other 
academic entrepreneurs, such as business and management scholars who 
plausibly hold some considerable competitive advantages as potential normative 
entrepreneurs vis-à-vis their peers in economics departments. Firstly, business-
school-versions of international economics are grounded in empirics rather than 
theory and deliberately focus on the transmission of fundamental and rather 
common-sensical principles instead of abstract mathematical formulations. 
Business schools pride themselves on offering ‘practical knowledge’, which 
makes its economic discourse appealing for non-economists as well as the 
financial press that targets wide readerships. Secondly, in recent decades MBA 
programs have become hugely popular among elites across the world and far 
greater numbers of students enrol into business-related courses rather than pure 
economics135, meaning that arguably a greater share of business and government 
elites have direct exposure to the business school discourse than cutting-edge 
economic theory. Thirdly, the ideas of business schools are transmitted widely to 
companies and governments around the world through management consulting 
firms that maintain strong connections to elite business schools. This means that 
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business and government elites’ exposure to business school ideas and 
discourses is upheld throughout their professional careers. Fourthly, the business 
school discourse is also likely to be adopted within companies and thereby 
further transmitted to employees at all levels. In sum, business schools enjoy 
great social authority for the transmission of ‘practical’ economic knowledge and 
enjoy an exceptional reach to business and government elites (via MBA 
programs and management consulting firms) as well as the wider public (via 
media and within-firms discourse and workshops). These factors all contribute to 
explain the remarkable popularity of the globalization discourse. 
Another crucial carrier of the globalization narrative were think tanks, and in 
particular the World Economic Forum (WEF). Founded in the 1970s by the 
executive business school Centre d’Etudes Industrielle in Geneva as an 
international conference aiming to bring together European business and 
government elites to discuss how to close the productivity gap with the USA it 
grew into one of the world’s most respected think-tanks in the 1990s under the 
leadership of Klaus Schwab136. In particular, its annual meeting held in the alpine 
ski resort of Davos, Switzerland, enjoys great media attention. The WEF’s 
embrace of the globalization narrative is significant for two related reasons. On 
the one hand, the evolution of the WEF into the preferred meeting-place of the 
world’s powerful – or ‘super-VIPs’137 - attributes considerable social authority 
and symbolic power to the organization. In particular, the ‘spirit of Davos’ has 
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come to be interpreted as the incorporation of the ‘modern’ in public policy and 
the desire to belong to this exclusive club of the powerful thus exerts strong 
pressures to adopt the discourse it promotes138. At the same time, the WEF as a 
think-tank has understood it extremely well to use its social authority in order to 
actively promote its world-view. Particularly important in this regard are the 
Competitiveness Reports139, which since the early 1990s rank all countries of the 
world according to their level of ‘competitiveness’. Despite the questionable 
methodology underlying these rankings140, they enjoy great attention in the press 
and among economic and political elites, powerfully transmitting the idea that 
national economies are in competition with each other and that a nation’s 
economic success is ultimately determined by its attractiveness to global 
capital141. Not infrequently, governments go as far as to define progress in these 
rankings as their official government policy142, which constitutes a prime 
example of the dynamic of coercive isomorphism described above. 
 
The transformations in the predominant economic narratives from the 1980s to 
the 1990s from a story about free markets to an account emphasizing 
globalization are thus significant because they advocated a rather different view 
of national economies. While the former portrayed them as objects to be liberated 
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Doing Buisness as Soft Power," in International Studies Association 57th Annual Conference (Atlanta, 
GA2016). 
 90 
 
from government intervention, the latter described them as units to be turned 
into competitive locations for global capital. Despite the inaccuracy of many of 
the empirical claims that underlie the discourse, the framework - promoted by 
business schools, management consulting firms, think tanks and the media – was 
widely accepted by the mid-2000s when an analyst observed that “the necessity 
of competitiveness has been hammered home by governments, corporations, and 
the media to the point that it is taken for granted, a fact of life that is so obvious 
that we unthinkingly acquiesce to its dictates”143. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The goals of this chapter were threefold: to situate this thesis theoretically; to unpack 
the concept of economic narratives and the social mechanisms through which they 
diffuse and affect policy outcomes; and outline the key developments in 
predominant economic narratives that are essential to understand the profound 
transformations in the social representation of inward FDI in economic policy 
discourses during the second half of the twentieth century. The following two 
chapters will describe the latter phenomenon in much more detail, focusing on 
developments in the six large advanced economies: the USA, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, Canada and Japan. The subsequent chapter then presents a series 
of quantitative tests that assess the impact of this ideational transformation on 
individual attitudes, voting and government policies in a cross-national perspective. 
                                                          
143 In Fougner, "The State, International Competitiveness and Neoliberal Globalization: Is There a 
Future Beyond 'the Competition State'?," 165. 
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Lastly, the final chapter assesses these developments in the United Kingdom and 
France in more depth, using qualitative research methods. 
The core message that this chapter aimed to convey - and which resonates 
throughout the remainder of this thesis - is that the ways in which we understand 
the world economy and the language that we use when we talk about it are based on 
powerful interpretive frameworks, which are not merely functional reflections of 
reality, but intersubjectively constructed belief systems that mirror not only ‘real’ 
material economic developments, but also a variety of cognitive, normative, 
emotional and political biases.  
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PART II. THE SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF INWARD FDI 
Chapter 2 . FDI AS A MEANS TO AN END: FROM LE DÉFI AMÉRICAIN TO 
THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE, 1960-1990 
“[I]ndependence is not an ethical conception, but an economic necessity.” 
Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber1 
 
The following two chapters describe the key developments in FDI policy and the 
configuration of predominant social representations of inward FDI in economically 
advanced recipient countries from the 1960s until 2007, with a focus on the USA, UK, 
Germany, France, Japan and Canada, which together account for a substantial part 
of the total global FDI in- and outflows during the period under consideration. 
Following the preceding discussion, the chapters will illustrate how the evolution in 
predominant economic narratives gave rise to distinct ‘statist’, ‘neoliberal’ and 
‘globalization’-inspired social representations of inward FDI. Because the ‘neoliberal’ 
period was relatively short - playing primarily the role of a transition period in the 
evolution of the social representation of inward FDI -, the discussion in these two 
chapters centers primarily on the social interpretations of inward FDI emerging from 
the ‘statist’ and ‘globalization’ narratives. In order to emphasize the difference 
among the two – and due to a lack of creativity –, I dub the statist version simply as 
the ‘old’ social representation, and the version emerging from the globalization 
narrative as the ‘new’ one. Accordingly, the present chapter focuses primarily on 
                                                          
1 Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge  (New York: Atheneum, 1979), 38. 
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unpacking the configuration of the ‘old’ (statist) version and on presenting an 
overview of the key developments in inward FDI policy that accompanied it in the 
six major advanced economies; it also briefly discusses the social representation 
emerging from the ‘neoliberal’ narrative, but in less detail. The subsequent chapter 
will then focus on the ‘new’ social representation of inward FDI that emerged in the 
early 1990s. 
The period of the ‘old’ perception of FDI in advanced economies that is at the focus 
of this chapter is characterized by governments, which were – to varying degrees - 
concerned about FDI inflows; economists and policymakers were aware of the 
potential benefits of inward FDI, but at the same time emphasized the risks of the 
latter for long-term industrial development. As a result of this ambivalent attitude, 
most governments somewhat reluctantly permitted the establishment of foreign 
companies in their jurisdictions, but attempted to complement them with policies 
targeted at minimizing the perceived economic risks2. In this sense - and in contrast 
to the period of the ‘new’ perception of FDI - governments always considered FDI 
inflows purely as a means to an end and never as an end in themselves. Governments 
put in place some regulations, but generally allowed the inflow of FDI because they 
believed that they bring jobs, technology, management skills and additional physical 
capital investments to an economy, with a net positive effect on a country’s 
economic growth and balance of payments, at least in the short run. Yet at the same 
                                                          
2 In comparison, most developing country governments showed a much stronger hostility towards 
MNCs until the 1980s, putting in place strict regulations on FDI inflows and sometimes resorting to 
the outright expropriation of foreign companies. Presumably, developing country governments’ 
comparatively higher adversity to FDI is related to a combination of material structural economic 
differences, anti-colonial sentiments and Marxian-inspired economic ideologies. See also the brief 
discussion in these regards provided in the conclusion chapter. 
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time they worried about the foreign ownership of domestic industry because foreign 
owners may not act in the long-term ‘national interest’ and hollow out domestic 
industries. ‘Economic sovereignty’ was policymakers’ implicit guiding principle, 
and, accordingly, the ultimate goal of FDI policy always remained to build strong 
national industries. Thus, policymakers wanted ‘some’ FDI, but not ‘too much’3. As I 
will also discuss briefly, the neoliberal narrative gave rise to a less critical alternative, 
emphasizing the benefits of international competition as a force that can enhance the 
efficiency of national industries and therefore advocating for a ‘neutral’ FDI policy; 
at the same time, however, the neoliberal narrative remained notably less 
enthusiastic about the potential benefits of inward FDI than the globalization variant 
that came to succeed it and which is described in the next chapter. 
To elaborate the configuration of the ‘old’ perception of FDI in more detail, the 
remainder of this chapter will first give a broad overview of the global patterns and 
characteristics of FDI flows in historical perspective and then develop a broad-brush 
political history of FDI inflows and their reception in the USA, UK, France, 
Germany, Japan and Canada between the early 1960s and the late 1980s. The 
historical overview suggests an interesting ‘reversal of fortunes’: During the period 
of unchallenged expansion of US MNCs overseas from 1960 to 1973, the US 
government was welcoming of FDI inflows, while governments in Europe, Japan 
and Canada were concerned about these developments and envisioned stronger 
regulations and restrictions on FDI inflows. In stark contrast, from the late 1970s, as 
                                                          
3 Following this logic – which was to be completely overturned subsequently -, high (frequently called 
‘excessive’) levels of FDI inflows were widely interpreted as a sign of structural weaknesses of a 
national economy. 
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European as well as the Canadian governments became gradually more relaxed 
about FDI inflows, US Congress became increasingly concerned about the inward 
investments from European and especially Japanese companies, enticing a 
prominent anti-FDI political discourse, which peaked in the mid-1980s. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows are, at the same time, a relatively old and a 
relatively recent phenomenon. In some sense, companies that simultaneously 
operate in several jurisdictions have existed since the political borders that made 
‘cross-border’ economic transactions possible were established in the first place4. 
However, for the longest stretches of human mankind – and unlike today - the 
economic importance of such flows remained fairly modest. They started to grow 
during the long period of European colonization, when large-scale state-owned or 
state-sponsored trading companies adopted explicitly trans-national business 
models focused on the exploitation and transportation of raw materials and the 
building of physical infrastructure. During the nineteenth century (the period of the 
‘first global economy’5), driven by the process of industrialization and the rapid 
progress in communication and transport technologies, several European (primarily 
British and Dutch) and American companies began adopting international value 
                                                          
4 Karl Moore and David Lewis (1999) identify the first ‘multinationals’ appearing in the Old Assyrian 
Kingdom around 2000 BC (in: Jones 2005:16). See Karl Moore and David Lewis, Birth of the 
Multinational: 2000 Years of Ancient Business History from Ashur to Augustus  (Copenhagen: 
Copenhagen Business School, 1999). In the Middle Ages, family-owned merchant and banking 
buisnesses rank among the most remarkable cross-border enterprises. 
5 Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century, 18. 
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chains also in the manufacturing sector6. And by 1914, trans-national production 
chains had become a fairly common phenomenon in a large number of 
manufacturing sectors7. Although it is difficult to estimate the volumes of FDI flows 
at the time, recent research by economic historians suggests that levels of 
international production had been fairly substantial at the time (with the value of the 
global FDI stock as a share of annual world GDP possibly reaching levels similar to 
those observed only again in the 1990s)8. From a political perspective, it is interesting 
to note that these large volumes of cross-border investments were largely considered 
as uncontroversial and didn’t receive much attention before the outbreak of World 
War I. According to Geoffrey Jones, the period was characterized by a general “lack 
of concern about the nationality of ownership”9. Accordingly – mirroring the norms 
of free capital movement underlying the monetary system of the time -, there were 
very few, if any, barriers to the entry of foreign firms and host governments 
generally did not undertake any special efforts to monitor or control the activities of 
foreign companies10. The advent of the First World War undermined this generally 
liberal stance and the nationality of firms were for the first time clearly identified as 
                                                          
6 See Mira Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise : American Business Abroad from the 
Colonial Era to 1914  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). Firms such as the German‐
owned electrical company Siemens and US‐owned Singer Sewing Machines, which established their 
first overseas plants in the 1850s and 1860s respectively, were among the first manufacturing 
multinationals in history. See Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism: From the Nineteenth to the 
Twenty-First Century, 20. 
7 For example chemicals, pharmaceuticals, electricals, machinery, motor cars, tires, branded food 
products or cigarettes. Multinationals and Global Capitalism: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First 
Century, 21. 
8 Possibly reaching as much as one third of global production (similar levels to today). See ibid. 
9 Ibid., 202. 
10 Ibid., 201. 
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a political issue when affiliates of ‘enemy-owned’ companies were systematically 
expropriated by warring parties11.  
These trends towards political nationalism further unfolded during the inter-war 
period as the fundaments of the ‘first global economy’ were gradually disintegrated. 
The widespread establishment of trade barriers and exchange controls significantly 
hindered international operations and the global FDI stock fell sharply during that 
time. Foreign ownership of companies remained a political issue throughout the 
inter-war period, especially so in the USA, which adopted relatively strict 
restrictions on inward FDI in several industries12. In contrast, most European 
governments - although showing an increasing awareness of foreign ownership as 
an issue - were more hesitant to implement formal restrictions on inward FDI. Even 
the Nazi government reportedly remained fairly tolerant of foreign firms operating 
in Germany13 until the outbreak of World War II when, not surprisingly, the 
involved warring parties again resorted to expropriate assets held by enemy country 
companies. 
Although FDI flows had played an important role in the global economy of the late 
nineteenth century, the volume as well as the nature of global FDI flows reached a 
quantitatively and qualitatively different scale in the period following World War II. 
The value of the global FDI stock rose dramatically throughout the post-war era; the 
great majority of FDI flows came to be increasingly concentrated among the ‘Triad’ 
of advanced economies constituted by North America, Europe and Japan (rather 
                                                          
11 Ibid., 27. 
12 Ibid., 204. 
13 Ibid. 
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than North-South exchanges); and the focus of FDI activity moved away from the 
natural resources and utilities sectors to, first, manufacturing and then increasingly 
the services industries. These are the developments that are at the focus of attention 
of the remainder of this thesis. 
Table 2.1 indicates the varying exposure of the six major OECD economies to FDI 
from 1960 until today by comparing the 5-year average FDI stocks (i.e. the 
accumulated flows) in absolute numbers (measured in billion current USD) as well 
as share of GDP14. Focusing in particular on the data before 1990, it suggest several 
interesting trends: First, while the FDI stock increased rapidly in all major advanced 
economies except Japan in the 1960s and early 1970s, the economic role of foreign 
companies relative to the size of the economy is shown to have been particularly 
great in Canada and, to a lesser extent, the UK. The FDI stock of Germany and 
France were slightly below the estimated world average, while it remained 
exceptionally low in Japan. Second, from the 1970s to the early 1990s, there was a 
movement towards some convergence among the major OECD economies: while 
Canada’s FDI stock as a share of GDP decreased from over thirty to under twenty 
percent, the USA experienced very substantial inflows (even when measured 
                                                          
14 Some general caveats related to historical FDI data should be borne in mind: different countries 
used different definitions of what a ‘multinational’ company is (e.g. are investments of a jointly-held 
Japanese-British company in the UK ‘FDI’?), as well as different thresholds that distinguish FDI from 
portfolio investments (the US uses a 10% threshold, which has today become common practice; yet, 
historically, Germany only registered investments that acquired at least 20% of a German company as 
FDI, France used 25%, etc.). In addition, a very substantial part of FDI is financed through 
subsidiaries’ retained earnings, the amount of which can be difficult to estimate. As a powerful 
illustration of these confusions and complications, The Economist reported in 1974 that US 
policymakers had “no clear idea about the exact amount of the inward FDI stock”. See "Money Moves 
In," The Economist, 14 September 1974. Another critique of FDI data is that it is measured at book 
(rather than market) value, which can significantly bias global balance of payments estimates. See 
DeAnne S. Julius, Global Companies and Public Policy: The Growing Challenge of Foreign Direct Investment  
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990). 
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relative to the sheer size of the economy). The UK remained the largest recipient of 
FDI among the major European economies, while the inward FDI stock of France 
overtook Germany’s in relative terms (a not well known phenomenon that subsides 
until today). Third, Japan remained an inward FDI ‘laggard’ throughout the period, 
maintaining its FDI stock well below 1 per cent of GDP until the 1990s.  
Table 2.1. International comparison of historical inward FDI stock (in billion 
current USD) and as a share of GDP (in percentages), five year averages 
 1960-
1964 
1965-
1969 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
89 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
2005-
2009 
2010-
2013 
USA FDI stock 7.6 10.1 17.5 40.9 129.4 346.4 685.8 1769 2507 3028.4 3947.5 
 As a share of GDP 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.9 3.7 6.8 10.4 19.9 22.5 21.4 24.6 
UK FDI stock 5.4 8.7 15.9 30.1 54.4 105.6 190.2 280.8 582.4 1056.0 1351.8 
 As a share of GDP 7.1 8.1 9.8 10.2 11.1 15.1 18.1 20.4 33.5 42.2 55.2 
Germany FDI stock 1.7 4.9 9.6 29.7 31.6 59.4 122.0 186.0 349.8 626.2 773.3 
 As a share of GDP 2.3 4.3 4.6 4.8 4.1 5.2 6.3 8.2 15.8 19.6 22.1 
France FDI stock NA 3.0 7.3 12.9 35.6 52.0 128.8 385.6 547.2 1037.4 1018.5 
 As a share of GDP NA 2.5 2.7 2.3 6.1 6.3 9.8 25.9 33.4 42.0 38.1 
Japan FDI stock 0.0 0.3 1.5 2.5 3.8 8.0 14.8 32.6 73.0 149.0 204.3 
 As a share of GDP 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.7 3.2 3.7 
Canada FDI stock 15.4 26.4 32.7 48.8 62.4 93.4 113.2 159.6 277.2 496.6 475.4 
 As a share of GDP 34.2 33.9 27.6 22.2 19.1 18.6 18.9 22.2 30.3 32.5 35.0 
World FDI stock 54.5 NA 166.0 301.9 786.0 1366 2460 4976 8719 15688 22563 
 As a share of GDP 4.0 NA 5.1 4.2 6.3 7.9 9.8 16.0 24.0 28.5 31.9 
SOURCES: Data before 1980: FDI data from Dunning and Cantwell (1987) and Safarian (1993)15; 
Historical exchange rates from Antweiler (2016)16; GDP from World Bank Database. All data from 
1980 onwards from UNCTAD. 
 
The global ‘explosion’ of FDI in the 1990s and 2000s, which dwarfs the significance 
of these earlier developments, will be analyzed in some more detail in the following 
chapter. The two remaining sections of this chapter will proceed to describe the 
                                                          
15 John H. Dunning and John Cantwell, Irm Directory of Statistics of International Investment and 
Production  (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987); A. E. Safarian, Multinational Enterprise and Public Policy : A 
Study of the Industrial Countries  (Aldershot, Hants, England: E. Elgar, 1993). 
16 Werner Antweiler, "Pacific Exchange Rate Service: Foreign Currency Units Per 1 U.S. Dollar, 1948-
2015," (2016). 
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reception of these ever-increasing flows of FDI among the major OECD economies in 
two periods: the rise of the US MNCs from the 1960s to the oil and dollar double-
shock of 1973 and the rise of European and Japanese MNCs in the 1970s and 1980s 
until the exhaustion of the Japanese boom economy and the end of the Cold War in 
the early 1990s. 
 
LE DÉFI AMÉRICAIN, 1960-1973 
The USA emerged from World War II as the undisputed political, economic and 
technological superpower. While the war had destroyed not only productive 
capacities, but also essential economic institutions (e.g. price systems, the financial 
system, property rights etc.) in Europe17, the domestic economy in the US was not 
only spared major direct destructions but further strengthened by the massive public 
investments (primarily into the defense industry) which reinforced the basis for the 
technological dominance of the US economy that persists until today18. As one 
consequence of these economic asymmetries, US MNCs, enjoying a technological, 
managerial and financial advantage in most industries, eagerly expanded their 
businesses overseas in the post-war era. From the late 1950s onwards, this 
phenomenon became increasingly controversial on several fronts: Even though the 
US public and government remained largely unconcerned about FDI inflows (which 
in any case were small) until the 1970s, US Treasury officials became increasingly 
worried about the effect of outward FDI on the US balance of payments. In Europe, 
                                                          
17 Barry J. Eichengreen, The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), Chapter 3. 
18 Ibid. 
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the penetration of US MNCs raised alarm bells from the late 1950s onwards, 
arousing deep-seated concerns about the continent’s ‘technological dependence’. 
Similarly, Canadian politicians started worrying aloud about the ‘truncation’ of 
Canadian industry and questioned whether the economic reliance on US companies 
was really in the ‘national interest’. At the same time, Japan, which had effectively 
closed its economy to FDI in the 1930s, strongly resisted the multilateral and bilateral 
pressures to remove its barriers to inward FDI, which it considered as a threat to 
indigenous industrial development. The remainder of this section will discuss these 
developments before 1973 in some more detail. The following section will then 
analyze the developments from the 1970s to 1992. 
 
The USA: Beware What You Are Wishing For… 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, US policymakers removed almost all 
restrictions on inward FDI, which had been implemented during the inter-war 
period19. The government encouraged both outward and inward FDI, even though, 
as a natural consequence of the nearly hegemonic position of US businesses in the 
world economy at the time, the former outstripped the latter by an order of 
magnitude. 
Due to the steady erosion of the US current account throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
however, Treasury officials started to consider the sizable outflows of FDI 
                                                          
19 Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century, 204. 
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increasingly as a “burden on the country’s balance of payments”20. In consequence, 
in 1962 President Kennedy unveiled plans to decrease outward FDI and increase 
inward FDI. To reduce the incentives of US businesses to establish subsidiaries in 
Europe he announced further pushes to reduce the tariff barriers between the two 
continents (despite the insistence of the business community that “it is not the tariff 
barrier as much as nearness to a growing market which motivates most of that 
investment”)21. In order to encourage European companies to invest in the USA, the 
Kennedy administration created an Office of International Investment, which was to 
inform European businesses about the investment opportunities in the US through 
the embassy network.22 Unlike several state-level investment agencies, it was, 
however, not to provide any financial inducements23. Even though the 
administration mentioned the creation of employment and the availability of new 
products and production methods as (almost ‘collateral’) benefits that inward FDI 
can bring, the main motivation to encourage inward FDI was simple accounting: 
“Straightforward balance of payments considerations were, no doubt, mainly 
responsible for this desire [to attract FDI].”24 
Yet, despite these initial efforts, FDI inflows remained relatively small and the US 
current account deficit deteriorated further in the context of the US’ military 
involvement in Southeast Asia. In response, the Johnson administration 
implemented some restrictions to curb the outflow of FDI, the so-called “Voluntary 
Foreign Credit Restraints”, in 1965. After the dollar confidence crisis in 1967, under 
                                                          
20 "U.S. Companies Oppose Subsidiaries Tax," Financial Times, 30 January 1962. 
21 Ibid. 
22 "Attracting the Foreign Investor," Financial Times, 6 April 1962. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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the great protest of the US business community, these restrictions were made 
mandatory25. As an unintended but very significant consequence of these 
constraints, US subsidiaries in Europe began to borrow increasingly from European 
banks, fuelling the emerging London-centered Eurodollar market26. 
Pressure on the US balance of payments finally subsided when the Nixon 
administration first suspended the dollar-gold convertibility in August 1971 and 
then substantially devalued the US dollar in February 1973. After the US balance of 
payments had turned back into surplus, the mandatory restrictions on outward FDI 
were abolished in February 197427. The devaluation of the US dollar finally did lead 
to marked increases of FDI inflows, primarily from the UK, Germany and Japan. 
Initially, this “invasion, with the help it gave on the balance of payments, was 
welcomed by officials”28, but soon thereafter it started to entice some worries and 
already in early 1974 “[t]hree congressional committees [were] looking into the 
possible disadvantages.”29 
 
Europe: ‘A dilemma of historical significance’ 
The Second World War had left most European industries in shatters. The European 
economy severely lacked capital and had incurred a deep technological backlog to 
                                                          
25 John Ellicott, "United States Controls on Foreign Direct Investment: The 1969 Program," Law and 
Contemporary Problems 34, no. 1 (1969). 
26 Paul Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System : Practice and Theory of International Interest Rates, 6th ed. ed. 
(London: Macmillan, 1977), 152ff. The Euro-Dollar System. Eurodollars are time deposits 
denominated in U.S. dollars at banks outside the jurisdiction (and thus financial regulation) of the 
United States. The first Eurodollars were issued in 1957. 
27 "Making It in the United States," The Economist, 2 February 1974. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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the booming US economy. Therefore, European governments initially welcomed the 
increasing investments by US companies, which were widely considered to be 
“uncontroversial”30 in the direct aftermath of the war. However, in the early 1960s 
several governments started to express their concerns about the ‘economic invasion’ 
of Europe by US multinationals. Most vocal were the French. While General De 
Gaulle had pursued a generally liberal FDI policy during his first mandate (1958-
1962)31, a conjecture of events involving the subsidiaries of US companies in France 
in 1962-6332 notably shifted the discourse of public intellectuals and government 
officials. Maurice Duverger, professor of political science at Sorbonne University, 
expressing the general sentiment among the Parisian policy elites, wrote in a column 
published in Le Monde on 10 January 1963: 
“The USA already have many ‘Trojan horses’ amongst us and they don’t stop sending 
more of them: such are their capital investments…Those who are receiving them don’t 
feel mistrust; instead, they are welcoming them with open arms, as if they were a boon, 
entirely unconscious of the danger, which they present.”33 
Soon after, actions followed words: realizing that the rules of the European 
Economic Community would make any unilateral attempt to curb inward 
                                                          
30 Rainer Hellmann, Amerika Auf Dem Europamarkt: Us-Direktinvestitionen Im Gemeinsamen Markt  
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1966), 24. [original in German, translated by author] 
31 Ibid., 25.Hellmann 1966:25 
32 Three events in particular were commented on very critically by the French media: the sudden 
layoffs at General Motors and Remington Rand, the attempts by US canning factory Libby McNeill to 
influence French agricultural policy and Chrysler’s hostile takeover of the French carmaker Simca. See 
ibid., 26; Norman Graham, "Developed Countries and Multinational Corporations: Threat Perception 
and Policy Response in France and the United Kingdom," in Host National Attitudes toward 
Multinational Corporations, ed. John Fayerweather (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982). 
33 In Hellmann, Amerika Auf Dem Europamarkt: Us-Direktinvestitionen Im Gemeinsamen Markt, 21. 
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investments self-defeating34, then Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 
proposed to his EEC partners to establish regulations to limit foreign direct 
investment in the Common Market as a whole because “[i]t was not desirable that 
essential sectors of the Common Market economy should be dependent on external 
decisions”35. In September 1963, the government introduced new legislation, which 
subjected secondary offerings of French shares to foreign interests to special 
authorization36 and a few month later the Finance Ministry intervened to block 
General Electric’s planned takeover of Machines Bull (later admitted under strict 
conditions)37. In February 1965, General De Gaulle uttered his now famous views 
that the US’ ‘exorbitant privilege’38 to print the international reserve currency led to 
an excess supply of USD, artificially fueling the financial power of US MNCs and 
their ability to take over European companies, which he interpreted as “a kind of 
expropriation of one or another enterprise in certain countries.”39 In May 1965, 
French Industry Minister Michel Maurice-Bokanowski renewed the call for a 
Common Market Investment Policy and a pan-European industrial policy in order to 
face the competition of US companies. In the same address Maurice-Bokanowski 
developed a theory of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ FDI, announcing that “[t]he present policy of 
                                                          
34 A unilateral restriction on inward FDI could not stop the targeted foreign companies from setting 
up a subsidiary in another EEC member country and export their products from there without any 
restrictions. In the words of Servan-Schreiber: “A Common Market country that takes a more 
restrictive attitude than its partners toward American investment only helps its competitors as its 
own expense.” Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge, 47. 
35 "French Bid to Curb Foreign Investment in E.E.C.," Financial Times, 25 January 1963. 
36 "French Move to Restrict Foreign Take-Overs," Financial Times, 4 September 1963. 
37 Hellmann, Amerika Auf Dem Europamarkt: Us-Direktinvestitionen Im Gemeinsamen Markt. 
38 In fact, De Gaulle did not use this exact wording, even though he articulated the same idea. The 
term ‘exorbitant privilege’ was suggested by Giscard d’Estaing and has later been (mis-)attributed to 
De Gaulle. See Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Hélène Rey, "From World Banker to World Venture 
Capitalist: Us External Adjustment and the Exorbitant Privilege," IDEAS Working Paper Series from 
RePEc (2005). 
39 "The General Makes One Valid Point." 
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the Finance Ministry is that take-overs by foreign firms [i.e. the ’bad’ FDI] will in 
future generally be forbidden, while the creation of new productive concerns with 
advanced technology [i.e. the ‘good’ FDI] is regarded more warmly”40. 
Even though France’s EEC partners could not agree to implement formal limitations 
on US FDI inflows, many of them (from all political spectra) shared the French 
concerns about the ‘excessive’ inflows of US FDI to Europe. They resented in 
particular the phenomenon of hostile takeovers and the increasing competition in 
European capital markets from US subsidiaries due to the emergence of the 
Eurodollar market. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson warned of the danger of 
“industrial helotry”41 in Europe and pronounced that the primary objective of 
Europe must be “to prevent the domination of our economy by the Americans”42. 
Hans Dichgans, MP of the German centre-right governing party CDU, stated that 
“[h]istory teaches us that in the long run a healthy economy must free itself from 
dependence on foreign capital and rely on its own resources. The United States itself 
furnishes the best example of this”43. Robert Marjolin, illustrious member of the 
European Commission, worried publically that Europe was becoming an importer of 
technology and an exporter of brains44. Similarly, an LSE economist claimed that 
“from the sole point of view of the implications for technology, working for a foreign 
                                                          
40 "French Minister Calls for E.E.C. Investment Policy," Financial Times, 27 May 1965. 
41 "U.S. Industry and Progress - a Financial Times Survey: Signs of Slackening in Investment in 
Europe," Financial Times, 27 November 1967. 
42 In Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge, 47.Particularly controversial was Chrysler’s takeover of 
the British carmaker Rootes in 1967. See Hodges, Multinational Corporations and National Government : A 
Case Study of the United Kingdom's Experience, 1964-1970. 
43 In Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge, 45. The German government actively intervened when 
Mobil Oil tried to take over Aral in 1967, capping control at 28% and requiring the foreign 
stockholders to pass a resolution affirming that “they agree that the German identity of the firm shall 
be maintained” ibid., 48. 
44 "U.S. Industry and Progress - a Financial Times Survey: Signs of Slackening in Investment in 
Europe." 
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subsidiary is like working for its parent. Either way foreign interests are buying 
domestic ability to produce ideas. If it is bad for British technology when a scientist 
emigrates, it is bad when foreign subsidiaries hire, or retain, British scientists”45. 
UNICE, a leading European business lobby46, published a report in which they 
uttered their concerns that American investments in Europe had become excessive, 
arguing that they have led to (i) difficulties for European companies to access 
European capital markets, (ii) labor shortages and rising wages, and (iii) a dangerous 
decrease of profit margins because US companies “failed to respect” [sic] the 
European cartel arrangements47. Even the famously liberal Financial Times called for 
regulatory action and industrial policies in order to face the competition from US 
MNCs in an editorial published on 8 February 196548. 
It was in this context that the French journalist and progressive liberal politician 
Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s essay Le défi américain (The American Challenge), 
                                                          
45 Max Steuer, "The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on the United Kingdom," ed. Department of 
Trade and Industry (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1973). 
46 Now called BUSINESSEUROPE 
47 In Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge, 49f. 
48 The crucial passages of the editorial read as follows: “[T]here can be no doubt that both 
Governments and industry in Europe have become increasingly concerned at the growing importance 
of American-based companies in certain sectors of the economy. In cars, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, oil refining and distribution and electronics, for example, a substantial proportion of 
total production is in most European countries under foreign control. To say that this represents a 
danger is not to belittle the enormous contribution which, particularly since the war, U.S. capital has 
made to the prosperity of Europe. There are numerous instances in which the establishment of U.S. 
companies in some European country has provided much-needed competition for a local producer 
who otherwise would have dominated the market. Equally, however, there are cases where the one 
and only reason why a U.S. company has been able to buy out an established manufacturer has been 
because of the sheer amount of cash which it can dispose (…) There are (…) a number of steps which 
could be taken in Europe to cope with the problem. National Governments could exercise stricter 
control over foreign direct investment projects. A better organization of Continental capital markets 
would lessen the advantage which any American bidder for a European company enjoys in a 
competitive situation merely by his ability to lay his hands immediately on large sums of money. A 
greater readiness on the part of European Governments to encourage and facilitate joint ventures in 
technologically advanced and highly capital-intensive industries would enable American ‘know-how’ 
to be matched on this side of the Atlantic. (…) Finally, a lowering of tariff barriers would lessen the 
attractiveness of overseas operations in many fields.”"The General Makes One Valid Point." 
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published in France in 1967, became an international bestseller, which sold over 
600,000 copies in France alone49 and was translated into 15 languages. As such, and 
even though his policy conclusions are radically different from those suggested by 
French mainstream politicians such as General De Gaulle, it provides a detailed 
insight into the social representation of FDI inflows in Europe and the very real 
concerns and fears surrounding them at the time.  
Servan-Schreiber introduces the ‘problem’ of US FDI in Europe as follows: 
“Starting with a rather matter-of-fact examination of American investment in Europe, we 
find an economic system that is in a state of collapse. It is our own. We see a foreign 
challenger breaking down the political and psychological framework of our societies. We 
are witnessing the prelude to our own historical bankruptcy.”50 
Yet, Servan-Schreiber strongly rejects General De Gaulle’s claim that this ‘invasion’ 
of US companies is due primarily to the “dollar inflation”51. Instead, he accepts that 
US companies do have a real competitive advantage over their European rivals, 
which he considers as being based primarily on their superior managerial skills: 
“This war – and it is a war – is being fought not with dollars, or oil, or steel, or even 
with modern machines. It is being fought with creative imagination and 
organizational talent.”52  
Despite this martial tone in his opening statements, Servan-Schreiber’s analysis of 
US FDI in Europe is rather nuanced. He concedes that it has brought many benefits 
                                                          
49 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote in 1979 that “[i]n France no book since the war, fiction or non-fiction, 
sold so many copies in its first three months” in The American Challenge, Foreword. 
50 Ibid., 31. 
51 Ibid., Foreword. 
52 Ibid., 31. 
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to the European economy. However – and this is key for our analysis of the social 
representation of FDI at the time –, he does not consider US FDI as a desirable 
solution for the long-term economic development of Europe because it is 
undermining its economic independence, which he – and, as I will argue, most of his 
contemporaries – saw as the ultimate aspiration of national economic policy: 
“[I]ndependence is not an ethical conception, but an economic necessity. In the short run, 
dependence is beneficial. American investment, although it is presently an instrument of 
domination is also the principal vehicle of technological progress for our economies. It 
introduces manufacturing processes and management techniques that are new to us. 
Indirectly, it forces European manufacturers to a rationalization and modernization they 
would never have accepted without such competition. The immediate economic effect of 
American investment is, therefore, quite positive. If we continue to permit American 
investment in its present form, Europe will share in the profits that foreign investors 
make from the high productivity. These profits spread throughout the economy, raising 
the general standard of living. (…) But in the long run this will change. To ask if the 
Europeans should turn an increasing share of their industrial development over to the 
United States is like asking whether it is better (economically) to be a wage earner or a 
company owner. There is a straightforward answer to this question as far as the nation-
state is concerned. Economic analysis shows that foreign investment imposes strict limitations 
on national development, limitations inherent in the very process of industrial creativity. 
(…) Thus, the infusion of ever larger amounts of American investment into key industries 
has the short-term advantage of sparing Europe expensive research costs. But in the long 
run it deprives the European economy of the possibilities of rapid expansion that exist 
only in these key industries (…) If we can build a better industrial organization here in 
Europe, we will get faster and considerably greater benefits from it than we could from 
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what American investors would leave us after they have drained off dividends and 
royalties.”53 
So what should Europe do to confront this challenge to its economic independence? 
Considering any restrictive measures as self-defeating54, Servan-Schreiber essentially 
proposes to ‘take the bull by the horns’: rather than keeping the Americans out of 
Europe, Europe (and Europeans) should become more American. In particular, he 
urges European politicians to deepen Europe’s economic integration55 and to pursue 
a pan-European industrial policy with the goal to build giant pan-European 
companies that can compete with its American challengers, especially in the field of 
technology56. 
 
Canada: Learning to walk without a ‘crutch’ 
The stock of inward FDI in Canada was exceptionally high in international 
comparison throughout the post-War period until the 1990s (see Table 2.1). 
Naturally, most of these capital inflows originated from the United States and were 
                                                          
53 Ibid., 59-61. [Emphases added] 
54  “(…) Europeans are faced with a dilemma that might well be of historic significance. If we allow 
American investment to enter freely under present conditions, we consign European industry - or at 
least the part that is most scientifically and technologically advanced and on which our future rests - 
to a subsidiary role, and Europe herself to the position of a satellite. If, on the other hand, we adopt 
effective restrictive measures, we would be double losers-denying ourselves both the manufactured 
products we need and the capital funds that would then be invested in other countries. By trying to 
be self-sufficient we would only condemn ourselves to underdevelopment. What can we do?” Ibid., 
52. 
55 “Our back is to the wall. We cannot have both economic self-sufficiency and economic growth. 
Either we build a common European industrial policy, or American industry will continue taking 
over the Common Market.”Ibid., 149. 
56  “As an alternative to annexation or satellization, there is the choice of competition. This demands 
that European businesses, particularly those in the area of ‘Big Science,’ become fully competitive on 
the global market. Figures show that they cannot do this from their own resources, and that 
government assistance is necessary, particularly in such areas as electronics, data processing, space 
research, and atomic energy.” Ibid., 116. 
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concentrated in the natural resources57 and manufacturing58 industries. While the 
Canadian government originally welcomed (or at least chose to ignore59) these 
investments, in the 1960s Canadian politicians, policymakers and academics alike 
became increasingly worried about the potentially negative long-term consequences 
of the dependence of the Canadian economy on foreign companies60. Reflecting on 
this period, Canadian economist Edward Safarian summarizes the predominant 
views at the time as follows: “It was usually acknowledged that such decision 
making [i.e. facilitating the inflows of FDI] could lead to short-run gains through the 
import of capital and technology and because of market connections. In the longer 
run, it was argued, it led to ‘truncation’, that is, to firms which lacked 
entrepreneurial development and independent innovative capacity (…) The long-
run effects, in brief, were said to be anti-developmental.”61 
On the initiative of Finance Minister Walter L. Gordon62, the Canadian government 
commissioned an in-depth study of the benefits and costs of FDI in early 1966. The 
                                                          
57 Foreign ownership reached 64 per cent in the petroleum and natural gas sector in 1963, and 62 per 
cent in the mining and smelting industry in 1964. See Melville H. Watkins et al., "Foreign Ownership 
and the Structure of Canadian Industry: Report of the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian 
Industry," ed. Privy Council Office (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1968), 2.  
58 54 per cent of the industry was foreign-owned in 1964. See ibid. 
59 In Edward Safarian’s words, “[i]t is fair to say that Canadians generally, including governments, 
were not seriously interested in the topic until the second half of the 1950s, despite the high levels of 
foreign control of industries …” See Safarian, Multinational Enterprise and Public Policy : A Study of the 
Industrial Countries, 120. 
60 The ‘Watkins Report’ summarizes the general sentiment among policy elites at the time as follows: 
“The extent of foreign control of Canadian industry is unique among the industrialized nations of the 
world. Canadians are aware of the economic benefits which have resulted from foreign investment. 
They are also concerned about the implications of the present level of foreign control for Canada’s 
long-run prospects for national independence and economic growth.” Watkins et al., "Foreign 
Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry: Report of the Task Force on the Structure of 
Canadian Industry," 1. 
61 Safarian, Multinational Enterprise and Public Policy : A Study of the Industrial Countries, 122. For an 
elaboration of this argument, see Kari Levitt, Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada  
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970). 
62 Safarian, Multinational Enterprise and Public Policy : A Study of the Industrial Countries, 122. 
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research was carried out by a task force of eight leading Canadian academic 
economists63 under the leadership of Melville H. Watkins of the University of 
Toronto. Their findings were published two years later in an influential policy report 
entitled “Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry” 
(subsequently, it came to be known simply as the ‘Watkins Report’), which was 
widely read both within and beyond the borders of Canada. 
The report describes FDI inflows as “a package of product, technology, 
management, capital and market access [that] brings with it large potential economic 
benefits for the host country”, adding that “certainly these benefits are larger than 
are imagined by those who conceive of foreign investment as being simply a capital 
flow”64. The authors believe that “direct investment can increase employment in the 
host country, improve its balance of payments, and augment its standard of 
living”65. However, they continue, there can be too much of a good thing:“[T]he 
benefits from foreign investment may be subject to diminishing returns, that is, 
while some foreign investment provides a spur to the domestic economy, beyond 
some point it may become a crutch”66. Thus, even though the authors consider 
inward FDI as something generally beneficial, they argue that - especially if it comes 
in large quantities - it bears very significant risks for the national economic 
development of the recipient economy, which have to be addressed by public policy. 
The authors are concerned that, in the long run, FDI will threaten the political 
                                                          
63 The taskforce consisted of: Melville H. Watkins (Head), Bernard Bonin, Stephen H. Hymer, Claude 
Masson, Gideon Rosenbluth, Abraham Rotstein, A.E. Safarian and William J. Woodfine. 
64 Watkins et al., "Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry: Report of the Task 
Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry," 37. 
65 Ibid., 38. 
66 Ibid., 41. 
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independence67 of Canada as well as its prospects for national economic 
development: They consider FDI as a challenge to national sovereignty because 
“[f]oreign direct investment tends to shift the locus of decision-making outside of 
Canada and risks reducing the capacity of the Canadian government to implement 
its decisions in the public interest”68. In addition, they worry that the excessive 
reliance on foreign companies will undermine the long-term indigenous industrial 
development of Canada because it fosters an economic structure of ‘dependence’: 
“[T]he very inflows of inputs that come with foreign investment and create the benefits 
also tend simultaneously to generate costs or problems. The influx of senior personnel 
from the parent provides management skills of a higher quality; but the ease with which 
managerial and entrepreneurial skills can be imported may reduce incentives to improve 
these skills in the host country. Capital inflow increases aggregate saving and investment 
and the rate of economic growth; but the institutional development of a national capital 
market may be inhibited and the range of choice facing the investor reduced. The direct 
investment firm provides easy access for the subsidiary to the technology of the parent; 
but the latter is not necessarily the appropriate technology for the host country, and the 
potential to become a leader rather than a follower may be diminished (…)”69 
                                                          
67 Three issues in particular were fuelling these concerns: the US governments’ efforts to forbid 
Canadian companies trading with communist countries, the unilateral imposition of balance of 
payments controls and the Nixon shock. 
68 Watkins et al., "Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry: Report of the Task 
Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry," 345. Referring in particular to the US interest 
equalization tax, balance-of-payments controls on outward FDI and prohibitions to trade with certain 
communist countries, the authors lament the “intrusion of American law and policy into Canada” 
(ibid.). Or how Melville Watkins formulated it more bluntly during a formal speech: “Key decisions 
relevant to Canadians are thus made by Americans in corporate board rooms in New York and in 
government conference rooms in Washington”. See Melville H. Watkins, "A New 'National Policy' for 
Canada,"  The Empire Club of Canada Addresses(1968), 
http://speeches.empireclub.org/61150/data?n=15. 
69 Watkins et al., "Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry: Report of the Task 
Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry," 38-39. 
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To confront this double-challenge to Canada’s political and economic independence, 
the authors suggest “to devise national policies which will increase the benefits and 
decrease the costs of foreign investment”70. Calling for “A New National Policy”71, 
they propose three broad sets of reform: First, they call for legal reforms to regulate 
the activities of foreign subsidiaries more stringently and to make sure that the 
foreign subsidiaries act in the Canadian public interest72. Second, to avoid the 
monopolistic or oligopolistic patterns of MNC expansion, which they see as being 
primarily to the benefit of foreign shareholders rather than the Canadian public, they 
suggest improving Canadian competition laws in order to increase the efficiency of 
the Canadian economy. Third, they argue strongly for the need of a greater 
involvement of domestic actors (i.e., to ‘Canadize’ the Canadian economy), the active 
encouragement of Canadian entrepreneurship through industrial policy73, and the 
use of “other options”74 to access foreign capital and technology that do not require 
“relinquishing control”, such as licensing arrangements, the hiring of foreign 
experts, sending students to study abroad etc. In a speech held shortly after the 
publication of the report, Watkins summarized the challenge as follows: 
                                                          
70 Ibid., 2. 
71 “The old National Policy served Canada in its day, as an instrument of nation-building and a means 
of facilitating economic growth. The challenges have changed and a new National Policy is required. 
The nation has been built, but its sovereignty must be protected and its independence maintained. A 
diversified economy has been created, but its efficiency must be improved and its capacity for 
autonomous growth increased. (…) Increased economic interdependence among nations is recognized, but 
also that a stronger national economy is needed to function effectively in a global setting” ibid., 415. 
[emphasis added] 
72 Such as increasing the private Canadian presence in the decision-making organs of foreign-
controlled subsidiaries. See ibid., 345. 
73 Cf. Watkins statement that “more encouragement should be given to Canadian firms to evolve into 
multi-national firms” in Watkins, "A New 'National Policy' for Canada". 
74 Watkins et al., "Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry: Report of the Task 
Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry," 2. See also ibid., 68.: “While foreign techniques are 
available through direct investment, there are alternative ways of securing them. Patents can be 
licensed, foreign experts can be hired, nationals can be sent abroad for education, and foreign 
products can be copied.” 
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“The extent of foreign ownership of Canadian economy activity has meant the creation of 
a branch-plant economy in Canada. Such an economy has inherent limitations in terms of 
its potential for economic growth in a world of constant innovation. A branch plant is not 
where the action is, in terms of new products, technologies and ideas, and neither is a 
branch plant economy. An economy more under our control might well have a greater 
capacity for autonomous and sustained growth.”75 
In sum, even though the authors see ‘some’ FDI as potentially beneficial in the short- 
to medium-term, they don’t consider them as an end in themselves. In their view, 
the ultimate goal of economic policy is clearly to achieve a thriving ‘independent’ 
economy, which is structured around entrepreneurial indigenous firms76. 
Apparently, this rather skeptical attitude towards FDI resonated with a growing 
share of the Canadian public: An opinion survey conducted every year from 1969-
1977 found an increase in the proportion of respondents who believed that “U.S. 
Investment in Canada is a ‘Bad Thing’” jumped from 35% in 1969 to 55% in 197477. 
The open-ended question why U.S. Investments are good was answered in the 
following order of frequency: 1. The creation of employment, 2. The development of 
resources in Canada, and 3. That they bring money into Canada. The most 
frequently mentioned reasons why U.S. Investments are bad were 1. That Canada 
should control its own affairs, 2. That the profits leave the country, and 3. That 
Canada should be more independent. 
                                                          
75 Watkins, "A New 'National Policy' for Canada". 
76 In his formal address, Watkins laments the lack of entrepreneurial thrive of Canadian firms and “an 
emasculated business class satisfied, by and large, to manage a branch plant economy”. He continues: “My 
argument is that a successful National Policy should have created Canadian entrepreneurship capable 
of dominating the Canadian economy.” See ibid. [emphasis added] 
77 Alex J. Murray and Lawrence LeDuc, "Changing Attitudes toward Foreign Investment in Canada," 
in Host National Attitudes toward Multinational Corporations, ed. John Fayerweather (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1982). Interestingly, the authors say that older and poorer respondents generally tended to 
have a more positive attitude towards US FDI than younger and richer respondents. 
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Two years after the publication of the Watkins Report, The Economist reported that 
“public opinion has become emphatic and a failure to do something to assure that 
foreign-owned companies belong to the Canadian economy and are subject to 
Canadian law is something that the Trudeau government can afford less than any 
other”78. Finally, in 1973 the government introduced a new review mechanism for 
FDI inflows, which set out stringent criteria for takeovers of Canadian companies by 
foreign interests as well as some review procedures for new projects of MNCs 
already present in Canada79, making Canada one of the least welcoming of FDI 
among the industrial economies except Japan. 
 
Japan: ‘Not Quite Playing the Game’ 
The Japanese government had closed its economy to foreign investors in 193180. 
Under the allied occupation at the end of World War II, it started to gradually 
remove some of the restrictions from 1949 onwards, but its approach remained 
generally highly restrictive: The Foreign Investment Law of 1950 subjected all 
planned acquisitions by foreign investors to a strict administrative screening 
procedure during which “[t]ypically foreign investors were pressured to abandon 
FDI, and license their technology to Japanese companies; if the foreign investor 
refused to license, then a joint venture with a Japanese firm was proposed”81. As a 
result of this explicitly discouraging approach (as well as due to the lack of interest 
                                                          
78 "A Continental Embrace," The Economist, 19 September 1970. 
79 "Sohl Cries Wolf," The Economist, 9 June 1973. 
80 Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century, 207. 
81 Ibid. 
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by foreign investors before the late 1950s), the stock of inward FDI in Japan 
remained exceptionally low (see Table 2.1). 
After joining the OECD in 1964, the Japanese government was exposed to 
increasingly strong pressures to liberalize its investment regime in accordance with 
the so-called ‘best practices’ identified by the organization82. Yet, the negotiations 
turned out to become a “perennially tricky topic”83. While the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance supported an opening up of the economy to foreign investors, presumably 
because of the expected positive effect of inward FDI on the balance of payments, the 
politically powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was 
strongly opposed84. As a result, the government removed some of the restrictions, 
but simultaneously introduced others; accordingly, the predominant view among 
western government and business circles was that “Japan was not quite playing the 
game” and that “no other advanced industrial nation limits the foreign investor as 
strictly as Japan”85. 
The Japanese business community was also very reluctant to cooperate with foreign 
investors. A 1966 survey showed that only 10 per cent of the respondents would in 
principle be willing to consider a joint venture agreement86. Some of the reasons 
against greater foreign participation in the Japanese economy were the perceived 
                                                          
82 Cf. the fascinating account focusing on the process of capital account liberalization in Japan 
provided in Rawi Abdelal, Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance  (Harvard University Press, 
2007). 
83 "Can Foreign Capital Be Freed?," Financial Times, 16 November 1966. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
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“cultural differences”87, a “fear of monetary aggression”88, “disorderly 
competition”89, “disruptive effects (…) in the labour market”90, and “the pressure of 
foreign competition in sectors where the Japanese industry still consists 
predominantly of small units”91. 
Nonetheless, in response to the insistence of the OECD, as well as bilateral lobbying 
by the US and UK governments, in June 1967 the government finally announced that 
it will partially lift restrictions on inward FDI in specific sectors92 - a decision, which 
was received enthusiastically by the Financial Times, which called it “one of the most 
important decisions ever taken by Japan - commercial or otherwise”93. However, the 
excitement waned quickly as it became clear that the liberalization was going to be 
restricted to those industries in which Japanese companies were internationally 
highly competitive, such as shipbuilding, steelmaking or the production of soy 
sauce94.  One year later, the same newspaper ascertained that the Japanese 
government had received “no single application” by any foreign investor, 
concluding that “the whole atmosphere remains restrictive”95. 
                                                          
87 Ibid. 
88 M.H. Fisher, "Japan - Financial Times Survey: Government Control of Foreign Capital," ibid., 4 
November 1968. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 100% foreign ownership was to be allowed in 17 industrial sectors, 50% in another 33 sectors; in the 
remaining sectors FDI approvals were to be decided on a case-by-case basis. See "Foreign Investment 
in Japan: The Door Creaks Open," ibid., 15 June 1967. 
93 Ibid. 
94 "Japan - Financial Times Survey: Government Control of Foreign Capital," ibid., 4 November 1968. 
In addition, the extensive cross-shareholding structure (keiretsu) made foreign takeovers nearly 
impossible. See Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First 
Century, 207. 
95 Fisher, "Japan - Financial Times Survey: Government Control of Foreign Capital." 
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In sum, public attitudes towards US MNCs were mixed in all the major European 
economies, Japan and Canada. US MNCs were perceived as a useful means for 
domestic companies to access new technologies, to improve the balance of payments 
and reduce unemployment. Yet, at the same time, concerns that they may 
undermine domestic industries and economic sovereignty were widespread. The 
perception of FDI was generally more positive among civil servants and 
businessmen than politicians, labour unions and the public at large. The USA and 
Germany were the only two major economies, which did not impose any regulatory 
mechanisms in the 1960s. The UK and France both pursued a policy of ‘qualified 
welcome’ (with France’s welcome tending to be somewhat more ‘qualified’). After a 
period of openness towards US investments, public attitudes grew increasingly 
hostile in Canada in the 1960s, leading to the adoption of one of the most restrictive 
FDI regimes among developed countries in 1973. Japan remained de facto nearly 
inaccessible to foreign investors. Capturing the global sentiment at the time, The 
Economist judged in the late 1970s that “[w]hether they [MNCs] will continue to 
grow as fast as they have in the past is uncertain. Multinationals have plenty of 
critics, so they may become subject to more control by their governments at home, 
and be less welcome abroad.”96  
 
THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE, 1973-1992 
With hindsight we know that global FDI flows did not decline, as feared by The 
Economist; instead, MNCs continued to expand at an even faster pace in subsequent 
                                                          
96 "Made by Multinationals," The Economist, 21 April 1979. 
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decades (cf. Table 2.1). As this thesis aims to show, the changing social 
representation of FDI inflows were a crucial development that allowed this - at least 
for contemporaries in the early 1970s - rather surprising outcome to happen. In this 
regard, the period spanning from 1973 to 1992 was a crucial transition phase during 
which the predominant social representation of inward FDI started to become more 
favourable and the policy environment turned gradually more welcoming for 
MNCs97, first in Europe and in the 1980s also in Canada and (to a more limited 
extent) in Japan. Paradoxically, the US, which had been open to inward FDI while 
others were concerned during the 1960s, turned increasingly hostile towards inward 
FDI98. 
If the 1950s and 1960s had been the period of internationalization of US MNCs, the 
1970s and 1980s were primarily the period of international expansion by European 
and Japanese MNCs. The dollar-and-oil double-shock of 1973 marked an important 
turning point after which the share of global FDI flows originating from the US 
started to decline while US FDI inflows began to increase markedly (cf. Table 2.1). At 
the same time, even though manufacturing industries remained the primary 
destination for FDI, FDI in the services sector became gradually more important. In 
the aftermath of the debt crises in the 1980s, the IMF and the World Bank started to 
                                                          
97 On 19 February 1983, The Economist reported that “Multinational companies are coming in from 
the cold. Governments in the rich and poor world, anxious for new investment to promote jobs and 
exports are giving multinationals a warmer welcome. The slump is hastening a thaw in relations that 
began about 10 years ago.” "Big Is Not So Bad after All," The Economist, 19 February 1983. 
98 “As foreign investment in America expanded so did American concern about it (…) Fifteen years or 
so ago many Europeans feared that American multinationals were occupying the heights of Europe’s 
economy. (…) Now it is Americans who are agitated about an invasion of their economy by foreign 
multinationals”. "Challenge in Reverse," The Economist, 25 October 1980. 
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actively encourage developing countries to attract FDI99 and the UN also shifted to a 
notably more favorable attitude100. Nonetheless, FDI flows to developing countries 
were relatively small and highly concentrated in Hong Kong, Singapore, China, 
Brazil and Mexico. In 1990, the Triad North America-Europe-Japan still accounted 
for 80% of FDI flows101. Accordingly, FDI was still very much an intra-OECD 
phenomenon. The remainder of this chapter will give a broad overview of the 
reception of these flows in the six major OECD economies in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
United States: ‘Sincere hypocrisy’? 
By making US assets cheaper, the devaluation of the US dollar in 1973 sustained a 
period of large FDI inflows from European and Japanese MNCs102 (cf. Table 2.1), 
which supported the recovery of the US balance of payments, but soon evoked 
political controversies. While several US state governments, hoping to create 
regional employment opportunities, were eager to attract European and Japanese 
manufacturing FDI103, numerous federal politicians were increasingly concerned 
about the influx of foreign companies. In April 1974, The Economist reported that 
“lobbies in the American Congress are, if anything, even more agitated by foreign 
takeovers of American companies than the European Commission is by American 
                                                          
99 "No Direct Answer," The Economist, 27 April 1988. 
100 "Come Back Multinationals," The Economist, 26 November 1988. 
101 "Foreign Investment and the Triad," The Economist, 24 August 1991. 
102 "Making It in the United States." 
103 Many US states established Investment Promotion Agencies in Europe, predominantly in Brussels, 
and started offering increasingly attractive financial and tax incentives to MNCs during the 1970s. 
Economist. See "All Roads Lead to Brussels," The Economist, 27 April 1974.  
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companies swallowing up European firms”104. In September of the same year, US 
Congress commissioned an extensive study into the extent and effect of foreign 
investments in the US. The topic was such a ‘hot’ issue that a British government 
minister commented humorously that the topic of FDI "is, at one and the same time, 
intellectually complicated and fraught with high emotion. It is a problem which 
invites contention and which therefore is dangerous, especially among old 
gentlemen, as it is apt to raise the blood pressure. In the United States, of course, 
which has been quoted as a high citadel of capitalism, this theme is especially 
ferociously debated and I understand that one Congressman passed out.”105 
Four trends in particular seemed to worry US politicians: the increases of FDI in the 
form of takeovers of established US firms (rather than greenfield projects), increasing 
investments from Japanese and ‘Arab’106 (rather than European) investors, the 
observed ‘recycling’ of US dollars - which annulled the positive effect on the balance 
of payments that was usually attributed to inward FDI -107, and the expansion of 
foreign investors towards industries that were considered as ‘sensitive’ in terms of 
national security (e.g. domestic air transport and shipping, radio and TV, 
telecommunications, energy, etc.)108. In addition, many politicians resented the lack 
                                                          
104 Ibid. 
105 Lord Balogh, Minister of State at the Department of Energy in: UK Hansard, "Debates in the House 
of Lords," vol359 cc47-445 347. 
106 In reality the share of FDI from Japanese and Middle Eastern sources were relatively small, but 
vastly overestimated in public perception. An inquiry by the Economist showed that in particular 
Middle Eastern governments invested primarily into government securities, portfolios of stocks and 
bonds, certificates of deposit and real estate and hardly acquired majority stakes in any US 
companies. In 1976, the largest sources of FDI by country were: the UK, Canada, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Japan; their investments went primarily into manufacturing (40 per cent 
of inward FDI), oil (20 per cent), wholesale and retail (20 per cent), and banking, insurance and 
finance (14 per cent). "Less Than Meets the Eye," The Economist, 18 December 1976. 
107 "Money Moves In." 
108 "We Love You Not, We Love You," The Economist, 29 November 1975. 
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of reciprocity in international FDI policies (i.e. the rights of foreign investors in the 
US were not affected by the treatment of US investors in their respective home 
country). By November 1975 political resistance against FDI had become so 
widespread that The Economist reported: “This Thanksgiving legal challenges to 
takeover bids are as much part of America as cranberry sauce and pumpkin pie. (…) 
For a country whose firms have taken over so much abroad, this is sincere 
hypocrisy”109. In the same year, President Ford created the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which was to have “primary continuing 
responsibility within the Executive Branch for monitoring the impact of foreign 
investment in the United States (…) and for coordinating the implementation of the 
United States policy on such investment.”110 
In a polemic book published in 1978, journalist Kenneth C. Crowe expressed his 
alarmist views (apparently widespread enough to be publishable…) as follows: 
“Is America for sale? The simple answer is yes! America is for sale, in bits and pieces and 
large chunks - its stocks and bonds, its companies and real estate, its ideas and 
individuals. It always has been for sale, but never before have the buyers come in such 
large numbers from so many diverse parts of the earth. The buyers are the nouveau-riche 
Arabs, imperial Iran, the busy Japanese, the new econ-invaders: the governments of 
Germany, Britain, France, Romania [sic], Holland, Canada, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and 
Iran. (…) Foreign investment is good and bad. It is rarely good for all of the people. Some 
get jobs, some get fees, some get taxes, some get profits. Spiritually, it breaks down the 
barriers of the nation-state, race, religion, and culture. Conversely it brings absentee 
                                                          
109 Ibid. 
110 "Executive Order 11858--Foreign Investment in the United States,"  (Washington: Federal Register, 
1975). For an analytical history of the creation of CFIUS, see C. S. Eliot Kang, "Us Politics and Greater 
Regulation of Inward Foreign Direct Investment," International Organization 51, no. 2 (1997).  
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landlords, the draining of profits abroad (…), new pressures on the United States 
Government, and worst of all the insidious attack on the free enterprise system through 
investment by foreign governments.”111 
While public opinion was relatively unconcerned about the increases in FDI from 
European companies, the tone towards Japanese FDI became increasingly aggressive 
throughout the 1980s and numerous laws to monitor, control and screen foreign 
investment were discussed at both the federal112 and state levels throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. Most of the legislative proposals were, however, rejected, with the 
exception of the so-called ‘Exon-Florio’113 amendment, which created a formal 
process to review foreign investments and provided the president with a veto power 
to block foreign investment when ‘national security’ was threatened. President 
Reagan, however, was firmly opposed to any attempts to restrict FDI inflows. As 
part of the neoliberal narrative that he strongly promoted, he conceptualized inward 
FDI as a positive economic force that increases competition and economic efficiency. 
In response to the political pressures to restrict inward FDI, in particular FDI coming 
from Japan114, his administration released an official statement on 9 September 1983, 
in which the President, developing the ‘neoliberal’ representation of inward FDI, 
dismissed any such possibility: 
“I am releasing a major statement on international investment. This statement (…) 
encompasses the views of this administration on international investment. The last time 
such a policy paper was released was (…) more than 6 years ago. Since then, we have 
                                                          
111 Kenneth C. Crowe, America for Sale, 1st ed. ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978), 1-8. 
112 At least 24, according to"Good for You," The Economist, 29 June 1991. 
113 Named after Senator James Exon (D-NE) and Representative James Florio (D-NJ). 
114 For a bestseller that elaborates the nature of the perceived ‘Japanese threat’, see Clyde V. 
Prestowitz, Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead  (New York: Basic Books, 1988). 
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come to view international investment which responds to market forces as a vital and 
necessary ingredient in a stable, growing world economy. A world with strong foreign 
investment flows is the opposite of a zero-sum game. We believe there are only winners, 
no losers, and all participants gain from it. (…) The statement I am releasing enunciates 
the fundamental premise of our policy that foreign investment flows which respond to 
private market forces will lead to more efficient international production and thereby 
benefit both home and host countries. It also highlights three other important points. 
First, our concern with the increasing use of governmental measures to distort or impede 
international investment flows. Secondly, our strong support for the concept of national 
treatment which extends to foreign direct investors in the United States. And finally, an 
enumeration of specific multilateral and bilateral steps the administration has taken, and 
will take, to help liberalize international investment flows.”115 
The Reagan administration thus strongly supported the free flow of international 
capital. Its welcome to foreign investors, however, was not enthusiastic and 
primarily the result of its commitment to the principle of free markets in general 
rather than a positive evaluation of FDI specifically. The interests of the ‘national’ 
economy and ‘national’ industry remained the focus of its policies and despite the 
official non-discrimination approach, reservations about inward FDI were very 
present, among liberal economists116 as well as in the inner circle of President 
Reagan. For example, Malcolm Baldridge, Reagan’s Secretary of Commerce from 
1981 to 1987, expressed his cautions as follows: “I think socially as well as financially 
there’s much more gain to having an open investment policy throughout the world 
                                                          
115 See "Statement on International Investment Policy,"  (The American Presidency Project, 1983). 
116 See Graham and Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States. Although being generally 
in favour of inward FDI, Graham and Krugman highlight foreign MNCs’ propensity to import 
intermediate products and the non-reciprocity of liberal FDI regulations between the USA and Japan 
as two critical policy problems. 
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than the converse (…), [but] [w]e simply don’t want to be dependent on those flows (…) If 
we get hooked on them, we will be in trouble at some time in the future”117. 
 
Europe: The FDI Allegretto – Variations on a Theme 
The year of the devaluation of the US dollar (1973) and the ensuing turbulences in 
the global economy mark an important turning point in European economic history: 
the end of Europe’s ‘golden era’, and the difficult transition from an extensive to an 
intensive model of economic growth118. According to economic historian Barry 
Eichengreen119, the rapid recovery of the European economies from 1948-1973 was 
based primarily on the brute-force capital accumulation and the assimilation of 
known technologies from the USA, which allowed European economies to catch-up 
and (nearly) converge with the leading economy120. As the Western European 
economies had overcome capital shortages and were approaching the technological 
frontier, their ability to grow through the acquisition and adaptation of US 
technologies waned. To maintain economic growth, European policymakers had to 
start the difficult task of adapting a model of intensive economic growth, based on 
increases in efficiency and internally generated innovations121.  
                                                          
117 In Martin Tolchin and Susan J. Tolchin, Buying into America : How Foreign Money Is Changing the 
Face of Our Nation  (New York: Times Books, 1988), 25-26. 
118 Eichengreen, The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond. 
119 Ibid. 
120 The GDP per hour as a percentage of U.S. levels, a measure of productivity, in France, Germany 
and Italy increased from 32(Germany)-46(France) per cent in 1950 to 74(France)-79(Germany) per cent 
in 1973. In contrast, British productivity stagnated at about 60 per cent of U.S. levels. See ibid., 18. 
121 Ibid. 
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The end of the European ‘growth miracle’ also meant an end to the seemingly 
infinite growth opportunities for US MNCs in Europe122: In addition to the rather 
chilling welcome and the initiatives of European governments to promote joint 
ventures rather than acquisitions (MNC’s preferred mode of entry), the dollar 
devaluation made Europe significantly more expensive for US MNCs at the same 
time that the political wins of socialists and communists in Italy and France created 
political uncertainty. As a whole, enough to make US MNCs “want[ing] to go 
home”123. Yet, paradoxically, as US MNCs became “less enchanted”124 with Western 
Europe, Western Europe became increasingly enchanted with US MNCs, albeit with 
some national variations: Among the ‘Big Three’, the UK was the first country that 
started to explicitly attract inward FDI at a national scale in the late 1970s. While the 
French administrations maintained an anti-FDI discourse, in reality they 
significantly opened up their FDI regime (especially so after Mitterrand’s right-turn 
in the mid-1980s). In contrast, the German government, despite an official policy of 
openness towards FDI, actively supported informal mechanisms to protect domestic 
industries from foreign takeovers. 
The UK had been one of the worst performing European economies in the post-war 
era125. Besides its traditional liberal legacy, this may be one reason why UK 
policymakers, desperately seeking for ways to improve economic growth, were 
among the first countries in which the neoliberal narrative found political resonance. 
                                                          
122 The “sweetest deal ever” for US MNCs, in Servan-Schreiber’s terminology. See Servan-Schreiber, 
The American Challenge, 35. 
123 "American Multinationals Want to Go Home," The Economist, 17 April 1976. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Even though the economy started from a higher level. Cf. Eichengreen, The European Economy since 
1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond. 
 128 
 
As a consequence, the UK was also one of the first large advanced economies to 
‘warm up’ towards inward FDI126. The political discourse about inward FDI became 
notably more positive in the mid-1970s. According to a Chatham Report on inward 
FDI published in 1984, “British policy (…) has shifted from the somewhat 
schizophrenic approach (…) in the 1960s and 1970s to one which could be described 
as ‘positive welcome’”127. A statement by the Secretary of State for Industry issued in 
1982128 justified the shift towards a more liberal FDI policy as having a positive 
impact on the balance of payments (through capital inflows as well as by supposedly 
reducing imports and raising exports), and as increasing not only the quantity, but 
also the quality of output and employment. Similarly to Reagan in the USA, Margaret 
Thatcher – whose position towards inward FDI is elaborated in more detail in 
Chapter 6 – considered FDI as a beneficial force enhancing international competition 
and thereby forcing domestic industries to be efficient, but she still considered the 
latter - national firms and industries - as the principal drivers of national economic 
development. 
A few years later than in the UK, the FDI policies of France and Germany’ position 
towards inward FDI also became notably more liberal. The French government had 
for long been perceived as an advocate of “industrial xenophobia” whose “main 
objective was to keep out foreigners”129. This had always been somewhat of a 
misperception because the French government - even though it had adopted a 
                                                          
126 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the UK and Canada were the economies most dependent on 
inward FDI (cf. Table 2.1) 
127 Michael Brech and Margaret Sharp, Inward Investment: Policy Options for the United Kingdom, 
Chatham House Papers (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 19. 
128 In ibid. 
129 Ian Davidson, "European Investment Locations: A Change of View," Financial Times, June 05 1990. 
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variety of formal mechanisms to regulate FDI inflows and to protect domestic 
industries - was in practice more liberal than its discourse suggested130. The French 
Committee on Foreign Investment did review applications from foreign investors to 
ensure that FDI projects were consistent with the government’s industrial plans and 
often encouraged foreign investors to include local participants. But only very rarely 
did the Committee actually block FDI projects131. In a combination of a period of 
slow economic growth, a fundamental re-thinking of economic strategy among 
French technocratic elites132 and sustained pressures from the EC, France further 
liberalized its FDI policies throughout the 1980s. In the early 1980s, the government 
abandoned its policy to pressure foreign investors for local participation via joint 
ventures133. In the mid-1980s it got rid entirely of the review mechanism by moving 
to a ‘notification only’ system for foreign investors from the ECC; exchange controls 
were abolished soon thereafter134. In the early 1990s the government removed most 
of the remaining restrictions and, in addition, started to devise programs to attract 
                                                          
130 In fact, France’s inward FDI stock as a share of GDP was always close to the global average and 
notably higher than, for example, the FDI stock of the officially liberal Germany. One expert 
described the French FDI policy approach in the 1970s as one of ‘selective encouragement’ rather than 
restriction. See Safarian, Multinational Enterprise and Public Policy : A Study of the Industrial Countries, 
211. 
131 Interestingly, the emphasis on the criteria that the Committee used reportedly shifted over time: in 
the early 1960s and 1970s, the Committee was particularly favourable towards FDI that had the 
potential to improve the technological development of domestic firms, in the 1980s it focused 
increasingly first on the number and later the quality of jobs created. See ibid., 215. 
132 See Vivien A. Schmidt, From State to Market? The Transformation of French Business and Government  
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
133 Reportedly, a government official involved in the process simply stated that “[t]here are too many 
problems these days to be dogmatic on such matters”. In Safarian, Multinational Enterprise and Public 
Policy : A Study of the Industrial Countries, 221. 
134 Ibid. 
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foreign investors at the federal level under the coordination of the regional 
development agency DATAR135. 
In contrast to France, the German government had de jure always been open to 
inward FDI. Indeed, Germany was one of the few European countries that had not 
put in place a formal screening mechanism in the 1960s-1970s. However, the inflows 
of FDI to Germany were well below average in the 1980s when Germany 
experienced one of the lowest ratios of inward FDI stock as a share of GDP among 
the major industrial economies (cf. Table 2.1). This puzzling outcome is not due to a 
lack of investment opportunities in the German economy, but several informal 
mechanisms, which made the German economy much less open to FDI than the 
liberal FDI laws would suggest. First, most of the largest companies in the banking, 
services, mining, manufacturing, utilities and transportation industries were owned 
by the state, and many of them enjoyed a monopolistic market position, deterring 
foreign investors136. Second, a complex web of cross-shareholding among the major 
German industrial and financial firms (the so called ‘Deutschland AG’) made it 
difficult for foreign companies to buy large stakes in major German companies. 
Third, German corporate governance laws, which required the participation of 
worker representatives on supervisory boards were seen with suspicion by many 
potential foreign investors, in particular those from the US. Fourth, the German 
Cartel Office pursued the “most stringent anti-trust policy in Europe”137 and actively 
blocked some attempted foreign takeovers in the name of competition laws. Finally, 
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when hostile takeover bids by foreign MNCs became public, the German 
government often informally encouraged large companies and banks to put together 
German ‘counter-bids’138. The ‘fear’ of foreign takeovers was greatest in the mid-
1970s after the acquisition of a 25% stake of Krupp by the Iranian government and 
14% of Daimler-Benz by the Kuwaiti government “touched off a storm”139. However, 
towards the end of the 1980s, most of these fears seemed to have dissipated when 
the German government facilitated the gradual dismantling of the cross-
shareholding structure140, proceeded with the privatization of state companies and 
created, in 1991, a national Investment Promotion Agency, the Zentrum für die 
Betreuung von Auslandsinvestoren (ZfA)141. 
 
Canada: ‘More than oil, trees and water’ 
Canada significantly tightened its FDI regulation in 1973 through several 
amendments to the Foreign Investment Laws, which created a stringent review 
mechanism that was to be administered by the newly created Foreign Investment 
Review Agency (FIRA). According to the new law, all investments into existing or 
new businesses in Canada by a foreign acquirer with more than 250,000USD assets 
had to be approved by the FIRA on the grounds that it will ‘benefit Canada’.142 In 
comparison, the FIRA took its mandate more seriously than similar agencies in other 
                                                          
138 Brech and Sharp, Inward Investment: Policy Options for the United Kingdom, 20. 
139 Safarian, Multinational Enterprise and Public Policy : A Study of the Industrial Countries, 326. 
140 Cf. Pepper D. Culpepper, "Institutional Change in Contemporary Capitalism: Coordinated 
Financial Systems since 1990," World Politics 57, no. 2 (2005). 
141 Now ‘Germany Trade&Invest (GTAI)’ 
142 The criteria how to measure these benefits were unclear, creating uncertainty. Safarian, 
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countries and intervened very actively in subsequent years, rejecting at least 15 per 
cent of the applications made by foreign investors143. And indeed Canada was the 
only country among the major industrial economies in which the stock of FDI 
relative to GDP decreased throughout the 1970s and 1980s (cf. Table 2.1). The share 
of Canadian industry controlled by foreign investors fell sharply144 to levels that 
were closer to those in other industrial economies. In the early 1980s, however, the 
Canadian government started to backtrack on this approach. According to 
Safarian145 a series of studies by the Economic Council of Canada played an important 
role in these developments by shifting the emphasis to “the broader issue of the 
generation and diffusion of innovations” and the “different roles played by domestic 
and foreign-owned firms in the process of producing and distributing knowledge”. 
After winning the elections in 1984, the conservative government of Brian Mulroney, 
demonstrating a “much more welcoming attitude to FDI”146, closed the FIRA and 
replaced it with a new agency called Investment Canada, which didn’t reject any 
formal investment application throughout the 1980s147 and instead started “scouring 
the globe trying hard to persuade foreign investors that Canada is more than oil, 
trees and water”148. 
 
                                                          
143 Tolchin and Tolchin, Buying into America : How Foreign Money Is Changing the Face of Our Nation, 
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Japan: From formal to informal restrictions 
Japanese outward FDI increased sharply throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In 
contrast, the government remained reluctant to allow foreign investors access to the 
Japanese economy. Even though the government responded to the persistent 
pressures from the OECD, the USA, UK and MNCs149 to liberalize its FDI policy by 
gradually opening up more sectors to foreign investments throughout the 1970s150 
and by finally abolishing the Foreign Investment Law altogether in 1980 and 
replacing the approval procedure with a notification-only system, FDI inflows into 
Japan remained extraordinarily low in a comparative perspective (cf. Table 2.1). An 
important reason for this anomaly was that instead of opening up to FDI, the 
Japanese government and businesses, similarly to Germany, simply shifted the focus 
of FDI restrictions from formal government regulations to informal government and 
business practices151: First, the application of the ‘anti-monopoly law’ became 
notably stricter when judging potential foreign investments. Second, the private 
sector, supported by the government, extended its sophisticated cross-shareholding 
structure (the so-called keiretsu), both horizontally (particularly prominent among 
Japanese banks) as well as vertically (along the supply chains) to protect each other 
from foreign takeovers. Third, several structural factors of the Japanese economy 
further discouraged foreign investors152: most business was done within the 
conglomerates and it was extremely difficult for a foreign investor to get access to 
                                                          
149 See Dennis J. Encarnation and Mark Mason, "Neither Miti nor America: The Political Economy of 
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these networks. For example, because the conglomerates possessed their own 
distribution systems there were no independent large distributors in Japan, which 
made it very difficult for foreign companies to sell their products. In addition, it was 
difficult for foreign companies to find adequate staff because employers were 
expected to provide the necessary training themselves as well as to grant them very 
extensive social protections. Lastly, the rapidly appreciating yen made the costs of 
business in Japan were very high for foreign companies. As a whole, this meant that 
the formal liberalization of 1980 had in fact “little meaning in practice”153. M&A 
remained “practically unavailable in Japan even after the dismantling of most official 
barriers to FDI”154. 
 
In a global perspective, the period from 1973 to the early 1990s was thus an 
important transition phase during which the attitude of governments, policymakers 
and publics in the major industrial economies towards FDI became increasingly 
positive, starting in the UK in the late 1970s and spreading to France, Germany and 
Canada in the mid-1980s. Overall, the USA and Japan remained somewhat more 
reserved about the benefits of inward FDI, at least until the crash of the Japanese 
stock market in 1992. As Japan entered a long period of economic stagnation, US 
concerns about the ‘Japanese challenge’ and about FDI more generally started to 
dissipate. At the same time, the Western triumphalism in the aftermath of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union encouraged further changes in predominant 
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economic narratives, leading to a renewed re-thinking of the economic meaning of 
inward FDI, which is described in the next chapter. 
 
SYNTHESIS: THE ‘OLD’ PERCEPTION OF FDI 
The dominant perception of FDI in the period of statism of the 1960s and 1970s was 
thus rather skeptical. Foreign MNCs were seen as ‘opportunistic’ agents that could 
have a positive short-term impact on a national economy, but they could not be 
trusted to act in the national interest of long-term economic development. There 
were primarily three distinct categories of perceived benefits of FDI, which received 
varying emphasis in the political discourse about FDI according to a country’s most 
pressing needs: First, countries with balance of payments concerns (primarily the 
USA before 1973) appreciated the positive accounting effect on the capital account155. 
Second, countries (and especially regions within European countries) with high 
levels of unemployment saw FDI as a precious supplier of jobs, more specifically 
large quantities of low-value-adding blue-collar employment in the manufacturing 
sector156. Third, governments and policymakers of economies lagging behind the 
‘technological frontier’ (in particular Europe and Canada) saw FDI as an opportunity 
to import more advanced technology and managerial skills, especially if foreign 
MNCs cooperated with local companies through joint venture arrangements. 
However, despite these perceived benefits, governments remained sceptical of FDI. 
                                                          
155 Even though research has shown that due to MNCs’ higher propensity to import the net effect of 
increased FDI on the balance of payments is close to zero. See Graham and Krugman 1989. 
156 Again, research has demonstrated that MNCs propensity to import in reality largely annuls the net 
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Three concerns were highlighted in particular: First, it was very widely seen as a 
problem if the major strategic decisions of local businesses were taken abroad. It was 
feared that foreign executives would ignore the development needs of host 
economies and instead act entirely in their own interest or even in the interest of 
their home country government (for example, by limiting FDI to the low-value 
added production processes while keeping the high-value adding activities at 
home). Second, the competition from MNCs was not always welcome, especially 
when the latter were perceived to hold ‘unfair’ advantages over domestic rivals 
(such as asymmetric financial power, economies of scale, oligopolistic market 
positions, etc.). It was feared that rather than increasing the productivity of 
indigenous firms, competition from MNCs may overwhelm and destroy them, 
leading to industrial ‘truncation’ and ever increasing dependence on foreign 
technologies. Third, most countries attempted to protect ‘national security’ and 
‘national culture’ by restricting FDI into specific sectors (e.g. defense industry, 
domestic transportation, energy, telecommunications, radio and television stations,  
newspapers, etc.). 
Not surprisingly, the ambiguous perception of inward FDI was accompanied by 
ambiguous policies. Partly because of the perceived positive economic effects of FDI, 
partly because of the acknowledgment that a more protectionist policy would be 
self-defeating and counterproductive, most advanced industrial economies refrained 
from strongly restrictive policies157 and approved or chose to ignore the majority of 
FDI projects. Yet, governments, policymakers and publics alike were far from 
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enthusiastic about these contributions to their economy. The general policy stance in 
this period may thus be best described as ‘reluctantly permissive’. From the late 
1970s onwards, this started to change as FDI was gradually perceived in a more 
favourable light. In particular, the neoliberal narrative that emerged in the late 1970s, 
strongly embraced the free flow of capital158 and, as a corollary of this general 
principle, portrayed inward FDI as a positive economic force that enhances 
competition and thereby the productivity and efficiency of domestic industries. 
Accordingly, the narrative advocated for a ‘neutral’ FDI policy, which does not 
discriminate against foreign firms. But it still considered inward FDI as only a 
‘means to an end’ (that is, to improve the efficiency of national firms and industries) 
and it did not generally advocate for national governments to actively attract inward 
FDI. These important evolutions only unfolded in the 1990s, as the next chapter will 
elaborate. 
 
                                                          
158 Cf. Abdelal, Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance; Chwieroth, Capital Ideas: The Imf and the 
Rise of Financial Liberalization. 
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Chapter 3 . FDI AS AN END: THE ‘CUTTING EDGE OF GLOBALIZATION’, 
1990-2007 
 “Raymond Vernon (…) observed in 1977 (…) that ‘the multinational enterprise has 
come to be seen as the embodiment of almost anything disconcerting about modern 
industrial society.’ Yet now it is only a slight exaggeration to say that it is seen as the 
reverse, as the embodiment of modernity and the prospect of wealth: full of 
technology, rich in capital, replete with skilled jobs. Governments all around the 
world (…) are queuing up to attract multinationals.” 
The Economist, 27 March 19931 
 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, government attitudes towards FDI inflows 
began to gradually warm up in the 1980s when the meaning and significance of FDI 
inflows in dominant policy discourses started being sketched in a notably more 
favourable light. Rather than as a threat to the development of national industries, 
the neoliberal narrative portrayed FDI inflows as a useful economic means that has 
the potential to strengthen national industries by exposing them to international 
competition. In the early 1990s, the rise to prominence of the globalization narrative 
led to a further shift towards an even more favourable evaluation of the meaning of 
inward FDI. Proclaiming the growing economic irrelevance of national boundaries, 
the narrative essentially portrayed the world economy as a system consisting of 
‘nationality-less’ globally mobile multinational companies and national territories 
that can serve as their preferred locations of production. Within this logic, inward 
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FDI were re-conceptualized as a crucial driver of nations’ economic prosperity. In 
brief, it was argued – and soon taken for granted – that FDI inflows were at the same 
time an important cause as well as an outcome of a country’s national 
competitiveness. Thereby, the globalization narrative firmly defined FDI inflows as an 
inherently ‘good’ and highly desirable economic object; that is, a macroeconomic end 
in and of itself. 
The profundity of these transformations was reflected in an article published in The 
Economist in 2001, which described these developments as follows: 
“Foreign direct investment is ‘globalisation’ in its most potent form. (…) Economists and 
governments agree these days on the crucial importance of foreign direct investment. They see 
it both as the global market’s ‘seal of approval’ on a country’s policies and prospects, and as a 
force, especially in developing countries, for far-reaching economic change. This consensus is 
surprising when you remember that FDI remains politically sensitive in many poor, and some 
not-so-poor, countries. But the benefits are so great that reservations on this account have 
been put aside. The point about FDI is that it is far more than mere ‘capital’: it is a uniquely 
potent bundle of capital, contracts, and managerial and technological knowledge. It is the 
cutting edge of globalisation.”2 
This ‘new consensus’ about the meaning of inward FDI was strongly mirrored in the 
evolution of FDI policies during the same period. Throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s, countries around the world proceeded to cut regulatory restrictions on FDI 
inflows and at the same time started to create increasingly ambitious programs of 
investment promotion and attraction. The focus of FDI policy thus clearly moved 
away from attempts to develop regulatory instruments aimed at minimizing the 
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negative effects of MNCs and shifted instead towards the development of policies 
aimed at attracting them. Indeed, this policy shift was so pronounced that the main 
areas of debate in FDI policy soon centred not anymore on debating the benefits and 
costs of inward FDI, but on how to avoid the escalation of inter-governmental 
incentives ‘bidding wars’ for foreign investors3. At the same time, although attitudes 
towards inward FDI of mass publics did not quite embrace the same enthusiasm for 
inward FDI as this ‘new consensus’ among policy experts suggests, they did clearly 
become more favourable too and, maybe most importantly, allowed the rapidly 
increasing levels of inward FDI and foreign economic ownership to gradually turn 
into an uncontroversial political ‘non-issue’. 
The present chapter will elaborate these developments in some more detail. It will 
first give a brief overview of some of the most important evolutions in the nature 
and broad patterns of global FDI flows in the 1990s and early 2000s. Then it will 
proceed to further develop the transformation of the predominant social 
representation of inward FDI in the early 1990s and provide a summary overview of 
its resonance in the USA, UK, France, Germany, Canada and Japan. 
 
GLOBAL TRENDS 
In a historical perspective, the increases in global FDI flows observed throughout the 
1990s and 2000s are astonishing: Average annual global FDI flows have grown no 
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York: Routledge, 2007), 20. 
 141 
 
less than ten-fold between the six-year periods of 1985-1990 and 2005-2010 from 0.14 
to 1.5 trillion current USD4. Furthermore, estimates of total assets, value added, the 
number of people employed or total sales of foreign affiliates all point in the same 
direction, confirming this notable increase in the importance of foreign direct 
investments in the global economy5, with a variety of indicators suggesting that the 
operations of foreign affiliates account for no less than one third of total production 
in the present-day world economy. 
Compared to the global patterns in the 1960s and 1970s, this dramatic growth in 
global FDI flows has been characterized by several important transformations. In 
terms of economic geography, the source and recipient countries of global FDI flows 
have become increasingly diverse. As Figure 3.1 illustrates, FDI inflows had 
traditionally been strongly concentrated in developed economies. From the early 
1970s (from when the data is available) until the 2000s, advanced economies 
accounted for more than half and up to 85 percent of annual global FDI inflows, with 
a majority going to only the six largest advanced economies6. Emerging and 
developing economies normally received less than a third of global FDI inflows and 
                                                          
4 Own calculations based on UNCTAD Stat database. Period-averages are more meaningful indicators 
than annual levels because they are less sensitive to short-term volatilities. 
5 Cf. UNCTAD’s World Investment Reports (various issues). For a further discussion of the 
importance to distinguish between these measures see Robert E. Lipsey, "Foreign Direct Investment 
and the Operations of Multinational Firms: Concepts, History, and Data," NBER Working Paper Series 
No. 8665(2001); Robert C. Feenstra et al., "Report on the State of Available Data for the Study of 
International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment," ibid.No. 16254(2010); Robert E. Lipsey, 
"Measuring the Location of Production in a World of Intangible Productive Assets, Fdi, and Intrafirm 
Trade," Review of Income and Wealth 56(2010); Andrew Kerner, "What We Talk About When We Talk 
About Foreign Direct Investment," International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 4 (2014). 
6 Other important recipients of inward FDI were Belgium and Luxembourg, Spain, and the 
Netherlands, and from the 1990s increasingly China. Table A-3.1 in the appendix shows that only 
seven countries (USA, China, UK, Belgium and Luxembourg, France, Germany and Canada) account 
for 50 percent of the cumulative total FDI inflows from 1970 to 2013. A total of 20 countries (the seven 
plus Spain, the Netherlands, Brazil, Singapore, Australia, Russia, the British Virgin Islands, Mexico, 
Sweden, Italy, India, Switzerland and Ireland) account for more than 75% of all global FDI flows since 
1970. 
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their share decreased sharply after the debt crises of the 1980s as well as the financial 
crises in emerging markets in the late 1990s. Moreover, about half of FDI going to 
developing economies was absorbed by only four countries: China (including Hong 
Kong), Brazil, Mexico and Singapore7. In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2007-09 these patterns started to change notably and the share of FDI flows going 
to developed economies fell below 50 per cent8. At the same time, multinational 
companies from emerging markets, and especially from China, started to 
internationalize their value chains, leading to similarly strong increases in outward 
FDI from developing economies9. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 The strong increases of FDI inflows into other developing economies in the 2000s went primarily to 
Russia, India and the British Virgin Islands (holding company FDI). 
8 Note, however, that a non-negligble part of the FDI going to developing economies in the late 2000s 
is accounted for by developing country tax havens such as the British Virgin Islands (which 
accounted alone for more than 6 per cent of global FDI inflows in 2013), the Cayman Islands, 
Barbados or Bermuda. Cf. Lipsey, "Measuring the Location of Production in a World of Intangible 
Productive Assets, Fdi, and Intrafirm Trade," 103. 
9 The global share of outward FDI from developed economies decreased from 95 per cent in 1990 and 
88 per cent in 2000 to as little as 61 per cent in 2013 (UNCTAD Stat database). On emerging market 
multinationals, see Ravi Ramamurti and Jitendra V. Singh, Emerging Multinationals in Emerging 
Markets  (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Mauro F. Guillen and 
Esteban Garcia-Canal, "The American Model of the Multinational Firm and the "New" Multinationals 
from Emerging Economies," Academy of Management Perspectives 23, no. 2 (2009); Ravi Ramamurti, 
"What Is Really Different About Emerging Market Multinationals?," Global Strategy Journal 2, no. 1 
(2012). 
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Figure 3.1. The share of total annual FDI flows going to developed and developing 
economies, 1970-2013 
 
SOURCE: Own calculations, based on UNCTAD Stats database. NOTE: The principal countries 
accounting for sharp increase in FDI going to developing economies in the late 2000s are: Russia, 
India and the British Virgin Islands. 
 
At the same time, patterns of global FDI patterns also reflect important changes in 
production processes and company strategies that underlie them. The most common 
view of an FDI flow typically purports a manufacturing company from country A 
establishing a factory in country B. While these forms of international investment 
flows certainly do exist in large numbers, this type of ‘classical’ FDI accounts for a 
gradually decreasing share of total global FDI flows. Especially over the last two 
decades, the patterns of global FDI flows have become increasingly complex. Today, 
a majority of FDI flows are not in manufacturing but in the service sector, a very 
substantial part is based on the acquisition of existing firms rather than the 
establishment of new plants or offices (so-called ‘greenfield’ investments), and an 
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ever increasing share of international financial flows that are officially counted as 
‘FDI’ are in fact monetary transactions channelled through holding companies in 
low-tax jurisdictions, which involve little or no industrial activity. 
To assess the degree of the sectoral shifts in global FDI, Figure 3.2 shows the 
estimated percentage of the sectoral FDI stock as a share of the total FDI stock in 
developed and developing economies in 1990 and 2012. It illustrates that - in 
developed as well as developing economies - the share of the FDI stock in the 
services sector has indeed increased strongly, while the share of FDI going into 
manufacturing industries has decreased. In part, this sectoral shift is a natural 
reflection of the growing importance of the service sector in the global economy in 
general. Yet, Figure 3.2 equally shows that in both developed and developing 
economies the share of FDI going into the service sector has also increased more 
rapidly than the average contribution of the service sector to GDP (the latter is 
indicated by the black lines in Figure 3.2)10; presumably, a phenomenon that was 
driven primarily by the privatization of state-owned services industries on the one 
hand11 and the global liberalization of finance on the other12. At the same time, 
despite this notable internationalization of the service industries in recent years, 
                                                          
10 For example: From 1990 to 2012, the share of the FDI stock in developed economies going to the 
service sector increased by 18 per cent (from 50 to 68 per cent), even though the value added to GDP 
by the service sector increased by only 10 per cent in the same period (from 64 to 74 per cent). In 
developing economies, the share of the FDI stock in service industries increased by 15 per cent (from 
48 to 63), even though the increase of services as a share of GDP was only of 9 per cent (from 47 to 56). 
11 As many services are difficult to trade, FDI is essential for many service companies to access 
markets. 
12 About one third (5.4 trillion USD) of the total FDI stock in services, estimated to have reached close 
to 15 trillion USD in 2012, is accounted for by the finance industry (4.5 trillion by business activities, 
2.1 trillion in trading industries, about 1.5 trillion in transport, storage and communications, and the 
remainder in a variety of other service sectors). See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014: Investing 
in the Sdgs: An Action Plan  (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2014), Web appendix table 24. 
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Figure 3.2 also illustrates that it does not yet reach the degrees of internationalization 
that are observed in the manufacturing industries13. 
Figure 3.2. The estimated sectoral share of the total inward FDI stock compared to 
the sectoral share of GDP in developed and developing economies in 1990 and 
2012  
 
SOURCE: Sectoral share of FDI stock: Own calculations, based on UNCTAD WIR 2014, web annex 
table 24; Sectoral share of GDP: Own calculations based on WBDI database. NOTE: Black lines 
indicate the approximate share of value added to GDP of each sector in the same year. If the share of 
the sectoral FDI stock is higher than the average value added to GDP by this sector, it indicates that a 
sector is relatively internationalized. 
 
A closely related phenomenon are the very large volumes of cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) in the 1990s and 2000s. Figure 3.3, which shows the annual 
value of sales in cross-border M&A transactions as a percentage of the value of 
                                                          
13 For example: The figure shows that even though the manufacturing industries in developed 
economies contributed on average less than 20 per cent to national GDP in 1990, more than 40 per 
cent of the total FDI stock in developed economies was in manufacturing; in contrast, even though the 
primary sector in developing economies contributed close to 40 per cent of GDP in 1990, less than 10 
per cent of the FDI stock was in that sector, etc. 
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annual FDI inflows for developed and developing economies14, illustrates that cross-
border acquisitions can account for more than half of inward FDI flows to developed 
economies, in particular during the M&A waves of the 1990s and early 2000s. In 
comparison, M&A was somewhat less important in developing economies where it 
accounted for between 10 and 30 percent of total FDI inflows. 
Figure 3.3. The value of cross-border M&A sales as a percentage of the value of 
annual FDI inflows in developed and developing economies 
 
SOURCE: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2014. Web Annex Tables 01 (FDI flows) and 09 (M&A). 
NOTE: This graph is for illustration purposes only and has to be interpreted with caution; even 
though FDI and M&A are closely related, the estimates derive from different measurement 
methodologies (see Footnote 14). 
 
Another important characteristic of the evolution of global FDI flows in the 1990s 
and 2000s are the increasingly complicated ownership chains that underlie them. In 
                                                          
14 It is important to bear in mind that even though the values of FDI inflows and cross-border M&A 
sales are closely related, they are not exactly congruent. For example, reinvested earnings or intra-
firm loans, which are counted as FDI, are not counted as M&A. In contrast, acquisitions of less than 
10% of a company’s total equity stock are not counted as FDI (UNCTAD, World Investment Report 
1996: Investment, Trade and International Policy Arrangements  (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 
1996), 11.) 
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particular, inter- or intra-company capital flows to holding companies in tax havens 
– jurisdictions that offer very low withholding tax rates on dividends paid from 
subsidiaries to parent firms15 – account for an ever growing share of global financial 
flows that are officially classified as ‘FDI’. For example, a detailed analysis of US FDI 
has established that the share of US outward FDI that goes to holding companies in 
the first instance has increased from about 10 percent in 1982 to close to 50 percent (!) 
in 201316. The ultimate goal and destination of so-called ‘special purpose entity’ 
(SPE) FDI is a priori unclear: they can be channelled towards a company in a third 
country, they can remain ‘parked’ in the tax haven jurisdiction for an extended 
period of time, or they can be re-routed to the country of origin. These developments 
imply that it has become increasingly difficult to track the actual purpose and origins 
and destinations of global FDI flows17. 
Finally, many scholars and commentators have argued that the gradual transition 
from a Fordist logic of industrial mass production to dynamics described as post-
Fordist ‘knowledge economies’ have fostered changes in corporate strategies that 
have altered the type of economic activities that MNCs delegate to foreign affiliates. 
                                                          
15 The most important examples are the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the UK, Ireland, Switzerland, The 
British Virgin Islands, Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. Cf. Lipsey, "Measuring the Location of 
Production in a World of Intangible Productive Assets, Fdi, and Intrafirm Trade," S103; Ronen Palan, 
Richard Murphy, and Christian Chavagneux, Tax Havens : How Globalization Really Works  (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010). 
16 See Marilyn Ibarra-Caton and Raymond J. Mataloni, "Direct Investment Positions for 2013: Country 
and Industry Detail," ed. US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business (Washington, 
DC2014), 7-8. 
17 See Alfons Weichenrieder and Jack Mintz, "What Determines the Use of Holding Companies and 
Ownership Chains?," Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Papers 0803(2008); Lipsey, 
"Measuring the Location of Production in a World of Intangible Productive Assets, Fdi, and Intrafirm 
Trade." In some cases, data on employment, sales and value added by foreign affiliates may therefore 
be more meaningful indicators than FDI flows as such. Cf. Ibid; Kerner, "What We Talk About When 
We Talk About Foreign Direct Investment." 
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For example, Robert Reich18 and Kenichi Ohmae19 claim that in the late twentieth 
century MNCs have transformed from nationally embedded hierarchical command-
and-control organizations20 into decentralized knowledge-seeking “global webs”21. 
As a result, these scholars argue, the logic driving the internationalization of 
companies has changed too: while the traditional view of why companies expand 
abroad - summarized in Vernon and Well’s ‘product cycle theory’22 - argued that 
companies develop new products primarily in their home market and then moved 
abroad when they start to lose their competitive advantage domestically due to the 
entry of new competitors, MNCs were now seen as pursuing truly global strategies in 
which they seek to acquire highly specialized knowledge and technology from 
around the world and to adapt the latter in order to meet very specific local tastes 
and demands23. Crucially for our purposes here, these views imply that MNCs 
increasingly delegate decision-making authority and high-value-adding R&D 
activities to foreign affiliates, thereby improving the quality of the economic activities 
that are captured as FDI statistics. Empirical research that has assessed the nature 
                                                          
18 Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism. 
19 Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy. 
20 Who were “no different from the Roman Catholic Church’s approach to globalization … push[ing] 
their headquarters dogma through the system”, according to ibid., 8. 
21 Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism, 131. 
22 Louis T. Wells, The Product Life Cycle and International Trade  (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate 
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1972); Raymond Vernon, "The Product Cycle 
Hypothesis in a New International Environment," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 41, no. 4 
(1979). 
23 In the process, MNCs, according to Reich, have increasingly become “façade[s], behind which 
teems an array of decentralized groups and subgroups continuously contracting with similarly 
diffuse working units all over the world”. Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st 
Century Capitalism, 82. Or, in the words of Kenichi Ohmae: “Contemporary global corporations are 
fundamentally different. They have to serve the needs of customer segments. Instead of educating the 
‘barbarians’ to drink Coke or eat cornflakes, they have to discover the basic drinking and eating needs 
of people and serve these needs. Sometimes they come up with entirely new products and services 
that headquarters never dreamed of.”Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked 
Economy, 8-9. 
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and extent of these supposed transformations have, however, found that they are 
much less pronounced than business strategists initially suggested. On the one hand, 
‘global companies’ are far less ‘global’ than one might think. For example, Alan 
Rugman’s study found that in the 1990s over 80 per cent of the sales of the world’s 
largest (and supposedly most highly internationalized) firms were still concentrated 
in their ‘home regions’24. On the other hand, increases in R&D activities within 
foreign affiliates are also far less pronounced than the globalization narrative tends 
to suggest. For example, an influential study by John Cantwell showed that MNCs 
had already delegated some R&D activities to their affiliates in the 1960s and 1970s 
MNCs and that this phenomenon in fact increased only very slowly in the following 
decades25. Similarly, a more recent study by the US BEA found that in 2004 85 per 
cent of the total R&D expenditures by US MNCs were still accounted for by parent 
firms and only 15 per cent by foreign affiliates even though the latter accounted for 
27 per cent of companies’ total value added26. Compared to 1994, these figures 
corresponded to a 3 per cent increase in both R&D as well as total value added by 
foreign affiliates27. As a whole, the evidence thus seems to suggest that the growing 
internationalization of MNC operations is a real trend, but that the extent of this 
change is much more modest than it is frequently assumed. 
 
                                                          
24 Rugman, The Regional Multinationals : Mnes and "Global" Strategic Management. 
25 Cantwell, "The Globalisation of Technology: What Remains of the Product Cycle Model?," 156. 
26 Daniel R. Yorgason, "Research and Development Activities of U.S. Multinational Companies: 
Preliminary Results from the 2004 Benchmark Survey," Survey of Current Business (2007): 23.  
27 Ibid., 24. 
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In sum, the patterns and nature of global FDI flows in the late twentieth century 
have experienced a number of transformations: the absolute levels of global FDI 
have increased sharply; the source and recipient economies have become 
increasingly diversified; the main focus of FDI activity has moved away from the 
manufacturing sector, involving a greater role of M&As in the services sector and 
strong increases in SPE FDI instead; and a slightly growing component of global FDI 
involve some R&D activities. While these changes are important, the simultaneous 
transformations in the predominant social representation of inward FDI were much 
more sweeping, as the subsequent section will elaborate. 
 
FROM THE REGULATION TO THE ATTRACTION OF INWARD FDI, 1992-2007 
Although the structural transformations in the world economy and international 
business in the late twentieth century were certainly very ‘real’, the globalization 
narrative that rose to prominence in the early 1990s interpreted these changes and 
their consequences in a very specific - and in some sense peculiar - way. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the proponents of the globalization narrative argued that the 
relationships between national economies and the world economy had transformed 
fundamentally and that the priorities for national economic development were 
increasingly subjected to the imperatives of the global economy. As I will elaborate 
below, the logic of this narrative encouraged a process of social reconstruction of the 
predominant social representation of inward FDI in relevant policy (as well as 
academic) discourses. Rather than as a threat for the development of national 
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industries – as in the statism narrative – or as a force fostering the efficiency of 
national firms – as in the neoliberalist narrative -, this new conceptualization of FDI 
inflows portrayed them as the embodiment of a nation’s economic ‘competitiveness’. At 
the same time, this remarkable transformation of the predominant perceptions of 
FDI inflows from an economic ‘problem’ into a source and symbol of economic 
competitiveness was accompanied by notable changes in government attitudes and 
policies towards foreign multinationals. 
As two FDI policy experts observed in the early 1990s: 
 “[A] fundamental reorientation of the role of government appears to be occurring, one 
that changes MNE-state relations from confrontation to co-operation. States now see the 
creation of domestic competitive advantage as a pressing national policy goal, and state 
regulation of MNEs is increasingly being driven by the competitiveness agenda.”28 
Similarly, John Dunning, pioneer and unofficial dean of scholarly research on FDI, 
argued that 
“… the increasing need to be competitive in global markets (…) has become a major 
catalyst for action  (…) [which] has led governments (…) to reconsider the factors 
influencing the competitiveness of their own resources and competencies; and to judge 
the contribution of MNEs in this light.”29 
Crucially, the context and logic of the globalization and competitiveness narrative 
assigned a very powerful symbolic message to FDI inflows: namely, that they 
                                                          
28 Lorraine Eden and Evan H. Potter, "Introduction," in Multinationals in the Global Political Economy 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).[emphases added] 
29 John H. Dunning, "Governments and Multinational Enterprises: From Confrontation to Co-
Operation?," in Multinationals in the Global Political Economy, ed. Lorraine Eden and Evan H. Potter 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 70. 
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represent a “vote of confidence”30 or “seal of approval”31 of a nation’s economic 
policies and prospects by global markets (or, in reverse, that the absence of FDI is a 
sign to worry and a reason for ‘disappointment’32 or even ‘embarrassment’33) and 
that they thus serve as a useful proxy indicating the economic success of national 
economies per se. The reasoning underlying these views is well summarized in the 
following passage: 
 “In the supposedly new world of global competition in which we now live, places as 
well as firms must, so we are told, become ‘competitive’. Places are no different from 
other commodities, and their value therefore depends on how consumers and investors – 
those with money to spend – rank them against their competitors. In this game, attracting 
inward investment can be both an instrument and an indication of success. ‘Competitive’ 
places are defined as those that can attract FDI, and FDI in turn is said to make places 
more ‘competitive’ (…) To achieve these benefits aspiring recipient areas should (so the 
story continues) enhance their ability to attract and embed FDI.”34  
Thereby, FDI inflows were reconceptualised at the same time as a “prime instrument 
for national governments to leverage their competitiveness”35 and “perhaps the 
                                                          
30 “[I]nbound FDI expresses a vote of confidence on the part of the foreign investor in the openness of 
the economy concerned”. See Alex Jacquemin and Lucio R. Pench, Europe Competing in the Global 
Economy : Reports of the Competitiveness Advisory Group, ed. Group European Commission. 
Competitiveness Advisory (Cheltenham, UK and Lyme, NH: E. Elgar, 1997). 
31 "The Cutting Edge." 
32 For example: “By most measures, India’s economy is a disappointment. The country receives a 
paltry $3 billion a year in foreign direct investment, only a fraction of the money going into China and 
Mexico (…)”, in "Which Way to Capitalism?," The Economist, 30 May 1998. 
33 For example: “A corrupt judiciary must be reformed if embarrassingly meagre foreign direct 
investment and hoped-for privatisations are to take off (in 2003, FDI per person in Turkey was worth 
a mere $8, compared with $244 in Hungary and $110 in Poland)”. See "Babacan's Miracle," The 
Economist, 22 January 2005. 
34 John Lovering, "Mncs and Wannabes - Inward Investment, Discourses of Regional Development, 
and the Regional Service Class," in The New Competition for Inward Investment: Companies, Institutions 
and Territorial Development, ed. Nicholas A. Phelps and Philip Raines (Edward Elgar, 2003), 41-42. 
35 Thomas C. Lawton and Michael Hodges, "Promoting Competitiveness: Inward Investment 
Incentives and Enterprise Policy," in European Industrial Policy and Competitiveness: Concepts and 
Instruments, ed. Thomas C. Lawton (Basingstoke and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 207. 
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ultimate benchmark of competitiveness”36; that is, a cause as well as an outcome of 
national economic success. As such, FDI inflows –rather than as a risk to be managed 
– were re-defined as being “vital to strengthening the ability of [national] economies 
to compete in global markets”37.  
A similar simultaneous transformation is mirrored in scholarly research on FDI. 
From a focus on the balance of payments and employment effects of inward FDI, 
research on FDI in international economics in the 1990s started to focus increasingly 
on its qualitative benefits, “such as the transfer of new technologies, skills, business 
practices, and production approaches”38, which came to be summarized as the idea 
of positive spillovers39. Interestingly, despite the concept’s theoretical appeal, the 
findings of empirical research attempting to identify the existence and size of these 
spillover effects are highly inconclusive40. A meta-analysis of these studies41 
suggests that the existence of any spillover effects and whether they are in fact 
positive rather than negative greatly depends on the stage of economic development 
and the presence of absorptive capacities in recipient economies. The pronounced 
                                                          
36 Ibid., 207-09. 
37 Oman, Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Competition among Governments to 
Attract Fdi, 7.[emphasis added] 
38 Ross Brown and Philip Raines, "The Changing Nature of Foreign Investment Policy in Europe: 
From Promotion to Management," in Regions, Globalization, and the Knowledge-Based Economy, ed. John 
H. Dunning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 442. 
39 The notion of ‘spillovers’ captures the idea that inward FDI has a positive effect on the productivity 
of the local economy by creating more competition in local industries through the introduction of new 
production methods (‘horizontal’ spillovers) and forcing the supplier industries to upgrade to the 
demands of globally successful companies (‘vertical’ spillovers). 
40 Holger Goerg, an economist and leading expert on FDI, wrote in 2010: “Governments around the 
globe try actively to attract multinationals to locate in their country, assuming that these companies 
bring large benefits. Yet, when it comes to empirically verifying whether such positive effects on host 
countries actually exist, and what there [sic] magnitude may be, one quickly realizes that not much is 
known”. See Foreword in Concepcion Latorre, Impact of Foreign-Owned Companies on Host Economies : 
A Computable General Equilibrium Approach  (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc, 2012), i. 
41 Meyer and Sinani, "When and Where Does Foreign Direct Investment Generate Positive Spillovers? 
A Meta-Analysis." 
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contrast between the mixed and ambivalent findings of the economics discipline on 
the effects of inward FDI on the one hand and the nearly unanimous enthusiasm of 
policymakers for the attraction of the latter on the other is indeed somewhat 
puzzling. In a review essay, two leading FDI economists interpreted this gap as 
suggestive evidence that policymakers must somehow have witnessed certain 
positive effects of FDI, which are not captured by their empirical tests42. A simpler – 
but possibly more plausible – explanation is that policymakers are in fact less 
interested in the robustness of empirical findings than academic economists may 
wish for and are instead more sensitive to the normative and symbolic values 
transmitted by policy narratives, as suggested in Chapter 1. 
 
At the same time, the profound changes in the understanding of inward FDI are also 
strongly reflected in the policies towards MNCs that countries pursued in the 1990s 
and early 2000s. In contrast to the statist period in which the focus of inward FDI 
policy was on how to best regulate MNCs in order to minimize their negative 
impacts and the ‘neutral’ approach suggested by the neoliberal narrative, the focus 
of FDI policy in the 1990s clearly shifted towards how to attract and retain foreign 
subsidiaries. While FDI inflows had been primarily seen as an economic challenge 
demanding industrial policy actions in order to enhance the ability of domestic firms 
to compete with their foreign competitors, they were now reconstructed as a central 
constitutive component of any strategy for a national ‘industrial’ – or what was now 
                                                          
42 Robert E. Lipsey and Fredrik Sjoeholm, "The Impact of Inward Fdi on Host Countries: Why Such 
Different Answers?," in Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development?, ed. Theodore H. Moran, 
Magnus Blomstrom, and Edward M. Graham (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International 
Economics, 2005), 41. 
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preferably called ‘competitiveness’ - policy43. The impact of this redefinition of FDI 
inflows as a highly desirable economic object on the behaviour of states can be 
observed most readily in two dimensions: On the one hand, as the evolution of the 
OECD FDI regulatory restrictiveness index44 presented in Figure 3.4 shows, all of the 
major advanced economies continued liberalizing their FDI regimes throughout the 
1990s and early 2000s. On the other hand, they simultaneously established and/or 
significantly expanded upon existing investment promotion and attraction 
programs; efforts, which one leading expert described simply as “the new 
approach”45 in national FDI policy46.  
                                                          
43 See Robert Pearce, "Industrial Policy, Mnes and National Technology," in Global Competition and 
Technology: Essays in the Creation and Application Knowledge by Multinationals, ed. Robert Pearce 
(Houndsmills, Basingstoke, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1997); Ana Teresa Tavares and Stephen Young, 
"Fdi and Multinationals: Patterns, Impacts and Policies," International Journal of the Economics of 
Business 12, no. 1 (2005). 
44 The index takes four dimensions of FDI restrictions into account: Foreign equity limitations, 
screening or approval mechanisms, employment restrictions, operational restrictions. 1 means highest 
levels of restrictions, 0 means no restrictions. See OECD, "Fdi Regulatory Restrictiveness Index,"  
http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm.  
45 Edward Safarian, "Host Country Policies Towards Inward Foreign Direct Investment in the 1950s 
and 1990s," Transnational Corporations 8, no. 2 (1999): 108. 
46 Which focuses on how “to improve the country-specific capabilities which attract and retain the 
increasingly mobile firm-specific intangible assets” rather than on the regulation of inward FDI. Ibid. 
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Figure 3.4. The evolution of the OECD FDI restrictiveness index for the six major 
advanced economies over time 
 
SOURCE: Golub and Koyama (2006)47 
 
Certainly, some countries and especially regional governments had pursued policies 
to attract FDI for a longer time48. However, both the number of government bodies 
pursuing FDI attraction policies49 as well as the amount of financial resources they 
spent to attract FDI increased to unprecedented scales in the 1990s and 2000s50 
(irrespectively of the serious doubts surrounding the effectiveness of such policies51). 
In the words of John Lovering, policymakers’ enthusiasm for inward FDI was so 
                                                          
47 Stephen Golub and Takeshi Koyama, "Oecd's Fdi Regulatory Restrictiveness Index: Revision and 
Extension to More Economies," OECD Working Paper Series (2006). 
48 For example, Singapore, Ireland, Israel and some US states. 
49 “Although very few investments received location incentives in the 1960s, such incentives are 
extremely common today.” Thomas, Competing for Capital, 3. Similarly, while only a handful of 
countries had a national Investment Promotion Agency in 1980, more than 170 existed in 2012. 
50 For example, an OECD study found that the number of US states offering incentives as well as the 
number of programmes in each state both roughly doubled from 1977 to 1996. In the case of Alabama 
(the only state for which such data was available), the estimated cost of the incentives granted per job 
created rose from about $4,000 in the late 1970s to $168,000 (!) in the early 1990s. See Oman, Policy 
Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Competition among Governments to Attract Fdi, 58 ff. 
51 Cf. Tavares and Young, "Fdi and Multinationals: Patterns, Impacts and Policies," 4. 
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great that “[t]he corridors of the regional economic governance ring to peans of 
praise for inward investment, and a large FDI ‘catch’ is likely to be lavishly 
celebrated in the local media, and the press releases of development agencies, 
companies, and politicians.”52 Tellingly for the extent of this change, by the late 
1990s dominant debates about FDI policy had shifted away from whether to restrict 
or regulate MNCs to how to avoid ‘bidding wars’ among governments to attract 
MNCs53. The following sections will very briefly describe these evolutions in some 
more detail for the six large advanced economies that are at the focus of this 
overview. 
 
United States: The Dogs Don’t Bark 
More than in other countries, the US national governments’ approach to FDI policy 
in the 1990s and 2000s focused primarily on the creation of a liberal international 
investment regime. Accordingly, with regards to inward FDI, the priority of the 
presidential administrations of Bush Sr., Clinton and Bush Jr. was to uphold the 
principles of national treatment and non-discrimination for foreign investors54. As 
suggested by the OECD index (see Figure 3.4), the USA left its generally liberal FDI 
                                                          
52 Lovering, "Mncs and Wannabes - Inward Investment, Discourses of Regional Development, and the 
Regional Service Class," 42-43. 
53 See, for example, Mody, Foreign Direct Investment and the World Economy; Oman, Policy Competition 
for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Competition among Governments to Attract Fdi; Thomas, 
Competing for Capital. Or as observed by Tavares and Teixeira: “Multinational firms are sought after 
(literally chased) by nearly all countries nowadays.” Ana Teresa Tavares and Aurora Teixeira, 
Multinationals, Clusters and Innovation : Does Public Policy Matter?  (Basingstoke and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 1. 
54 Nicholas A. Phelps and Philip Raines, The New Competition for Inward Investment: Companies, 
Institutions and Territorial Development  (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 
2003), 62. 
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laws55 largely unchanged throughout the 1990s and 2000s. At the same time, in 
comparison to most other countries, the national government was less active in the 
promotion of inward FDI56. Instead, state-level governments pursued increasingly 
aggressive strategies in this area and the federal government passively played an 
important role through its choice – unlike the EC - not to impose any institutional 
constraints on the ensuing FDI incentives ‘bidding wars’ among local 
governments57. Even though some US states had started to promote inward 
investment from abroad as early as the 1970s, the scale and scope of investment 
promotion expanded dramatically throughout the 1990s58 and public spending on 
investment incentives reached as much as US$46.8 billion in 2005 alone (roughly 
three times as much as the comparable total expenses within the EU)59. 
During the same period, the FDI stock in the US economy grew at unprecedented 
speed from less than 9 percent of GDP (or 539 billion current USD) in 1990 to over 24 
percent of GDP (or 3551 billion current USD) in 2007. The most remarkable aspect 
about these breath-taking developments from a political perspective is the fact that it 
was largely ignored by most political actors. While the comparatively insignificant 
                                                          
55 The laws generally aim to guarantee foreign investors’ ‘national treatment’, while allowing three 
types of exceptions: 1) reciprocity conditions (for example in finance, insurance, air and maritime 
transport); 2) some general restrictions in sectors perceived as ‘sensitive’ such as telecommunications, 
TV and radio, nuclear energy, etc.; 3) the ‘Exon-Florio’ provision allowing the President to review 
(and, if necessary, block) any foreign investment on the grounds of ‘national security’ (such 
presidential vetoes have, however, been extremely rare; see OECD, Oecd Reveiws of Foreign Direct 
Investment: United States  (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995), 
54.) 
56 It established the first national Investment Promotion Agency Invest in America, later renamed Select 
USA, only in March 2007. The official reason for its creation was to “promote American 
competitiveness”. See WTO, "Trade Policy Reviews," (World Trade Organization). WT/TPR/S/275, 
13 November 2012:4)ii)33). 
57 Thomas, Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital. 
58 Cf. OECD, Oecd Reveiws of Foreign Direct Investment: United States, 50; Oman, Policy Competition for 
Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Competition among Governments to Attract Fdi; Thomas, Competing 
for Capital; Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital. 
59 Competing for Capital; Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital. 
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increases in FDI in the 1970s and 1980s had led to heated political debates and 
legislative initiatives (see Chapter 2), opposition to the much greater increases in FDI 
inflows in the 1990s was barely hearable; a fact that The Economist alluded to in the 
following way: “If the most urgent question for Republicans in 1998 was why there 
was so little outrage about Bill Clinton’s morals, the most urgent question for 
protectionists was why there was so little outrage about the surge in foreign 
takeovers of American companies.”60 Arguably, an important reason for this curious 
non-event is the profound transformation in the social representation of inward FDI 
described above, which one expert writing on US FDI policy in this context 
summarized as “the discursive ‘naturalization’ of inward investment [as the] route 
to economic prosperity”61. The reconceptualization of inward FDI thus seemed 
having cut off – at least for some time62 – the winds from protectionist sailing boats 
through the redefinition of FDI as an inherently desirable and thus politically 
uncontroversial economic object. 
 
Europe: A Foreign Affair 
Similar developments could also be observed in Europe where restrictions on 
inward investments were gradually removed, while investment promotion efforts 
                                                          
60 "Trial by Prosperity," The Economist, 2 January 1999. 
61 Andrew Wood, "The Politics of Orchestrating Inward Investment: Institutions, Policy and Practice 
in the Industrial Midwest," in The New Competition for Inward Investment: Companies Institutions and 
Territorial Development, ed. Nicholas A. Phelps and Philip Raines (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, 
MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 2003), 89. 
62 Some political controversies re-emerged in the mid-2000s, in particular around investment from 
China. See also the brief discussion of these developments in the Conclusions chapter.  
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were scaled up significantly63. Yet, compared to the dynamics in the USA, the 
unfolding of these events in Europe is also characterized by some nuanced 
differences. Most importantly, the EC played a key role in pushing member 
countries to liberalize their investment regimes while at the same time reducing the 
competitive pressures of incentives ‘bidding wars’. The treaties of the European 
Union guarantee the principle of national treatment for EU firms in all EU member 
countries and furthermore generally prohibit the imposition of restrictions on capital 
movements (from member countries as well as third countries)64. Although most 
member states continue to have some sectoral limitations in industries perceived to 
be particularly ‘sensitive’ (e.g. energy sector, publishing and broadcasting or air 
transport) and some form of (hardly ever used) formal review mechanisms, these 
remaining restrictions are generally not substantive. As suggested by Figure 3.4, by 
the mid-2000s the three major European economies had removed nearly all formal 
restrictions on inward FDI as the restrictiveness indexes of Germany, France and the 
UK approached the lower bound of the index’s scale65. At the same time, public 
spending on FDI attraction increased continually throughout the 1990s at the state as 
well as national levels. Nonetheless, in contrast to the USA, EC regulations on state 
                                                          
63 Two experts observed a trend “throughout Western Europe (…) towards more positive and 
receptive attitudes towards the attraction of FDI”. Brown and Raines, "The Changing Nature of 
Foreign Investment Policy in Europe: From Promotion to Management," 436. 
64 Art 63 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) establishes these principles; 
Arts. 64-66 elaborate the possible exemptions under specific circumstances 
65 Importantly, in most countries foreign investors were also allowed to bid in the privatization 
processes of formerly state-owned companies 
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aid were effective in somewhat restraining the exacerbation of investment incentives 
‘bidding wars’66. 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the UK government had been somewhat less 
concerned about FDI inflows than most of its peers in the post-war era. In the 1990s 
and 2000s it further embraced this general approach of openness toward foreign 
investment and subnational as well as the national government started to court 
foreign investors very actively. From levels which were already relatively high in 
international comparison, the UK’s inward FDI stock increased further from roughly 
20 percent of GDP (or 203 billion current USD) in 1990 to a remarkable 43 percent (or 
1229 billion current USD) in 2007. While FDI inflows in the 1960s-80s had still stirred 
some political debate (cf. Chapter 5), such worries had now disappeared nearly 
completely. Instead, the predominant reception of increasing FDI flows among 
politicians and the financial press were nothing short of enthusiastic. They were 
described as “a boon to the British economy”67, which “infect the competitive 
spirit”68 and “ginger up the economy”69; both political parties reportedly “boasted”70 
                                                          
66 The EC regulations on ‘state aid’ generally prohibit the granting of incentives, which ‘distort[s] 
intra-Community competition’, but allow for exceptions in the interest of regional development (as 
well as some more specific sectoral exceptions, f.e. schemes for the support of SMEs, specific R&D 
activities, etc.). Accordingly, ‘development areas’ can grant investment incentives up to ‘award rates’ 
of a maximum of 20 per cent of the total value of the fixed assets of an investment projects, and for 
‘least favoured regions’ up to 50 per cent. However, they are not allowed to discriminate between 
foreign and domestic investors, which should have the same access to state aid funds. In 2001, the 
total amounts of state aid (awarded to both foreign and domestic investors) ranged from a low of 0.66 
per cent of GDP (UK) to a high of 1.58 per cent (Finland) of GDP. While good data on investment 
incentives granted to foreign investors is difficult to obtain, the authors of a WTO Trade Policy 
Review observed significant variations across countries, with Ireland being the most and Italy and 
Germany the least willing to subsidy foreign investments. Furthermore, competition seemed to be 
most intense for FDI projects in the automobile, electronics and pharmaceutical sectors. See WTO, 
"Trade Policy Reviews."WT/TPR/S/3, 30 June 1995. See alsoOman, Policy Competition for Foreign 
Direct Investment: A Study of Competition among Governments to Attract Fdi; Thomas, Competing for 
Capital; Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital. 
67 "Britain's Many Options." 
68 "A Rentier Economy in Reverse," The Economist, 22 September 1990. 
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about the UK’s success to attract FDI, which they interpreted as a “vote of 
confidence”71 in the UK economy and even “a source of national pride”72. 
Accordingly, - in stark contrast to the policy discussions of the 1960s and 1970s 
focusing on how to reduce the reliance on inward FDI - in the 1990s and early 2000s 
the main concerns expressed about inward FDI now related overwhelmingly to the 
risks of losing FDI inflows (which became a particularly salient topic of debate 
surrounding the UK’s decision not to join the EMU in the mid-1990s73 and 
discussions about a first potential ‘Brexit’ in the early 2000s74). 
Developments in France during the 1990s were similar, but - due to the exceptionally 
high degree of skepticism toward inward FDI that was predominant among French 
policymakers in previous decades – in some sense more dramatic75. As the OECD’s 
FDI restrictiveness index in Figure 3.4 suggests, French FDI policy in the early 1980s 
was still highly restrictive. But under intense pressure from the EC, the investment 
regime was gradually liberalized after Mitterrand’s turn to economic liberalism in 
the mid-1980s76. Remarkably, by 2005 France had established one of the most liberal 
investment regimes in the world. As in most other countries, this gradual removal of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
69 "Down but Not Out," The Economist, 7 June 2003. 
70 "Still Coming In," The Economist, 22 January 2000. 
71 “Britain is currently a magnet for foreign investment. (…) This flow of money is widely seen as a 
vote of confidence in the British economy. Hence the symbolic importance of the government’s 
announcement that foreign investment is still going up.” See "Sunshine, with a Chance of Showers." 
[emphasis added] 
72 The full quote is: “When a British company invests in a new plant, it is a source of some satisfaction 
to the local MP whose constituency benefits. But if a foreign company opens a shiny new factory on 
these shores, it is a source of national pride and ministerial self-congratulation. Of all the enticing 
locations a footloose global capitalist might consider – from the Pearl River Delta to Northern 
Bohemia – they chose us! (…)” See "Foreign, Redirected Investment." 
73 "Ashdown on Europe," The Economist, 4 March 1995; "Britain's Many Options." 
74 "Economics Focus: Thinking the Unthinkable," The Economist, 20 October 2001. 
75 A “complete revolution” in the words of the Financial Times. See Davidson, "European Investment 
Locations: A Change of View." 
76 For an account of the details of the liberalization procedure, see OECD, "Oecd Reviews of Foreign 
Direct Investment: France," (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1996).  
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restrictions on FDI was accompanied by the simultaneous establishment of a 
government-led apparatus aimed at attracting inward FDI77; efforts that renowned 
experts judged as “energetic”78. During the same period, the FDI stock in France sky-
rocketed from less than 8 per cent of GDP (or 98 billion current USD) in 1990 to over 
48 per cent (or 1247 billion current USD) in 2007.  
Although Germany traditionally imposed relatively few formal restrictions on 
inward FDI, its bank-based system of corporate control and the cross-shareholding 
networks79 de facto strongly inhibited foreign takeovers80. As a result, the FDI stock 
in Germany was notably lower than in France or the UK (see Table 2.1) and experts 
judged Germany (together with Italy) to be generally less enthusiastic about inward 
FDI than most of its European peers81. Nonetheless, clear signs of a change in 
understanding of the role of the national economy in the world economy are also 
observable in the German economic policy discourses of the 1990s and 2000s; it 
became particularly salient in the mid-1990s when the Standort82 debate – Germany’s 
version of the globalization and competitiveness narrative – took center stage and 
substantially reframed the economic meaning of inward FDI. For example, the 
                                                          
77 As The Economist observed, “[a]fter years of keeping foreign companies at arm’s length, France is 
pulling them into its embrace.” See "France's Foreign Affair," The Economist, 12 February 1994. The 
French investment promotion efforts were centered around the network of Invest in France agencies. 
78 Brown and Raines, "The Changing Nature of Foreign Investment Policy in Europe: From Promotion 
to Management." 
79 See Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism : The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage  (Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Culpepper, 
"Institutional Change in Contemporary Capitalism: Coordinated Financial Systems since 1990." 
80 Hostile takeovers were virtually “unheard of” before Vodafone’s hostile takeover of Mannesmann in 
the year 2000. See "Deutschland Ag," Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service. 
81 Cf. Phelps and Raines, The New Competition for Inward Investment: Companies, Institutions and 
Territorial Development, 438; Oman, Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of 
Competition among Governments to Attract Fdi. 
82 The English translation of Standort is ‘location’ and the ‘Standort debate’ refers to debates about the 
quality of the German national economy as a location of economic production within the global 
economy. 
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influential Council of Economic Experts explained their reasoning about the meaning 
and significance of FDI inflows as follows: 
 “The difficulties of the German economy to overcome its growth weaknesses are 
determined by the dynamics of locational competition. In a world, in which qualified 
labour is available in many countries, in which capital and entrepreneurial activity are 
mobile across borders, in a world economy, which is becoming ever more integrated 
through the reduction of trade barriers as well as through the developments in 
communication and transport technologies, the labour force, which is tied to one Standort, 
can only find employment if their Standort can be made attractive to investments. (…) 
Neither export figures nor the real exchange rate of the German mark are good indicators 
to judge the quality of the Standort. What matters are investments, in particular 
investments of foreign companies in Germany (…) Here we witness clear warning signs: 
foreign direct investment into Germany have fallen to disappointingly low levels …”83 
Mirroring such views, Gerhard Schroeder (Chancellor from 1998 to 2005) proclaimed 
in the late 1990s that “there is no longer a ‘German model’”, instead proposing “a 
program of modernizing the German state with tax and spending cuts and adapting 
to globalization by seeking to attract foreign investment”84. Accordingly, the 
German government visibly scaled up its investment promotion efforts in the early 
2000s, which reached a peak in a disturbing ad-campaign that was widely publicized 
during the 2006 football World Cup held in Germany (see Figure 3.5). 
 
                                                          
83 Sachverstaendigenrat, "Jahresgutachten 1996/97 Des Sachverstaendigenrates Zur Begutachtung 
Der Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung," ed. Deutscher Bundestag (1997), 10-11. [Original in 
German, own translation] 
84 Ben Lieberman, "From Economic Miracle to Standort Deutschland: Exchanging Economic 
Metaphors in the Federal Republic of Germany," German Politics and Society 18, no. 2 (2000): 45. 
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Figure 3.5. Germany, the ‘Land of Ideas’… 
 
 
  
SOURCE: Scholz and Friends85 
 
Canada: Sound of Silence in Hudson Bay 
As discussed in the previous chapter, very high levels of US FDI inflows in Canada 
in the 1950s and 1960s fostered widespread concerns among Canada’s public and 
policy elites and led to the adoption of a variety of regulatory restrictions aimed at 
reducing Canada’s reliance of foreign investment inflows. From the mid-1980s 
onwards Canada started to backtrack on this approach - as illustrated in Figure 3.4 - 
and granted the principle of ‘national treatment’ to US investors through the 
adoption of NAFTA in 1988. However, in comparison to other advanced economies, 
it did maintain a review process that affected a substantial share of investment 
projects86 and also upheld more sector-specific restrictions (primarily in publishing 
                                                          
85 Scholz and Friends, "Cases: Deutschland,"  http://www.s-
f.com/scholz_friends_european_office/en/creation/cases/deutschland/. 
86 The review process had to determine that a planned FDI project would have a “net benefit to 
Canada”. In general, this requirement was interpreted liberally, and by 2011 only four investment 
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and broadcasting, extractive industries, fishing, transport and communication as 
well as finance and insurance) than most of its peers87. At the same time, however, 
the Canadian government also started to actively promote FDI in the manufacturing 
sector at the national level and state-level governments - frequently competing for 
investment projects with US states - equally started offering increasingly generous 
incentives packages88. Accordingly, a WTO policy review concluded in 1998 that, 
overall, “attracting foreign investment has … become a main objective of Canada’s 
economic policy”89. Having reached levels above 30 percent of GDP in the early 
1960s, the inward FDI stock relative to total economic production decreased 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s (see Table 2.1). From the early 1990s onwards, this 
ratio started to re-increase and in the mid-2000s it finally returned to levels above 30 
percent. Having stirred great political controversy in the 1960s, a key characteristic 
of this second FDI boom in Canada – mirroring similar phenomena across the 
developed world – was that it went almost unnoticed. Right after the takeover of the 
legendary Hudson Bay Company (founded in 1670) by US investors in 2006, The 
Economist commented with some awe that “there was barely a whisper of protest. 
Even the Council of Canadians, which not too long ago would have delivered a 
rousing nationalistic rant on the evils of American ownership, was 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
proposals, all in cultural industries, had been rejected on these grounds. WTO, "Trade Policy 
Reviews." WT/TPR/S/246, 4 May 2011. 
87 Ibid. WT/TPR/S/22, 7 October 1996:point 68. 
88 Oman, Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Competition among Governments to 
Attract Fdi, 74ff. The same study found that in the province of Quebec the average incentives granted 
in the years 1995-1998 amounted to $50,000-$80,000 per job created, or roughly one quarter of the total 
investment. 
89 WTO, "Trade Policy Reviews." WT/TPR/S/53, 1998. 
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uncharacteristically silent”90. In Canada too, FDI had become politically largely 
uncontroversial. 
 
Japan: Searching for ‘Global Vitality’ 
Under intense international pressure - primarily from the USA and OECD - Japan 
had removed most formal restrictions on inward FDI in the 1980s91. Yet – similar to 
Germany in some ways – many informal barriers92 to foreign investors subsisted 
into the 2000s. At the same time, the Japanese government also seemed less 
interested in the idea of investment promotion than other states93. As a result, the 
FDI stock in the Japanese economy – although growing nearly ten-fold relative to 
economic production from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s – remained exceptionally 
low in international perspective, hovering around 3 percent of GDP in 2007. 
Interestingly, while these relatively low levels of inward FDI had previously 
appeared to correspond to the intentions of Japanese policymakers, they now 
gradually came to be seen as a ‘problem’ and ‘sign of weakness’. In 1997, The 
Economist reported that “slowly that [old] way of thinking is being eroded. Worried 
by the American lead in several industries, notably information technology, they 
[the Japanese] have realised that foreign investors can be a valuable source of know-
                                                          
90 "A Foreign Invasion," The Economist, 4 February 2006. 
91 Like most other countries, it did maintain some sector-specific restrictions in ‘sensitive’ industries, 
e.g. telecommunications, air and maritime transport, fishing, etc. See "Trade Policy Reviews." 
WT/TPR/S/76, 17 October 2000. 
92 Such as complex regulatory and distribution systems, widespread cross-shareholding structures, a 
high tax burden as well as very high costs of land and real estate. See ibid. WT/TPR/S/32, 5 January 
1998. 
93 Cf. Oman, Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Competition among Governments 
to Attract Fdi. 
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how and technology.”94 Two economists from Hitotsubashi University elaborated 
these lines of reasoning as follows:  
“[W]hereas in the past it may have been sufficient to rely on knowledge and technology 
that is easily separable from managerial resources – technology that can be obtained 
through licensing, for example – this is no longer the case. Today, the areas in which 
Japan would most benefit from foreign knowledge and technology are those that are 
embodied in people, organizational structures, business processes, and products and 
come as a ‘package’, that is, in the form of FDI. While this is true for the manufacturing 
sector, it is especially true for services, which will have to generate most of Japan’s future 
economic growth, but in which the country has produced few internationally competitive 
companies and productivity lags considerably behind that of other advanced economies. 
However, for Japan to be able to take advantage of such types of knowledge, it will have 
to achieve ‘inner globalization’ based on the recognition that the nationality of a firm is of 
little relevance for a country’s economic welfare.”95 
At the same time, the government started to issue periodically repeated official 
declarations to “take measures to make it [Japan] an attractive investment 
destination for foreign firms” in order to “double” inward FDI flows within certain 
time frames96 and it implemented a series of initiatives to attract FDI97. In the mid-
2000s, a government agency initiated a highly visible advertisement campaign in the 
global financial press, in which it declared that “[t]here’s no ambiguity: Foreign 
                                                          
94 "Not Quite So Sparkling China," The Economist, 1 March 1997. 
95 Fukao and Paprzycki, Foreign Direct Investment in Japan : Multinationals' Role in Growth and 
Globalization, 10-11. 
96 See World Trade Policy Reports on Japan from 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013. 
WTO, "Trade Policy Reviews." 
97 For example, the government started offering tax incentives and low-interest loans to foreign 
investors in the late 1990s; it created the Japan Business Support Center, a one-stop shop for foreign 
investors, in 2003; it adopted a ‘Program for the Acceleration of Foreign Direct Investment in Japan’ in 
2006 and created an ‘Expert Committee on FDI Promotion in 2007. See ibid. WT/TPR/S/76, 17 
October 2000; WT/TPR/S/175, 19 December 2006; WT/TPR/S/211. 
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direct investment has the green light to go in Japan”98, and announced in 
melodramatic fashion the ‘third opening’ of Japan: 
 “With astonishing results, Japan has opened up to the outside world twice in recent 
history. First, in the mid-19th century, the country embraced the West to become an 
industrialized power after centuries of isolation. Later came its post-war experience of 
democratizing, almost overnight, to achieve miraculous growth. Today the country is 
undergoing an equally dramatic ‘third opening’ to foreign investments. And like during 
the previous two periods when Japan welcomed the outside world, the changes and 
opportunities are multifaceted and manifold. (…) There has been a significant shift in 
attitude: foreign investments are no longer seen as a threat, but as an opportunity for growth and 
domestic reform.”99 
 
The evolution of government attitudes and FDI policies in the large advanced 
economies in the 1990s and early 2000s thus share many similarities. All countries 
proceeded to remove remaining regulatory restrictions on FDI inflows throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s and, at the same time, significantly scaled up their investment 
promotion efforts. During the same period, levels of inward FDI increased sharply in 
all six countries under observation. Interestingly from a historical perspective - and 
in stark contrast to the developments in the 1960s and 1970s outlined in the previous 
chapter -, these surges in investment inflows from foreign companies, however, 
hardly roused any political opposition. Instead, they were warmly welcomed by 
governments who considered them to be largely uncontroversial and, on the whole, 
an unambiguously ‘good thing’. 
                                                          
98 "Invest Japan," The Economist, 11 October 2008. 
99 "Doors and Opportunities Open up in Japan," The Economist, 9 June 2007. [emphasis added] 
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SYNTHESIS: THE ‘NEW’ PERCEPTION OF FDI 
The profundity of the transformation of the predominant social representation of 
inward FDI is unmistakable. While the statist narrative predominant in the 1960s 
and 1970s described inward FDI as an economic ‘challenge’ or even a ‘threat’, they 
subsequently came to be re-interpreted as the opposite. As observed, in the 1990s, 
governments around the world started to consider inward FDI increasingly as an 
‘opportunity’ and a ‘solution’ to their economic woes rather than a ‘problem’. This 
transformation is not only dramatic in its degree of change, it is also somewhat 
puzzling. Although the nature of FDI flows certainly did evolve during the long 
period of observation, these changes were – as far as this can be assessed empirically 
– not nearly as sweeping as the simultaneous transformation in the socially 
constructed economic meaning attached to them. Furthermore, the findings of 
empirical studies assessing the effects of FDI inflows on the economy have 
continued to be highly ambiguous. In order to unravel this puzzle, this thesis 
suggests situating this transformation within the evolution of predominant economic 
narratives and in particular the rise of the globalization narrative in the early 1990s. 
Offering a distinct – and somewhat peculiar - framework to understand the world 
economy, the narrative argued that ‘national’ economies have lost much of their 
economic relevance and portrayed multinational companies as ‘nationality-less’ and 
globally mobile units that incorporate the ‘cutting edge’ of economic production. As 
a result, the narrative re-conceptualized national economies as ‘sites of production’ 
for globally mobile companies and argued that the economic success of national 
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economies is increasingly defined by the contribution of local economic activities to 
global value chains rather than the strength of indigenously grown industries. In this 
light, inward FDI came to be interpreted as an inherently ‘good’ and highly desirable 
economic object. It was portrayed not only as a source of employment-creation, but 
primarily as a force for ‘positive spillovers’ that can foster national economic 
development (or ‘competitiveness’) by upgrading the quality of the economic 
activities that are performed in any one country. Moreover, as a further implication 
of the narrative’s logic, inward FDI came to be attributed with a very powerful 
symbolic value. While increases in FDI inflows in the 1960s and 1970s were 
commonly understood as a sign of weakness of domestic industries, they now came 
to be gradually re-interpreted as a symbol of economic success. 
The next part of the thesis will assess the impact of this ideational transformation at 
larger cross-national samples using quantitative methods. Subsequently, the last part 
will trace these developments in more depth in a comparative case study of the 
United Kingdom and France. 
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PART III. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES 
Chapter 4 . SOCIALIZING INTO GLOBALIZATION? CHANGING ECONOMIC 
NARRATIVES AND PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS INWARD FDI 
Focusing on developments in the six largest advanced economies, preceding 
chapters have analysed commonly held beliefs about the economic implications of 
FDI inflows and illustrated the dramatic changes that these beliefs have undergone 
during the course of the post-war era. The aim of this present part of the thesis is to 
assess whether and to what extent these evolutions are reflected in trends in public 
opinion (this chapter) and voting behaviour at general elections (Chapter 5) through 
quantitative analyses of relevant cross-national data that draw from larger samples 
of countries, encompassing practically all developed economies. 
As the primary aim of the previous sections was to scrutinize and spell out the depth 
and nature of the transformations in the prevalent ways in which FDI inflows were 
thought about, its focus was primarily (although not exclusively) on the discourses 
advocated by those social groups that engage most explicitly with inward FDI: that 
is, economic experts and policy elites such as academics, financial journalists, 
economic commentators, policy makers and their advisers. In contrast, the analyses 
presented in the present and subsequent chapters focus on the reverberations of 
these ideational changes among mass publics1. As previous studies have shown, 
there are a number of reasons that suggest that economic attitudes of policy 
                                                          
1 Ideally I would of course like to compare the supposed effects among elites and non-elites more 
rigorously. However, this enterprise proves difficult due to data constraints. A number of high-
quality elite surveys were conducted in the 1970s (see the collection in John Fayerweather, Host 
National Attitudes toward Multinational Corporations  (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1982).), but to the best 
of my knowledge not in more recent years. 
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specialists and elites and the population at large can differ systematically2. For the 
purposes pursued here, in particular two reasons for such potential differences merit 
mention: Firstly, the economic narratives at the heart of the argument pursued in 
this thesis are of relatively higher relevance for policy specialists and some other 
parts of elite groups (whose day-to-day work activities frequently engage directly 
with the issues at the heart of economic narratives) than for the public at large 
(whose professional focus is typically further removed from such questions). 
Secondly, as a variety of studies of economic attitudes have convincingly 
demonstrated3, levels of income and education are two of the strongest and most 
consistent positively associated predictors of the liberalism of individual economic 
views. As a result, it seems safe to assume that the reflection of the changes in 
economic narratives described in previous chapters are somewhat less pronounced 
in public opinion data than they are in specialized policy debates and that attitudes 
of mass publics towards inward FDI are on average more hostile than those of policy 
specialists4. Yet, at the same time, as the discussion in Chapter 1 has elaborated in 
more detail (see in particular pp. 48-65), an important aspect of economic narratives 
                                                          
2 See Bryan Caplan, "How Do Voters Form Positive Economic Beliefs? Evidence from the Survey of 
Americans and Economists on the Economy," Public Choice 128, no. 3 (2006); "Systematically Biased 
Beliefs About Economics: Robust Evidence of Judgemental Anomalies from the Survey of Americans 
and Economists on the Economy," Economic Journal 112, no. 479 (2002); Robert J. Blendon et al., 
"Bridging the Gap between the Public's and Economists' Views of the Economy," Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 11, no. 3 (1997). 
3 For example, Anna Maria Mayda and Dani Rodrik, "Why Are Some People (and Countries) More 
Protectionist Than Others?," European Economic Review 49, no. 6 (2005); Jens Hainmueller and Michael 
J. Hiscox, "Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes toward International 
Trade," International Organization 60, no. 2 (2006); Sonal S. Pandya, "Labor Markets and the Demand 
for Foreign Direct Investment," ibid.64, no. 03 (2010).  
4 For example, a public opinion survey conducted in Canada in the mid-1970s that explicitly 
compared attitudes of ‘blue collar’ and ‘white collar’ workers found that while roughly half of the 
respondents among elites had a ‘rather positive’ attitude towards inward FDI, less than one third of 
working class members  expressed a positive view. See John Smetanka, "Sources of Foreign 
Investment Attitudes: A Study of Canadian Executives," in Host National Attiudes toward Multinational 
Corporations, ed. John Fayerweather (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 76. 
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– in contrast to more scientific types of economic knowledge – consists precisely of 
their close connection to non-elite and non-specialist social groups who play a 
central role in their creation and dissemination. Therefore, the main hypothesis to be 
tested in the following analyses is that the rise to prominence of the globalization 
narrative in the late 1980s and early 1990s – while the relative impact of this 
phenomenon on public opinion is expected to be somewhat less pronounced than its 
influence among policy specialists - encouraged individuals to adopt more 
favourable views of inward FDI. To test this hypothesis and some of its potential 
political implications, the current chapter analyses relevant evidence from cross-
national public opinion data while the subsequent chapter examines the reflections 
of these ideational developments in voting behaviour at general elections. 
Due to the relatively long time horizon of the argument of narrative change which 
unfolds over five decades and the lack of a series of consistent cross-national public 
opinion surveys covering such a long time period5, it is not possible to track the 
parallel evolution of narratives and public attitudes towards FDI directly. Instead, 
the analysis presented in this chapter builds on insights gained from the literature on 
socialization in the fields of social psychology and sociology and exploits some of the 
systematic patterns of measurable heterogeneity in the relative levels of exposure to 
the narratives of statism and globalization among specific subgroups of respondents 
that are suggested by this literature. In particular, I leverage the literature’s finding 
that individuals’ political and economic core beliefs are primarily formed in a 
                                                          
5 Public opinion surveys on attitudes towards FDI have been conducted for a long time. They were in 
fact more common and frequently of higher quality in the 1960s and 1970s – when FDI was seen as a 
political ‘hot topic’ – than they are today. (See, for example, the collection in Fayerweather, Host 
National Attitudes toward Multinational Corporations.) However, the problem is that the various surveys 
are not consistent over time as they use different questions and different samples over time. 
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relatively short time period during late adolescence and early adulthood. 
Accordingly, I posit that individuals who passed this period of prime socialization in 
a historical intellectual environment in which the globalization narrative was 
prominent will hold more favourable views of inward FDI than those exposed to the 
statist narrative during that time. Paying special attention to potential alternative 
age-related mechanisms that may simultaneously influence respondents’ views of 
inward FDI (such as structural transformations in the nature of FDI, a natural trend 
towards conservatism with increasing age or respondents’ employment prospects), I 
test this hypothesis using the results of two waves of a large-scale cross-national 
survey conducted by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The 
analyses find strong and robust evidence that corroborates the hypothesis and 
further analyses reveal that the more nuanced patterns of this generational 
difference in FDI attitudes are strongly consistent with the precise predictions of the 
argument of socialization, but not with those derived from potential alternative 
explanations. 
 
Narratives, socialization and individual attitudes towards economic globalization 
A number of existing studies have assessed possible determinants of individual 
attitudes towards international economic openness. Testing the predictions of 
relative factor endowment models - and interpreting levels of income and education 
as proxy variables for individuals’ skills -, several studies have found evidence that 
more highly skilled individuals in advanced economies are less likely to support 
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trade restrictions6. An analysis by Sonal Pandya (using public opinion data from 
Latin America) found similar evidence for the case of individual preferences towards 
inward FDI7. Subsequent studies have challenged the strong emphasis made by 
these original studies on the alignment of individual preferences with respondents’ 
derived material interest, arguing that they paid too little attention to empirically 
disentangle the effects of material interests from potentially overlapping ideational 
factors. For example, Jens Hainmueller and Michael Hiscox have shown that the 
impact of increasing levels of education on individual preferences towards trade are 
more consistent with theories conceptualizing education as a proxy for ideology, 
cultural beliefs and economic-political information rather than professional skills8. 
Edward Mansfield and Diana Mutz presented similar evidence on the impact of 
education and, furthermore, demonstrated that individual trade preferences are 
more strongly influenced by respondents’ perception of trade’s impact on the national 
economy (what they call ‘sociotropic’ concerns) rather than their own material well-
being (‘egocentric’ concerns)9. 
This study builds and expands upon these insights. Although the theoretical 
perspective pursued throughout this thesis in many ways agrees with rationalist 
                                                          
6 See Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, "What Determines Individual Trade Policy 
Preferences?," Journal of International Economics 54, no. 2 (2001); Kevin O'Rourke, "Heckscher-Ohlin 
Theory and Individual Attitudes Towards Globalization," in IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc 
(St. Louis2003); Mayda and Rodrik, "Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than 
Others?." 
7 Pandya, "Labor Markets and the Demand for Foreign Direct Investment." 
8 Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox, "Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual 
Attitudes toward International Trade," ibid.60, no. 2 (2006). See also "Educated Preferences: 
Explaining Attitudes toward Immigration in Europe," International Organization 61, no. 2 (2007). 
9 Edward D. Mansfield and Diana C. Mutz, "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, 
and out-Group Anxiety," ibid.63, no. 3 (2009). For a similar argument regarding outward FDI, see 
Edward D. Mansfield and Diana Carole Mutz, "Us Versus Them: Mass Attitudes toward Offshore 
Outsourcing," World Politics 65, no. 4 (2013). 
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approaches on the fundamental importance of interests in economic and political 
affairs, like Hainmueller and Hiscox and Mansfield and Mutz, it conceptualizes 
interests as more complicated phenomena than merely logical inferences that can be 
derived from an individual’s relative position in the economic system: As many 
studies in constructivist IPE have demonstrated10, carving out one’s interest towards 
certain economic processes is oftentimes less straightforward than it may seem; 
especially so when the economic effects of a phenomenon are far from being self-
evident, as it is the case for inward FDI. As discussed in the introduction chapter, 
professional economists disagree substantially about the consequences of increases 
in FDI inflows and empirical findings of its effects are nuanced and highly 
ambivalent. And if economic experts struggle to define the economic effects of 
inward FDI then the assumption that individuals ‘know’ them seems somewhat 
problematic. Furthermore, as Mansfield and Mutz have strongly argued11, 
individuals usually care not only about the effects of an economic process for their 
own personal well-being, but also the (perceived) implications thereof for the social 
groups they care about, such as their families and friends, local communities or their 
home country as a whole. 
To identify their preferences in face of such complexities and considerable 
uncertainty, as I have elaborated in Chapter 1, individuals must frequently rely on 
interpretive frameworks such as economic narratives when defining their perceived 
                                                          
10 See, for example, Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth 
Century; Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons, Constructing the International Economy  (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 2010); Jeffrey M. Chwieroth, "How Do Crises Lead to Change?: 
Liberalizing Capital Controls in the Early Years of New Order Indonesia," World Politics 62, no. 3 
(2010). 
11 Cf. Mansfield and Mutz, "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and out-Group 
Anxiety." 
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economic interests and preferences. In consequence, the key contention of this study 
is that by shaping the ways in which specific economic phenomena are 
conceptualized and by threading the webs of meaning that surround them, 
economic narratives can affect how individuals construe their (perceived) economic 
interests and thereby have an effect on the formation of individual preferences, 
which is independent from individuals’ specific material position within the 
economic system. While the studies by Hainmueller and Hiscox or Mansfield and 
Mutz follow similar lines of argumentation, they conceptualize the influence of 
ideational factors on preference formation as being largely static. The analysis 
presented in previous chapters, however, has shown that the content and the 
prescriptions that individuals derive from interpretive frameworks that they use to 
define their preferences can change substantially over time. As we have seen, the 
description of FDI inflows in predominant economic narratives has changed notably 
from a conceptualization of inward FDI as a ‘threat’ in the 1960s towards a new 
interpretation of FDI inflows as a symbol of economic success in the 1990s. 
Therefore, the hypothesis, which I aim to test in the empirical analysis that follows, 
is that individuals who were more strongly exposed to the statist narrative during 
their lifetime, all else equal, will express more negative views of inward FDI than 
individuals who were more strongly exposed to the narrative of globalization. 
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Age and socialization 
The key challenge to test this hypothesis is to identify a measurable dimension of 
variation that differentially affects the exposure of specific groups of respondents to 
one narrative or the other in a systematic manner. To that end, the analysis that 
follows proposes to exploit differences in the time periods into which different 
groups of respondents were born. More specifically, I exploit the key insight 
generated by a firmly established stream of literature in social psychology and 
sociology, which has consistently found that most of the political and economic core 
beliefs that individuals hold are formed during late adolescence and early adulthood 
when individuals have been found to be relatively open to adopt new ideas, whilst 
their susceptibility to change attitudes decreases gradually subsequently12. 
This relationship between age and individuals’ mental or normative flexibility has 
been observed in a variety of issue areas and the literature has forwarded a number 
of explanations why people become less likely to change their views as they grow 
older. Jon Krosnick and Duane Alwin list thee reasons in particular13: a biologically 
driven process of cognitive decay that makes the absorption of new information 
more difficult for older people; individuals’ reliance on previous experiences as 
anchors that create psychological stability, which naturally decreases the 
proportional impact of new information as the total number of previous experiences 
                                                          
12 See Glenn, "Aging and Conservatism; Gregory B. Markus, "The Political Environment and the 
Dynamics of Public Attitudes: A Panel Study," American Journal of Political Science 23, no. 2 (1979); Jon 
A. Krosnick and Duane F. Alwin, "Aging and Susceptibility to Attitude Change," Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 57, no. 3 (1989); Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb, The Bennington Women after Fifty 
Years. For an application of these social psychological insights focusing on macroeconomics, see Paola 
Giuliano and Antonio Spilimbergo, "Growing up in a Recession: Beliefs and the Macroeconomy," 
NBER Working Paper Series 15321(2009). 
13 Krosnick and Alwin, "Aging and Susceptibility to Attitude Change," 416. 
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grows14; and the observed tendency towards decreased social engagement with 
increasing age, which tends to concentrate individuals’ social networks among 
individuals from the same cohort, thereby reducing the likelihood of being exposed 
to new norms or beliefs prominent among younger cohorts. 
While the relevant literature agrees on the existence of this broad pattern, there is 
some debate about the exact degree of difference in relative mental flexibility during 
adolescence and early adulthood as opposed to later stages in life. At the risk of 
oversimplification, the contending perspectives can be labelled, respectively, as the 
‘impressionable years hypothesis’ (IYH) and the ‘increasing persistence hypothesis’ 
(IPH)15. According to the former, individuals are unlikely to change core beliefs after 
the completion of early adulthood. In contrast, the latter contends that individuals 
keep adapting their beliefs and attitudes to general societal trends throughout their 
life cycle, although their susceptibility to change attitudes decreases gradually as 
they age.  
Aside of these ongoing debates, which I will elaborate in more detail below, the 
central insight produced by this field of research consists of the repeated observation 
that “the historical environment in which a young person becomes an active 
participant in the adult world shapes the basic values, attitudes, and world views 
formed during those years”16 and that these core beliefs acquired during early 
adulthood typically shape individuals’ views throughout their lifespan. 
Accordingly, because population-level exposures to newly emerging norms or social 
                                                          
14 Cf. Glenn, "Aging and Conservatism," 176. 
15 See Krosnick and Alwin, "Aging and Susceptibility to Attitude Change," 416. 
16 Ibid. 
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beliefs differentially affect different age groups, the literature portends the existence 
of persisting differences in public attitudes among groups of individuals who grew 
up in the same historical context, so-called cohort effects.  
Applied to the theoretical argument pursued in this thesis, this insight suggests a 
clearly defined prediction: namely, that individuals who passed their early 
adulthood in a time-period in which the narrative of globalization was highly salient 
will, all else equal, hold more favourable views of inward FDI than older individuals 
who passed their prime period of economic socialization in a historical context in 
which the statist narrative was predominant.  
Although the age-span of ‘early adulthood’ has never been conclusively defined, 
following the landmark study of Theodore Newcomb and his collaborators17, most 
studies in the field operationalize it as the period roughly between the age of 18 and 
25 years and I follow this standard practice in the empirical analysis below. Hence, 
situating the rise of the globalization narrative around the year 1990, the basic age-
related prediction of the argument of socialization is that individuals born before the 
mid-1960s – that is, individuals who turned 25 years old before 1990 – ceteris paribus 
have more negative views of inward FDI than individuals born later. 
 
Empirical strategy 
To test this prediction empirically, I combine conventional regression techniques 
with a method of graphical visualization, which allows me to analyse the precise 
                                                          
17 Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb, The Bennington Women after Fifty Years. 
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patterns of the cohort-effect in a more fine-grained manner and to differentiate it 
from other potential age-related differences in attitudes towards inward FDI. 
 
Graphical pattern analysis 
At least theoretically, age can affect individual attitudes towards FDI in a variety of 
ways. In particular two age-related mechanisms other than a cohort effect merit 
further discussion: (i) an individual’s employment prospects, and (ii) the 
relationship between age and political conservatism more generally. All else equal, 
younger members of the workforce tend to be more flexible, dynamic and open-
minded, which makes them more attractive for foreign multinationals as potential 
employees compared to older peers. As a result, it is possible that younger 
respondents generally have a more positive attitude towards FDI due to their 
relatively higher chances to be hired by a multinational firm in the future. Similarly, 
conventional wisdom suggests that older people tend towards political 
conservatism. This assumption, which is not uncontested18, may also suggest that 
younger respondents in general have a more liberal and cosmopolitan view of the 
world and thus naturally a more positive perception of foreign companies than older 
peers.  
To identify the existence of a cohort effect in public opinion surveys on attitudes 
towards FDI it is thus essential to disentangle any such effect from these potential 
alternative mechanisms. To do so, I refer to a method of graphical pattern analysis, 
                                                          
18 See discussion in Glenn, "Aging and Conservatism." 
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which was originally proposed by Paul Baltes and Robert Blanchard and his 
colleagues19. Crucially, although the proposed mechanism of socialization as well as 
the employment prospects or natural trend towards conservatism hypotheses are all 
connected to an individual’s age, they relate to age in different ways. While the latter 
two are typical ageing effects, which derive directly from the biological process of 
ageing itself, the former is primarily due to the historical context into which 
respondents are born rather than the ageing process per se. In consequence, the 
predicted patterns deriving from the distinct channels through which the ageing and 
cohort effects relate to individual attitudes towards FDI are distinct. To illustrate 
these differences analytically, the various patterns of the expected theoretical effects 
are plotted graphically in Figure 4.1.  
                                                          
19 See P. B. Baltes, "Longitudinal and Cross-Sectional Sequences in the Study of Age and Generation 
Effects," Human Development 11(1968); Robert D. Blanchard, James B. Bunker, and Martin Wachs, 
"Distinguishing Aging, Period and Cohort Effects in Longitudinal Studies of Elderly Populations," 
Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 11, no. 3 (1977). 
 184 
 
Figure 4.1. The expected effect of age on the attitude towards inward FDI 
 
 
To reflect the structure of the actually available data (discussed in more detail 
below), the plot illustrates the theoretical relationships of the different mechanisms 
under the assumption that we dispose of two survey waves (t1 and t2), which were 
both undertaken after the change in narrative had taken place at t0. The x-axis shows 
respondents’ year of birth (i.e. respondents’ age decreases as we move from left to 
right) and the y-axis the probability that they express a negative view towards 
foreign companies. For the sake of simplicity, I assume here that the effect of ageing 
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is linear20. The predicted relationship between age and attitude towards inward FDI 
that derives from the hypotheses of employment prospects or the natural trend 
towards conservatism are essentially the same: as illustrated in plot 1a in Figure 4.1, 
both hypotheses predict that the probability to express a negative view of MNEs 
increases gradually as the year of birth decreases and, critically, that respondents 
from the same birth cohort express more negative views at t2 than they had done at 
t1. In contrast, the theoretically predicted pattern of a cohort effect deriving from the 
mechanism of socialization described above - illustrated in plots 2a-c in Figure 4.1 - 
is rather distinct from these two hypotheses: According to the IYH, respondents who 
passed their years of prime socialization in a period in which the globalization 
narrative was predominant, will express notably more positive opinions about the 
role of foreign companies than respondents who had completed their early 
adulthood before the globalization narrative rose to prominence. Furthermore, the 
IYH also predicts that the difference among the two groups remains constant over 
time (i.e. it does not vary from t1 to t2) and that the effect is largely homogenous 
within the two groups of birth cohorts (plot 2a in Figure 4.1). Instead, the IPH 
suggests that - to a gradually decreasing extent – the rise to prominence of the 
globalization narrative also affects birth cohorts who completed their prime period 
of socialization before the 1990s. More precisely, it predicts that individuals who 
spent their early adulthood in a time period in which the statist narrative was still 
predominant will subsequently partly adopt the views of the globalization narrative, 
but that the degree to which they do so decreases as they grow older (and their 
attitudinal flexibility gradually declines). Moreover, it predicts a difference in the 
                                                          
20 Non-linear extensions can be elaborated easily from the illustration. 
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responses from the same birth cohorts from t1 to t2: the longer that individuals are 
exposed to a new narrative, the greater the chances become that they will adopt the 
views it advocates, but this effect gradually decreases as they grow older (see plot 2b 
in Figure 4.1). Crucially, in contrast to the employment or natural trend towards 
conservatism hypotheses, the latter implies that identical birth cohort groups turn 
more (rather than less) favourable towards FDI from t1 to t2. Combining the 
predictions of the IYH and IPH, the resulting expected effect of the socialization 
mechanism is illustrated in plot 2c in Figure 4.1. Overall, it suggests three key 
patterns: Firstly, respondents who turned 2521 before the rise to prominence of the 
globalization narrative in the early 1990s – in other words, respondents who were 
born before the mid-1960s – express notably less favourable views of inward FDI 
than respondents born later. Secondly, in contrast to the employment prospects or 
natural trend towards conservatism hypotheses, the socialization mechanisms 
suggests that there should be no notable age effect among cohorts born after the 
mid-1960s: as they were not previously primed by the statist narrative, their views 
on inward FDI should be roughly similar and not change much over time as they 
grow older. Thirdly, for the birth cohorts born before the mid-1960s, it suggests that 
the degree to which they adopt the views of the new narrative decreases as a 
function of age, but – in contrast to the employment prospects and natural trend 
towards conservatism hypotheses – increases from t1 to t2 as their exposure to the 
new narrative persists. 
 
                                                          
21 As discussed, this is a somewhat arbitrary cut-off point. In the analysis below I use five-year 
periods, which allows for some more flexibility. 
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Data and econometric specification 
To examine the presence of these patterns in individual attitudes towards FDI in a 
large cross-national sample, I use the results from the International Social Survey 
Programme’s (ISSP) 2003 and 2013 surveys on national identity, which asked 45,993 
respondents from 34 countries22 in 2003 and 45,297 respondents from 33 countries23 
in 2013 about their identity and their views on foreign cultures and international 
issues. The surveys include the following question about respondents’ attitudes 
towards foreign companies: “How much do you agree or disagree with the 
following statement[s]? … Large international companies are doing more and more 
damage to local businesses in [COUNTRY]”24. To analyse the respondents’ attitudes 
towards inward FDI, I create a dummy variable, which is equal to one if a 
respondent either ‘agrees’ or ‘strongly agrees’ with the statement. 
Figure A-4.1 in the appendix summarizes the distribution of responses by country 
and survey wave, showing a broad variation across countries: respondents from 
                                                          
22 They are: Austria, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Taiwan, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela and South Africa. 
23 They are: Belgium; Croatia; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; 
Great Britain, Hungary; Iceland; India; Ireland; Israel; Japan; Republic of Korea; Latvia; Lithuania; 
Mexico; Norway; Philippines; Portugal; Russian Federation; Slovakia; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain; 
Sweden, Switzerland; Taiwan, Turkey; United States. 
24 See question 7a in ISSP 2003 questionnaire and question 6a in ISSP 2013 questionnaire. The possible 
answers are ‘agree strongly’, ‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree’, ‘disagree strongly’, or 
‘can’t choose/no answer’. Two aspects of the phrasing of the question may be somewhat blurring for 
the purposes pursued here: Firstly, it refers to large ‘international’ companies, which must not 
necessarily be ‘foreign’ (although it seems reasonable to expect that a majority of respondents 
interpret them as such). Secondly, it implicitly contrasts ‘large’ (international) companies vs. ‘small’ 
(local) ones, which introduces another dimension that is not directly related to the nationality of 
ownership. Nonetheless, the question clearly does refer to a typical scenario in political debates about 
inward FDI and thus seems appropriate to gauge respondents’ views about inward FDI. For a 
previous study using the same question to assess attitudes towards FDI, see Ayse Kaya and James T. 
Walker, "The Legitimacy of Foreign Investors: Individual Attitudes Towards the Impact of 
Multinational Enterprises," Multinational Business Review 20, no. 3 (2012). 
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several Northern European countries rank among those with most favourable views 
of inward FDI, while French respondents - together with the Portuguese, Indians 
and Australians - appear to express the least favourable views. It also suggests that 
responses are in general relatively hostile towards inward FDI, with more than 50 
percent of the respondents expressing a negative view of foreign companies in a 
majority of countries. This, however, may also partly be explained by the negative 
framing of the question25. 
 
Statistical model 
To analyze the data, I apply a multi-level (hierarchical) probit model. While multi-
level analysis (MLA) is a firmly established method in the fields of sociology or 
medicine, for example, its application in political science is relatively more recent. In 
essence, MLA strategies take the nesting of individuals within clusters (in my case, 
respondents within nation-states) into account and, unlike conventional regression 
modelling techniques, aim to explicitly model this cluster-level heterogeneity rather 
than treating it merely as a nuisance. Doing so has substantive and statistical 
advantages26. Substantively, it makes it possible to assess the impact of cluster-level 
differences that can be of theoretical interest and thereby provides at setting in 
which the contextual contingency of individual-level variables can be better 
                                                          
25 On the importance of framing, see Michael J. Hiscox, "Through a Glass and Darkly: Attitudes 
toward International Trade and the Curious Effects of Issue Framing," International Organization 60, 
no. 03 (2006). Results may have differed notably if the question was instead framed as: “How much 
do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Large international companies are making an 
important contribution to the economy of [COUNTRY]”.  
26 See Marco R. Steenbergen and Bradford S. Jones, "Modeling Multilevel Data Structures," American 
Journal of Political Science 46, no. 1 (2002); Boris Shor et al., "A Bayesian Multilevel Modeling Approach 
to Time-Series Cross-Sectional Data," Political Analysis 15, no. 2 (2007). 
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assessed. In contrast to its most obvious alternative, the inclusion of cluster-dummy 
fixed-effects, MLA models do not just absorb cluster-level differences, but are able to 
explain (some of) them. Statistically, Monte Carlo simulations have shown that in the 
presence of nested data structures MLA models can also achieve better model fit 
because they share information from different levels and are better able to handle 
invariant or slowly changing variables27. Technically, I thus adopt a multi-level 
probit model with random intercepts28 that allows for within-cluster dependence by 
letting the constant vary from country to country and which splits the implicit error 
term into a country-level component that is shared by all individual respondents 
from the same country and an individual-level component that is unique to each 
respondent29. Formally, it takes the following form30: 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖) =  𝜙�𝛼𝑗 +  𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑗�            (1) 
𝛼𝑗 =  𝜙(𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑧𝑗)                               (2) 
where 𝑦𝑖=1 denotes a respondent indicating a negative view of foreign companies 
and 𝑥𝑖 are the covariates; 𝜙 indicates a cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution, i denotes individuals and j countries. Accordingly, 𝛽 
captures the individual-level effects of covariate 𝑥𝑖𝑗 and 𝛾1 the effect of country 
characteristic 𝑧𝑗. 𝛼𝑗 are country-specific intercepts and 𝛾0 denotes the overall 
(average) intercept. 
                                                          
27 "A Bayesian Multilevel Modeling Approach to Time-Series Cross-Sectional Data." 
28 Note that I do not allow for the simultaneous inclusion of random slopes. 
29 S. Rabe-Hesketh and Anders Skrondal, Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata, 3rd ed. 
(College Station, Tex.: Stata Press Publication, 2012). 
30 Cf. Daniel Stegmueller, "How Many Countries for Multilevel Modeling? A Comparison of 
Frequentist and Bayesian Approaches," American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 3 (2013): 749. 
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The main variable of interest is Birth cohort, an individual-level categorical variable 
dividing respondents into cohorts according to their year of birth in five-year 
intervals (i.e. born between 1929 and 1933, 1934-1938, etc.)31. Generally, the oldest 
cohort is used as the reference category. Furthermore, I include a number of control 
variables at the individual as well as the country-level. At the level of respondents, I 
account for the following covariates: Household income (ln) is the log of respondents’ 
reported monthly family income converted to euros32. Secondary degree is a dummy 
variable which is equal to one if the respondents’ reported highest education level is 
equal to ‘higher secondary completed’ or higher. Similarly, University degree is equal 
to one if the reported highest education level is ‘university degree completed’. 
Following the existing literature on individual attitudes towards international 
                                                          
31 Methodological studies in sociology and medicine have discussed the difficulties to disentangle 
age, period and cohort effects in much detail. At the heart of the ‘APC problem’ lies the fact that the 
three concepts are mechanically related to each other: Age=period – cohort. As a result, they 
shouldn’t be simultaneously included into a regression because “it is impossible conceptually to hold 
two of the terms constant without holding the third term constant as well”, which would thus cause a 
collinearity problem. See Andrew Bell and Kelvyn Jones, "The Impossibility of Separating Age, Period 
and Cohort Effects," Social Science & Medicine 93(2013). The ‘APC problem’ thus relates to the 
difficulty to disentangle age, period and cohort effects in one statistical model. As I am here not 
interested in disentangling the three factors from each other, but only to assess whether a cohort effect 
is present in the data or not (without simultaneously controlling for age or period effects), this is not 
an issue here. For a fuller discussion of the ‘APC problem’ and some proposed ‘solutions’, see Norval 
D. Glenn, "Cohort Analysts' Futile Quest: Statistical Attempts to Separate Age, Period and Cohort 
Effects," American Sociological Review 41, no. 5 (1976); Karen Oppenheim Mason et al., "Some 
Methodological Issues in Cohort Analysis of Archival Data," ibid.38, no. 2 (1973); Yang Yang and 
Kenneth Land, "A Mixed Models Approach to the Age-Period-Cohort Analysis of Repeated Cross-
Section Surveys, with an Application to Data on Trends in Verbal Test Scores," Sociological 
Methodology 36(2006); Yu-Kang Tu, George Davey Smith, and Mark S. Gilthorpe, "A New Approach to 
Age-Period-Cohort Analysis Using Partial Least Squares Regression: The Trend in Blood Pressure in 
the Glasgow Alumni Cohort," PLoS ONE 6, no. 4 (2011). 
32 According to the conversion rates indicated by the ISSP codebook (2003 survey) or the homepage 
XE.com (2013 survey). Please note that previous models also included respondents’ individual 
income, which, however, had a weaker and less consistent effect on attitudes towards inward FDI 
than the household income. This may be due to the fact that the household income is a more 
appropriate indicator of the economic status of students, persons with family care duties and retirees, 
who together constitute a significant part of the total sample. 
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economic openness33, I expect a higher family income as well as a higher level of 
education to be negatively associated with the probability that a respondent 
expresses a hostile attitude towards inward FDI. Nationalism is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if the response to the question ‘How much do you agree or 
disagree with the following statement: “I would rather be a citizen of [COUNTRY] 
than any other country in the world”’34 is either ‘agree strongly’ or ‘agree’, and zero 
otherwise. In accordance with the findings by Mutz and Mansfield35, who have 
convincingly argued that patriotic or nationalist feelings are an important 
noneconomic predictor of negative attitudes towards trade or outsourcing, I expect 
the covariate to be associated with more hostile views towards FDI. Public sector 
employee is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent indicated to work for 
the government or a state-owned enterprise. Assuming that public sector workers 
are generally more sceptical about the private sector and that they have a lower 
personal interest in working for a MNC themselves (cf. the employment prospects 
hypothesis), I expect it to be associated positively with FDI hostility. Female is a 
dummy variable for female respondents. In line with previous investigations of the 
“mysterious case of female protectionism”36, I expect it also to be positively 
associated with anti-FDI attitudes. 
                                                          
33 See, for example, Scheve and Slaughter, "What Determines Individual Trade Policy Preferences?; 
Mayda and Rodrik, "Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others?; 
Hainmueller and Hiscox, "Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes 
toward International Trade." 
34 Question 19 in International Social Survey Programme, "Issp - 2003: National Identity (Ii)," (2002). 
Question 17 in "Issp 2013 - National Identity Iii: Basic Questionnaire," (2012). 
35 Mansfield and Mutz, "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and out-Group 
Anxiety; Mansfield and Mutz, "Us Versus Them: Mass Attitudes toward Offshore Outsourcing." 
36 Brian Burgoon and Michael J. Hiscox, "The Mysterious Case of Female Protectionism: Gender Bias 
in Attitudes toward International Trade," (2004). Edward D. Mansfield, Diana C. Mutz, and Laura R. 
Silver, "Men, Women, Trade, and Free Markets," International Studies Quarterly 59, no. 2 (2015). 
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At the country-cluster level, I control for GDP (logged), GDP per capita (in thousands 
USD), economic growth rates (percentage points), and the stock of inward FDI as well 
as outward FDI as a share of GDP (both as percentage points). Because economies 
with small domestic markets have stronger structural incentives to embrace 
economic openness than economies with larger markets that have a greater potential 
to build domestically focused industries, I expect a larger GDP (log) to be associated 
with more negative attitudes towards inward FDI. Following the empirical evidence 
that the net positive effect of inward FDI on productivity tends to be greater in high-
income than in middle-income economies (where IFDI’s crowding out effects appear 
to have the most harmful consequences)37, I expect GDP per capita to be negatively 
associated with anti-FDI attitudes. Assuming that the resistance towards inward FDI 
is weaker during times of economic difficulties, I expect lower economic growth 
rates to be associated with less hostility and higher growth rates to be associated 
with more hostility towards FDI inflows38. The effect of a larger stock of inward FDI 
as a share of GDP is not clear a priori. On the one hand, the greater visibility of 
foreign companies associated with a larger stock of inward FDI may arise greater 
political debates about them, but on the contrary a greater familiarity with foreign 
companies among the population may also lead to less negative attitudes towards 
them (i.e. a learning effect). Finally, countries with a large number of internationally 
oriented home-based MNCs may have more positive attitudes towards the 
                                                          
37 Meyer and Sinani, "When and Where Does Foreign Direct Investment Generate Positive Spillovers? 
A Meta-Analysis." 
38 This pattern is also confirmed in a series of cross-national opinion surveys conducted in the 1970s. 
See Murray and LeDuc, "Changing Attitudes toward Foreign Investment in Canada; Norman 
Graham, "Developed Countries and Multinational Corporations: Threat Perception and Policy 
Response in France and the United Kingdom," ibid. 
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international economy and MNCs in general, which is why I expect higher levels of 
the outward FDI stock to be associated with more positive attitudes towards FDI. 
 
Results 
Table 4.1 presents the main results of the two-level probit regressions. Column 1 and 
2 show the estimation results for the 2003 and 2013 surveys separately. Column 3 
shows the estimations based on the merged dataset that includes both survey waves 
simultaneously. The table shows the results including respondents from all countries 
for which the surveys were conducted (cf. footnotes 22 and 23 above)39. Information 
about respondents’ household income is not provided for about a quarter of the 
sample and responses regarding education levels and nationalist feelings is missing 
for a few thousands observations, reducing the total combined sample from an 
original 82,193 to 54,064 respondents. 
Turning to the results, nearly all individual-level control variables are significant in 
the theoretically expected direction in both surveys: a higher household income as 
well as higher levels of education are associated with a more positive view of FDI, 
while the expression of nationalistic feelings, employment in the public sector and 
female gender (the latter only in the 2003 survey) are significant predictors of more 
hostile attitudes towards inward FDI. The association of the included country-level 
covariates generally point in the same direction in both surveys, although curiously 
the associations are statistically insignificant in the 2003 survey but significant 
                                                          
39 Note that dropping the few non-OECD economies included in the ISSP surveys does not affect the 
results. 
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(without exception) in the 2013 survey. Altogether, they suggest that respondents 
from larger economies are somewhat more hostile towards inward FDI while 
respondents from economies with a higher GDP per capita and a higher stock of 
outward FDI tend to express fewer concerns. The association of economic growth 
rates is in an unexpected negative direction, suggesting that macroeconomic 
difficulties (i.e. lower growth rates) are associated with more rather than less hostility 
towards FDI. The stock of inward FDI is weakly positively related in the 2003 survey 
but negatively (and statistically insignificantly) in the combined dataset. 
The variables of main interest are the fourteen birth cohort categories at the top of 
the table40. As a whole, the birth cohort variables clearly and consistently show that 
younger birth cohorts are less strongly opposed to inward FDI than older 
respondents. More specifically, opposition towards FDI seems to decrease gradually 
as we move from the oldest respondents towards younger cohorts until the cohort 
born in 1964-68 at which point we observe a small ‘jump’ in the magnitude of the 
associated decrease in FDI hostility after which the size of the cohort effect roughly 
stabilizes at around -0.22 in the combined sample (which is an effect of similar 
magnitude as having a university degree or expressing nationalistic views). Overall, 
this pattern corresponds closely to the theoretical expectation of a cohort effect 
induced by socialization as discussed above. 
 
                                                          
40 Note that the birth cohort groups at each end of the spectrum are merged so that there are at least 
1,000 respondents in each group. 
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Table 4.1. Main results 
 (1) 
2003 survey 
(2) 
2013 survey 
(3) 
Merged 
In
di
vi
du
al
-le
ve
l 
Born before 1929 Reference  
category 
 Reference  
category 
1929-33 0.01 
(0.05) 
 0.01 
(0.05) 
1934-38 -0.04 
(0.05) 
Reference  
category 
-0.08+ 
(0.04) 
1939-43 -0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.00 
(0.05) 
-0.09* 
(0.04) 
1944-48 -0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.13** 
(0.04) 
1949-53 -0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
1954-58 -0.08+ 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.15*** 
(0.04) 
1959-63 -0.09* 
(0.04) 
-0.10* 
(0.05) 
-0.17*** 
(0.04) 
1964-68 -0.17*** 
(0.04) 
-0.15** 
(0.05) 
-0.24*** 
(0.04) 
1969-73 -0.17*** 
(0.04) 
-0.15*** 
(0.05) 
-0.23*** 
(0.04) 
1974-78 -0.21*** 
(0.05) 
-0.11* 
(0.05) 
-0.22*** 
(0.04) 
1979-83 -0.21*** 
(0.05) 
-0.13** 
(0.05) 
-0.23*** 
(0.04) 
1984-88  -0.12* 
(0.05) 
-0.20*** 
(0.04) 
Born after 1988  -0.19*** 
(0.05) 
-0.27*** 
(0.05) 
Household income 
(ln) 
-0.12*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Secondary degree -0.13*** 
(0.02) 
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.11*** 
(0.01) 
University degree -0.20*** 
(0.02) 
-0.18*** 
(0.02) 
-0.20*** 
(0.02) 
Nationalism 0.32*** 
(0.02) 
0.22*** 
(0.02) 
0.27*** 
(0.01) 
Public sector 0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
Female 0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
(continues) 
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C
ou
nt
ry
-le
ve
l 
GDP (ln) 0.03 
(0.03) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
GDP per capita 
(thousands) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01** 
(0.00) 
-0.00+ 
(0.00) 
Growth -0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.06* 
(0.02) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
Inward FDI 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.01+ 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Outward FDI 0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00+ 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
 𝜎𝑣   0.26 0.24 0.30 
 ρ 0.06 0.06 0.08 
 Log-likelihood -15731.71 -18142.34 -33939.63 
 Countries 30 32 41 
 Respondents 25,401 28,663 54,064 
NOTES: Probit coefficients displayed. Standard errors in parentheses. Constant omitted; + p<0.1, *p < 
0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 
To examine the pattern in more detail, I first assess the statistical significance of the 
theoretically predicted break in the data for cohorts born before/after the mid-1960s 
and then plot the average predicted probabilities for each cohort separately. 
Table 4.2 shows the results from a series of Wald tests, which assess the statistical 
significance of the difference between the coefficient estimated for the 1964-68 cohort 
and those of all other birth cohorts in the estimations that are based on the merged 
dataset (Model 3 in Table 4.1). As a reminder, the IYH would predict FDI attitudes of 
cohorts who passed their early adulthood during a period in which the statist 
narrative was predominant (i.e. those born before the mid-1960s and having turned 
25 years old before 1990) to be different from those who passed their prime period of 
political-economic socialization in the 1990s and 2000s (i.e. those born in the mid-
1960s and later who turned 25 after the 1980s) when the globalization narrative was 
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salient; at the same time, if the hypothesis is correct, attitudes should be similar 
among cohorts who grew up in a similar ideational environment (i.e. those born 
before the mid-1960s and those born after). The results from the series of Wald tests 
in Table 4.2 suggest that this is indeed the case: the estimated coefficient for the 1964-
68 cohort is statistically significantly different from the coefficients of all older 
cohorts, but not statistically significantly different from the estimated coefficient for 
all younger birth cohorts. 
 
Table 4.2. Chi-square Wald test statistics assessing significance of difference in 
coefficient for 1964-68 cohort and coefficients of all other birth cohort categories 
 1929-33 1934-38 1939-43 1944-48 1949-53 1954-58 
1964-68 34.03*** 23.45*** 26.07*** 15.28*** 18.56*** 11.88*** 
 1959-63 1969-73 1974-78 1979-83 1984-88 >1988 
1964-68 7.56** 0.05 0.23 0.16 1.07 1.37 
NOTE: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 
To assess the more nuanced theoretical predictions deriving from the combination of 
the IYH and IPH illustrated in Figure 4.1 above, I next calculate and plot the cohort-
specific predicted probabilities based on the regression analyses conducted above. 
The results are illustrated in Figure 4.2., which shows the average predicted 
probability for an individual born into a specific birth cohort to express a negative 
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view of inward FDI, taking into account the cohort-specific distribution of all 
individual- and country-level confounders included in the regressions41. 
Figure 4.2. Average predicted probability to express a negative view of the impact 
of multinational companies by birth cohort, taking into account all covariates at 
individual and national level listed in Table 4.1 
 
Overall, the predicted probabilities of respondents of any cohort to express a 
negative view of FDI are relatively high with majorities of each cohort tending to 
agree with the view that international companies are harming local businesses. Yet, 
given the negative framing of the question and the higher levels of hostility towards 
FDI among non-elites typically observed in previous studies (see above) this is not 
altogether surprising. This being said, focusing on the evolution of predicted 
probabilities by birth cohorts, the pattern closely resembles the theoretical 
                                                          
41 Note that the plot illustrates the average marginal effect; that is, the average of predicted individual 
probabilities given their specific covariates, and not the conditional effect at the mean (which evaluates 
the change in probability holding all other variables constant at their mean or modal value). The main 
advantage of the former are that they allow making inferences to the total population, while the latter, 
strictly speaking, only allow making inferences for the stratum of observations that have the mean or 
modal values. See Clemma J. Muller and Richard F. MacLehose, "Estimating Predicted Probabilities 
from Logistic Regression: Different Methods Correspond to Different Target Populations," 
International Journal of Epidemiology 43, no. 3 (2014). This being said, the estimated predicted 
probabilities using either method are very similar in this case. 
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expectations of the combined socialization effect illustrated in Figure 4.1 above: from 
a maximum of over 70 percent of the oldest respondents in the sample (born before 
1934) expressing a negative view of FDI, the predicted probabilities gradually 
decrease for each subsequent birth cohort until it stabilizes at around 55 percent for 
respondents born after 1963. Moreover, crucially, predicted average attitudes of each 
birth cohort turned notably more favourable for all cohorts during the ten years that 
elapsed between 2003 and 2013. Because the most obvious alternative ageing 
mechanisms (such as the trend towards conservatism or the employment prospects 
hypothesis) would have predicted FDI attitudes of any specific cohort to deteriorate 
as respondents age by ten more years, these patterns provide relatively strong 
evidence against them. 
Moreover, other pieces of evidence from related research projects also contribute to 
question the notion that it is in some sense ‘natural’ for younger people to have more 
positive views of foreign companies. Most importantly, opinion surveys conducted 
in the 1960s-70s – that is, in a time period in which the statist narrative was 
prominent – repeatedly found that younger people were more (rather than less) 
hostile towards FDI than older respondents. For example, in his analysis of the elite 
surveys he conducted in Britain and France in the early 1970s, John Fayerweather 
noted that “younger legislators (…) [tend to be] more adverse to foreign firms”42 and 
the authors of an analysis of public opinion survey data from Canada in the 1970s 
wrote the following: “As in previous surveys, young persons are among those more 
likely to express negative attitudes toward foreign investment, 46 percent of the 
                                                          
42 See John Fayerweather, "Elite Attitudes toward Multinational Firms," in Host National Attitudes 
toward Multinational Corporations, ed. John Fayerweather (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 34. 
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respondents under 30 years of age in the most recent survey rating U.S. investment 
in the economy a bad thing in contrast with 36 percent of those over 50 years 
expressing a similar opinion”43. The observation that attitudes of young people 
towards inward FDI tended to be relatively more hostile in surveys conducted in the 
1960s-1970s, but more favourable in the 2000s is indeed hard to reconcile with these 
alternative ageing mechanisms. Instead, acknowledging that the economic narratives 
predominant in advanced economies before the Second World War had been 
relatively liberal compared to the statist discourse crystallizing in the aftermath of 
the war (cf. Chapter 2), the results correspond closely to the pattern suggested by the 
argument of socialization forwarded in this thesis44. 
 
Assessing potential alternative explanations for the cohort effect 
The existence of a generational cohort-effect in FDI attitudes in this data thus seems 
clear and the evidence in favour of the socialization mechanism is strong. Yet, 
establishing the precise causes of this effect conclusively remains a difficult task. 
Albeit it appears evident that, all else equal, individuals who passed their early 
adulthood in the 1990s and 2000s held more favourable views of inward FDI than 
                                                          
43 Alex J. Murray and Lawrence LeDuc, "Changing Attitudes toward Foreign Investment in Canada," 
ibid., 222. [emphasis added] 
44 Furthermore, there is also more evidence from surveys available that raises questions about the 
employment prospects hypothesis more specifically. Summarizing the studies that had assessed 
whether employees of foreign companies show more favourable views of inward FDI than other 
workers, John Smetanka concluded: “In several of the studies (…) investigators have focused on 
possible differences in attitudes between executives who work for independent national firms and 
those who are employed by the affiliates of foreign corporations. More often than not, however, little 
difference in opinion has been observed from the data.” Smetanka, "Sources of Foreign Investment 
Attitudes: A Study of Canadian Executives," 90. See also Karl P. Sauvant and Bernard Mennis, "Are 
There Learning Side-Effects Associated with Employment in a Transnational Business Enterprise," in 
Host National Attitudes toward Multinational Corporations, ed. John Fayerweather (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1982). 
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older respondents, the data does not directly tell us why. The preceding parts of this 
thesis, emphasizing the degree to which perceptions of the role of inward FDI for 
national economic development have changed, strongly suggest that the evolution of 
predominant economic narratives played an important role in these regards. Yet, a 
priori the change in narratives is not the sole possible explanation that is consistent 
with this finding. In particular, it is also possible that younger cohorts adopted more 
favourable views not only because of the change in narratives, but also due to ‘real’ 
changes in the nature of FDI, which younger people - arguably due to their greater 
attitudinal flexibility - could be quicker to realize than older respondents. If this is 
true, then structurally driven changes in the nature of FDI could simultaneously 
contribute to explain the existence of the observed generational difference in 
attitudes towards FDI and it would be difficult to disentangle the two effects from 
each other. 
Although I cannot completely rule out the possibility that structural changes in the 
nature of FDI also played a role as drivers of the cohort effect, there are several 
indications that make it rather unlikely that they played a major role. Most 
importantly, as it is discussed in greater detail in the introduction chapter (pp. 19-
20), empirical investigations of the degree of change in the nature of the operations 
of MNCs’ subsidiaries abroad have found that they have been modest, unfolding 
slowly and gradually over time. In other words, although these studies do suggest 
that the operations of MNCs have tended to become more internationally integrated 
over time and that the R&D intensity of FDI-related economic activities has 
increased slightly, these developments – unlike the simultaneous transformations in 
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predominant economic narratives - have been of a marginal rather than a 
fundamental character and it seems unlikely that these incremental and rather 
opaque developments would have been sufficient to induce mass publics to re-think 
their attitudes towards FDI. What is more, even if these structural developments 
would in principle be able to explain the observed decreases in FDI hostility of 
cohort groups between 2003 and 2013, they are unable to account for the ‘break’ 
observed between cohorts born before and after the mid-1960s. After all, the 
available evidence on the real transformations in FDI suggests that these are gradual 
processes, which started long before 1990 and continue unfolding slowly until today. 
Accordingly, if the cohort-effect was in effect driven by these structurally induced 
transformations, we would expect age to continue to matter as a predictor of anti-
FDI attitudes also for cohorts born after 1964-68 rather than the observed relative 
‘stabilization’ of attitudes among all cohorts born after 1964. 
 
Examination of the cohort effect for specific subgroups 
Finally, to further examine the degree of consistency of the patterns of the observed 
generational cohort effect with the predictions of the socialization mechanism vs. the 
hypothesis of structural changes, I also analyse and compare the specific 
probabilities that the regression analysis predicts for various subgroups of 
respondents in the sample for which either of these two contending explanations 
would anticipate the cohort effect to be particularly strong. 
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As discussed in the introduction chapter, the two (supposed) structural changes in 
the nature of FDI that have received most attention as potential explanations for the 
shrinking hostility towards FDI inflows in public opinion are, on the one hand, the 
gradually increasing R&D-intensity of IFDI-related economic activities and, on the 
other hand, the weakening of MNCs’ ties to their home economies and governments. 
While the former is believed to have improved the quality of IFDI-related jobs and 
MNCs’ contribution to a host nation’s innovation capacity, the gradual dissolution of 
MNCs’ ‘national identity’ may have eased public concerns that FDI inflows would 
undermine host economies’ political independence. In order to evaluate the extent to 
which it is these changes rather than the change in narratives, which have been 
driving the observed generational difference in FDI attitudes, I therefore proceed to 
examine in more detail the size of the generational effect for those specific subgroups 
of respondents in the sample whom we would expect to be particularly sensitive to 
the unfolding of such changes (to the extent that they have occurred at all; see 
introduction chapter). 
Specifically, to assess the importance of the supposed shift in IFDI-related activities 
from low-value adding blue collar jobs to high-value adding white collar 
employment as a driver of the generational difference in attitudes towards FDI, I 
estimate the size of the latter among the group of respondents who are most likely to 
benefit from such changes: that is, the highly educated and high-skilled workforce. 
Analogously, in order to evaluate the salience of the process of ‘de-nationalization’ 
of MNCs as a source of the observed improvement in public attitudes towards them, 
I also estimate the size of the generational effect for those respondents who we 
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would expect to be most sensitive to issues of sovereignty and ‘national control’: that 
is, respondents expressing higher levels of national pride45. Hence, to examine the 
extent to which the cohort effect is conditional on respondents’ level of education or 
strength of nationalist sentiments, I re-run the regression model 3 in Table 4.1 with 
the merged dataset and one dummy variable (equal to one for all respondents born 
after 1963) replacing the more fine-grained categorical birth cohorts variable. Figure 
4.3, which shows the average individual predicted probabilities (with 95 percent 
confidence intervals) for each relevant subgroup of respondents and the differences 
among them, illustrates the findings graphically. 
Overall, the results clearly disconfirm the hypothesis of structural changes being the 
principal driver of the generational difference in FDI attitudes. If the former were 
true, we would have expected the size of the generational difference in FDI attitudes 
to be particularly great either for respondents with a university degree and/or for 
those with strong nationalist feelings. Yet, the results show that although the 
subgroups of respondents with a university degree as well as those expressing a 
cosmopolitan identity clearly have a much more favourable view of inward FDI than 
their counterparts, there is nearly no difference in the size of the generational effect, 
which hovers around 5 percentage points in all four groups. Accordingly, the 
interaction effects (estimated in a separate regression model) of belonging into either 
subgroup and being born after the mid-1960s are also statistically insignificant 
(p>0.85 for university degree and p>0.45 for nationalism). Although these results per 
                                                          
45 The division of respondents into ‘nationalist’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ subgroups is based on individual 
agreement with the statement ‘I would rather be a citizen of [COUNTRY] than any other country in 
the world’, as before. 
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se do not demonstrate that the described structural changes didn’t happen and/or 
that they had no influence on how individuals assess inward FDI, they nonetheless 
do provide further empirical support against the claim that such developments were 
the major driver of the observed generational difference in FDI attitudes. 
Figure 4.3. The size of the cohort effect for groups of respondents presumably 
most sensitive to gradual changes in nature of FDI 
 
 
 
Finally, I use the same strategy in order to examine the consistency of the patterns of 
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the hypothesis of socialization and narrative change. Specifically, I aim to evaluate 
the size of the generational difference for those specific subgroups of respondents 
whose exposure to the statist narrative was particularly pronounced during the 
1960s-70s. If the hypothesis of socialization is correct, then the older generations of 
these specific subgroups should express particularly hostile views towards FDI, 
while this ‘add-on’ hostility should have largely disappeared among younger 
generations of the same subgroup. 
To test this hypothesis, I look at two specific subgroups: respondents from formerly 
communist countries46 and public sector employees. As it is well known, communist 
ideology was particularly hostile towards foreign companies of Western origins 
(which account for a large majority of total global FDI flows)47. Accordingly, to the 
extent that the observed generational difference in FDI attitudes is driven by 
individuals’ exposure to specific economic narratives, we would expect individuals 
who passed their schooling and early adulthood in an ideational context marked by 
the communist version of economic statism to have particularly sceptical views of 
inward FDI. In contrast, although the priming of older generations with anti-FDI 
views may of course to some extent ‘trickle down’ to their descendants, we would 
expect younger generations - who spent their prime period of socialization after the 
transition to capitalism - to hold notably more favourable views. In other words, we 
would expect the impact of being ‘old’ or ‘young’ to make a greater difference 
among subgroups of respondents from formerly communist countries than for those 
                                                          
46 That is those countries in the ISSP sample formerly part of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. 
47 See, for example, Nina Bandelj, From Communists to Foreign Capitalists  (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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from countries without a communist past if the hypothesis of socialization is true. 
The expected difference in attitudes of different generations of public sector and 
private sector employees is very similar. The reasoning behind the comparison is 
based on the assumption that public sector employees, finding themselves by 
definition in closer proximity to government institutions than their peers working in 
the private sector, are more strongly exposed to the economic narratives that a 
government promotes. Accordingly, if the socialization hypothesis is true, we would 
expect the generational shift in FDI attitudes to be more pronounced among 
respondents working in the public sector than those employed in the private sector. 
The results of the corresponding statistical analyses are presented in graphical form 
in Figure 4.4. In both cases, the results clearly confirm the predictions of the 
socialization hypothesis: IFDI attitudes of older generations of respondents in 
formerly communist countries are exceptionally hostile and they are somewhat more 
hostile for older generations of public sector workers than for their peers employed 
in the private sector; furthermore, the size of the generational cohort effect is 
substantially larger among subgroups of respondents in formerly communist 
countries (8.8 vs. 4.9 percentage points) and among public sector workers (8.6 vs. 5.9 
percentage points) than among their peers in countries without a communist past or 
not working in the public sector, as the socialization hypothesis predicts. 
Accordingly, the relevant interaction terms (estimated in separate regression 
analyses) are statistically highly significant for the case of communist legacy 
(p<0.001) and close to being significant for public sector employees (p<0.13). 
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Figure 4.4. The size of the cohort effect for groups of respondents highly exposed 
to statist narrative before 1990 
 
 
 
In sum: although the possibility that structural changes in the nature of FDI 
unfolding in parallel to the changes in economic narratives simultaneously 
contributed to tilt individuals’ assessment of FDI inflows into a more positive 
direction cannot be excluded completely, the results of these additional analyses are 
highly supportive of the contention that the mechanism of socialization likely played 
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a greater role in the generation of the observed generational difference in FDI 
attitudes than potential alternative mechanisms. 
 
Conclusions 
Previous work in the fields of social psychology and sociology examining the 
formation of attitudes throughout the lifespan of individuals has found strong 
evidence that political and economic core beliefs are primarily formed during late 
adolescence and early adulthood and that the likelihood that individuals change 
these views decreases fairly rapidly thereafter. Applying this insight to the case of 
inward FDI, I have analysed the evolution of relevant attitudes for different birth 
cohorts in two large cross-national public opinion surveys conducted by ISSP. In 
accordance with the argument pursued in this thesis, the analysis found clear and 
strong evidence of a generational cohort effect which shows that individuals who 
passed their prime period of political-economic socialization in the 1990s and 2000s 
when the narrative of globalization was prominent hold more favourable views of 
inward FDI than older respondents who grew up in a historical environment in 
which the statist narrative was still strong. In addition, further analyses have shown 
that the distinct features of the cohort effect, while being strongly consistent with the 
hypothesis of socialization and narrative change, largely disconfirm the more 
specific predictions that can be derived from potential alternative explanations for 
the observed patterns such as other ageing-related processes (e.g. natural trend 
towards conservatism or employment prospects hypotheses) or structural changes in 
the nature of FDI. As such, while the previous two chapters have focused primarily 
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on the transformations in the social representation of inward FDI among policy 
specialists, the analysis presented in this chapter shows that the simultaneous 
evolution of public opinion is highly consistent with these ideational developments. 
Although mass public attitudes towards inward FDI generally remained more 
sceptical than those of policy elites, the most pronounced concerns seem to have 
gradually dissipated from the early 1990s onwards. The political consequences of 
these changes in public opinion in advanced democracies are assessed in more detail 
in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5 . A POLITICAL BANG FOR THE FOREIGN BUCK? VOTING 
BEHAVIOUR AND ELECTORAL EFFECTS  
The preceding parts of this thesis have demonstrated the profound changes in the 
meaning ascribed to inward FDI in dominant economic discourses throughout the 
post-war era and the corresponding gradual easing of public attitudes towards 
issues of foreign company ownership, especially among younger people. As I have 
shown in previous chapters, from the late 1980s onwards when the globalization 
narrative started to gain a strong foothold in policy debates, economic experts and 
policymakers have become increasingly sanguine about FDI inflows. 
Simultaneously, public opinion at large – although remaining somewhat more 
reserved in its assessment of the desirability of attracting foreign companies – also 
turned notably more favourable towards IFDI as the most prominent concerns about 
the potential negative consequences of foreign companies seemingly started to 
dissipate. The aims of the present chapter are to assess whether and how these 
observed trends are reflected in voting behaviour. To do so, I analyse the 
correlations between relative increases in FDI inflows and the vote share of 
incumbent parties in over 200 general elections in 21 advanced democracies between 
1970 and 2007, using the so far most extensive dataset of its kind provided by Jeff 
Chwieroth and Andrew Walter1. 
FDI inflows are, of course, normally not the most salient issue on voters’ minds 
when they go to the polling station. Nonetheless, the available evidence clearly 
                                                          
1 Chwieroth and Walter, "From Low to Great Expectations: Banking Crises and Partisan Survival over 
the Long Run." 
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suggests that it is one factor - among many others - that they do (respectively did) 
take into account. Aligned with theoretical expectations and the results of the public 
opinion analysis presented in the previous chapter, the analysis finds that voters 
reacted negatively to increases in FDI inflows when the statist narrative was 
prominent, but largely ceded to do so after the rise of the globalization narrative 
towards the end of the Cold War. As such, the results do not only provide further 
evidence from large-n cross-national data in support of the theoretical claims made 
in this thesis, but they also elucidate some of the mechanisms that make economic 
narratives potentially politically more powerful than more ‘scientific’ types of 
economic knowledge. Although it remains clear that voters do not make FDI policies 
themselves, as I will discuss in more detail, empirical evidence suggests that voter 
preferences nonetheless play an important role in democratic systems as an enabling 
or constraining force that affects the extent to which policy specialists are able to 
pursue their preferred policy. 
 
Economic performance and voting behaviour: towards a realistic model of 
retrospective economic voting 
An influential stream of literature in political science has argued that voters select 
political leaders based on their past performance and the policies they propose, 
thereby holding incumbents responsible for their actions2. Other authors have 
                                                          
2 For overviews, see Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections : The Major Western Democracies  
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988); Helmut Norpoth, Michael S. Lewis-Beck, and Jean-
Dominique Lafay, Economics and Politics : The Calculus of Support  (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1991). G. Bingham Powell and Guy D. Whitten, "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic 
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criticised such models as being underpinned by idealistic views of democracy, which 
conceptualize citizens as overly sophisticated political actors and over-rationalize 
their voting behaviour. In a particularly powerful recent critique of these models, 
Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels3 persuasively argue that citizens are typically 
disinterested in actual policy programs or past policy outcomes and that their voting 
behaviour is instead largely determined by social identities and partisan loyalties 
acquired during childhood as well as voters’ feelings about the ‘nature of times’4 
rather than any objective assessment of incumbent governments’ political and 
economic performance. Demonstrating that voters repeatedly reward or punish 
incumbents for things that are clearly unrelated to the policy programs they adopt – 
such as bad weather or shark attacks -, Achen and Bartels question whether voters 
have the ability (or if they are even interested) to hold political leaders accountable. 
Instead, they argue, it is “social identities that shape how voters think, what they 
think and where they think they belong” in the party system5. Ultimately, Achen 
and Bartels contend, when voters go to the polling station, rather than expressing 
their individual policy preference, they generally simply follow the policy 
prescriptions that the relevant political parties, media outlets and social groups have 
defined for them. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context," American Journal of Political Science 37, no. 2 (1993); 
Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Martin Paldam, "Economic Voting: An Introduction," Electoral Studies 19, 
no. 2 (2000). 
3 Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists : Why Elections Do Not Produce 
Responsive Government  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); "Democracy for Realists: 
Holding up a Mirror to the Electorate," Juncture 22, no. 4 (2016). 
4 "Democracy for Realists: Holding up a Mirror to the Electorate," 269. 
5 Ibid. 
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Although their work is framed as a challenge to the idea of retrospective voting, 
much of it is not necessarily inconsistent with the key findings of that literature. A 
closer look at the economic voting literature reveals that most proponents of these 
models do not claim that past economic performance invariably determines election 
outcomes, but merely that they are one group of factors that influence voting 
behaviour. For example, an authoritative review of the literature concludes that 
economic performance is able to explain about one third of the variation in vote 
changes6 - in other words, it leaves two thirds unexplained. Moreover, most studies 
of economic voting concur that the typical processes underlying voters’ evaluation of 
past performance are not overly sophisticated. For example, the literature has found 
that voters tend to be myopic (that is, they have relatively short time horizons), that 
they react more to past rather than expected events and more to negative rather than 
positive changes, and that they seem to be more strongly motivated by sociotropic 
rather than egocentric concerns7. Furthermore, the literature’s finding that voters 
react to changes in indicators of economic performance - such as rates of economic 
growth, inflation or unemployment – does not necessarily imply that voters actively 
collect and analyse those statistics. Instead, more plausibly, changes in those 
statistics proxy for broader economic developments, which affect how the media, 
political parties and other social groups talk about the government and how they 
frame the ‘nature of times’8. Individual voters thus must not necessarily be aware of 
the latest quarter’s economic statistics for the latter to have an influence on how they 
vote, but it is sufficient if these economic developments influence the political 
                                                          
6 Lewis-Beck and Paldam, "Economic Voting: An Introduction," 114. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Achen and Bartels, "Democracy for Realists: Holding up a Mirror to the Electorate." 
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discourse of the social authorities of an individual’s specific social group. In this 
sense, economic statistics are best understood as proxies that indicate the general 
economic sentiment and discourse that is predominant at any given point in time 
and voters are not assumed to react directly to these statistics, but to the broader 
economic dynamics that simultaneously determine these indicators and the 
generally predominant economic discourse among the media and public. To give an 
example: most voters are probably unable to recall the exact national economic 
growth or inflation rates of the last quarter; but, instead, it is likely that the levels of 
recent economic growth and inflation rates are reflected in the media’s general 
discourse about the performance of the economy and that voters, in turn, are aware 
of the latter. If growth rates are increasing, the general assessment of economic 
performance in the media is more likely to be positive; if inflation rates are 
increasing, this is likely to be reflected in an economic discourse emphasizing 
economic instability and uncertainty, etc. In this sense, voters do not reward or 
punish incumbent governments for the evolution of economic indicators per se, but 
for the general economic discourse that the dynamics that underlie their evolution 
give rise to. 
While a majority of previous studies of economic voting have analysed the effect of 
changes in rates of economic growth, inflation or unemployment, this study is 
primarily interested in the impact of changes in the levels of FDI inflows. It is worth 
repeating that by analysing how increases or decreases in relative levels of FDI 
inflows affect an incumbent’s vote share, I do not assume that levels of FDI inflows 
are generally the primary concern of average voters on election day and/or that 
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voters carefully study the latest FDI statistics before casting their ballot. I only 
contend that during certain time periods, which I specify in the next section, levels of 
FDI inflows were one amongst a larger number of other factors that had some 
influence on how the media and political groups portrayed the incumbent 
government in their discourse, which in turn marginally affected the level of voter 
support for incumbent governments at general elections. 
 
Elections and inward FDI 
As previous chapters have elaborated in some detail, predominant attitudes towards 
inward FDI were largely negative during the 1960s-70s when the statist narrative 
was prominent. Public opinion tended to consider foreign ownership as an economic 
evil and also FDI policy specialists, although more nuanced in their overall 
assessment of the benefits and risks of inward FDI, were strongly focused on the 
potentially harmful implications of FDI inflows. As we have seen, throughout the 
1980s attitudes towards inward FDI became gradually more favourable and in the 
1990s policy specialists started to consider FDI as an overwhelmingly ‘good thing’. 
Public opinion in the 1990s-2000s did not necessarily embrace the enthusiasm for 
FDI emerging among economic experts and policymakers at the same time, but it 
certainly became more welcoming towards foreign investors, as the analysis of 
public opinion data presented in the previous chapter has clearly shown. Maybe 
most importantly in these respects, despite the rapidly increasing levels of inward 
FDI throughout the developed world in the 1990s-2000s, the media and the public at 
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large ceded to be too concerned about the issue of foreign ownership per se, allowing 
inward FDI to gradually turn into a largely uncontroversial political ‘non-issue’.  
Aligned with these observations, one would expect growing levels of foreign 
ownership in an economy to have reflected negatively upon the image of the 
incumbent government while the statist narrative was strong and, accordingly, 
increases in FDI inflows to have been punished by voters at general elections before 
the 1990s; at the same time, to the extent that the decreasing hostility towards FDI 
inflows observed in public opinion data is reflected in voting outcomes, one would 
expect this negative association having dissipated – and maybe even turned positive 
– at elections held after the end of the Cold War when foreign ownership ceded to be 
a salient political issue. 
 
The salience of FDI inflows in public opinion before the 1990s 
The key assumption that has to hold for the hypothetical negative association 
between FDI inflows and an incumbent’s vote share before 1990 to be plausible is 
that the media and voters cared enough about the issue of foreign ownership for it to 
have at least a marginal effect on election outcomes. The available evidence in these 
regards from a range of countries suggests that this was indeed the case. 
For example, in a survey conducted in Canada in 1975-76, which asked business 
executives about ‘the most important issue facing Canada’, no less than 12.4 percent 
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of respondents mentioned ‘US investments in Canada’9. Similarly, surveys 
conducted in the UK and France in the mid-1970s found that 7.8 percent of British 
MPs and 18.5 percent of French MPs identified ‘foreign MNCs’ as ‘the most pressing 
issue in international economic affairs’10. Although by no means suggesting that FDI 
was the top priority in politics and government affairs at the time, these figures 
nonetheless strongly suggest that IFDI clearly was a salient political issue at the time. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, investments from US multinationals were an eagerly 
debated issue in Western Europe and Canada in the 1960s-70s that received a lot of 
public attention. Two contemporary observers of Canadian politics, for example, 
noted in the mid-1970s that the rise of the economic nationalist discourse promoted 
in particular by Walter Gordon (MP of the Liberal Party and Minister of Finance 
from 1963-65) in the late 1950s and early 1960s11 had ended the period in which 
foreign investments were a topic reserved for nerdy policy specialists, as ordinary 
“Canadians began to formulate opinions toward specific public policies dealing with 
[the] regulation of incoming foreign investment”12 and a radical wing of the New 
Democratic Party, at least for some time, elevated calls for the nationalization of 
foreign firms to the top of their agenda13. Furthermore, as the notable number of 
surveys of public attitudes towards FDI conducted at the time suggest, ordinary 
people did not only form opinions, but their opinions also mattered to government 
leaders. For instance, at least one political observer claimed that the creation and 
                                                          
9 See Smetanka, "Sources of Foreign Investment Attitudes: A Study of Canadian Executives." 
10 See Graham, "Developed Countries and Multinational Corporations: Threat Perception and Policy 
Response in France and the United Kingdom," 241. 
11 For a detailed analysis of his role, see J. L. Granatstein, Yankee Go Home? : Canadians and Anti-
Americanism  (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1996), Chapter 6. 
12 Murray and LeDuc, "Changing Attitudes toward Foreign Investment in Canada," 216. 
13 Ibid., 218. 
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design of Canada’s Foreign Investment Review Agency in 1973 was directly “based 
on [the] analysis of trends in national polls”14. 
At the same time, the political climate for foreign investments was similar in the 
United Kingdom and France – the two cases which are analysed in much more detail 
in the subsequent chapter – as well as many other European countries. For example, 
the layoffs at the French subsidiaries of General Motors and Remington as well as 
Chrysler’s acquisition of a majority stock in French carmaker Simca in the early 1960s 
were highly salient political topics in France, which moved inward FDI right into the 
spotlight of public debates. One observer commented that “public opinion was (…) 
inflamed” about the issue of foreign ownership, claiming that it was “the impact of 
these events on French attitudes (…) [which] led to a period of restrictive regulation 
of foreign (especially U.S.) direct investment”15. Although it is of course difficult to 
discern the real impact of public opinion on the adoption of specific FDI policies, it is 
interesting to note that President De Gaulle forwarded several proposals to restrict 
inward FDI with great publicity shortly before the presidential elections of 196516. 
And the fact that Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s essay Le défi américain topped 
French bestseller lists for months leaves little doubts about the public interest in 
questions of FDI at the time17. Furthermore, public debates about inward FDI in 
France were not constrained to the De Gaulle period but remained on the political 
agenda well into the 1970s and early 1980s as the French Left increasingly “sought to 
                                                          
14 In John Fayerweather, "A Review of the State of the Art," ibid., 330. 
15 Norman Graham, "Developed Countries and Multinational Corporations: Threat Perception and 
Policy Response in France and the United Kingdom," ibid., 251. 
16 Ibid., 252. 
17 Simultaneously, its translation into fifteen languages is highly suggestive that these public debates 
about inward FDI were attracting attention far beyond French borders. 
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make an issue out of the threat of MNCs” after De Gaulle’s resignation in 1969, using 
the gradual increases in foreign investments as an opportunity to accuse the 
conservative government of ‘selling out’ to foreign capitalists18. 
In the United Kingdom too, groupings of the political Left, in particular the Labour 
party and trade unions, effectively used the supposed negative impacts of MNCs 
and controversies involving foreign companies as welcome “opportunities to 
criticize government policy and further politicize the[se] issues”19 while occupying 
the opposition benches in the early 1970s. Illustrating the real publicity and political 
importance of the IFDI issue at the time, a contemporary observer reported that the 
Conservative Heath administration was reluctant to impose restrictions on inward 
FDI, but was “worried to lose votes” if they didn’t do so20 while the Labour party, at 
the same time, made highly publicized pledges to impose stricter regulations on 
foreign multinationals during their campaign for the 1974 general elections (which 
they narrowly won)21. 
And also in the United States, as we have seen in Chapter 2, FDI inflows became a 
vigorously debated political topic in the 1970s-80s when “the xenophobic sentiment 
of the U.S. public (was)… fanned by the alarmist news coverage of the IFDI issue”22 
and the “view that the public was concerned about increased foreign ownership of 
domestic firms received such frequent airing in the media as to become conventional 
                                                          
18 Graham, "Developed Countries and Multinational Corporations: Threat Perception and Policy 
Response in France and the United Kingdom," 259. 
19 Ibid., 264. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 266. 
22 Kang, "Us Politics and Greater Regulation of Inward Foreign Direct Investment," 311. 
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wisdom”23. As discussed, US public opinion was strongly in favour of the 
introduction of restrictions of foreign investment inflows in the 1970s-80s – several 
polls finding that at least three quarters of the population supported calls for a 
greater regulation of inward FDI –, encouraging a variety of congressional initiatives 
in these regards (most importantly the creation of the CFIUS review process)24 and 
making it a prominent topic in Michael Dukakis’ unsuccessful bid for the White 
House in 198825. 
 
FDI as a political ‘non-issue’ in the 1990s-2000s 
In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War when the globalization narrative rose to 
prominence, such debates largely (although not entirely) disappeared from the 
political landscape in advanced democracies. Presenting evidence of events that 
haven’t occurred is of course difficult. But as I have discussed in some more detail in 
Chapter 3, against the background of the heated debates about FDI in the 1960s-80s, 
the rarity of political controversies surrounding FDI inflows after 1990 is truly 
remarkable, especially in view of the extraordinarily rapid increases in levels of 
foreign ownership observed across the developed world during the same period. 
The somewhat ‘surprising silence’ of the Council of Canadians after the US take-over 
of the Hudson Bay Company (see p. 166) and a similar non-response of nationalist 
groupings in the USA towards the surge of foreign investments in the late 1990s (see 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 See the excellent discussion of these processes in ibid. 
25 During which he called for “Americans to buy back industries and land from the Saudi Arabians, 
the Kuwaitis, the Japanese and the Europeans”. See Timothy McNulty and George Curry, "Dukakis, 
Bush Maneuver into Debate Position," Chicago Tribune, 20 September 1988. 
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p. 159) have already been mentioned. Similarly, as I will discuss in more detail in the 
next chapter, the number of parliamentary debates in the UK merely mentioning the 
word ‘take-over’ – after reaching a peak in the late 1980s – almost disappeared in the 
1990s and 2000s (see Figure 6.3, p. 271). 
Of course this does not necessarily mean that public opinion was now all in favour 
of FDI. As the public opinion analysis in the previous chapter has suggested, 
although growing increasingly favourable over time, public opinion remained fairly 
divided about the issue of foreign ownership – especially when it involves the 
takeover of domestic firms rather than greenfield investments26 - when the question 
was elicited explicitly. In this sense, it seems plausible to suggest that the importance 
of the rise of the globalization narrative on public opinion towards FDI and foreign 
ownership consisted not only of the favourable description of the meaning of FDI 
inflows it provided, but, equally importantly, its conceptualization of international 
economic integration as an ‘inevitable’ fact of modern economic life that has to be 
simply accepted and which was not worth being questioned or debated; a political 
‘non-issue’, in short. 
 
Empirical strategy 
Thus, while being a controversial and relatively salient political topic in the 1960s-
80s, public opinion towards FDI inflows turned notably more favourable in the 
1990s-2000s when foreign ownership lost much of its salience as a political issue in 
                                                          
26 See Pew Research Center, "Faith and Skepticism About Trade, Foreign Investment," (2014). 
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the developed world. To empirically test the political implications of these ideational 
developments, the current section analyses the relationship between relative FDI 
inflows and voter support at general elections in advanced democracies. More 
specifically, according to the observations made above, the hypothesis I am 
interested to test is the prediction that relative increases in FDI inflows were 
associated with a lower support for incumbent governments before 1990, but not 
thereafter. 
To test this argument, I use a dataset provided by Jeffrey Chwieroth and Andrew 
Walter27 that includes information on the popular vote share of the incumbent 
government in 221 general elections held in 21 OECD economies28 from 1970 to 2007 
to estimate a pooled cross-sectional OLS model of the following form: 
𝛥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡′𝑠 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖  +  𝛽𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖 
To take the distinct logics of majoritarian and proportional electoral systems into 
account, I use two distinct dependent variables29: the first dependent variable 
indicates the change in vote share of the incumbent lead party, the second the change 
in vote share of the incumbent coalition. In cases of single-party governments, the 
two variables are identical. In cases of coalition governments, the party variable 
measures the change in the level of support of the party of the Prime Minister at the 
election at time t minus its support at the previous general election, while the 
                                                          
27 Chwieroth and Walter, "From Low to Great Expectations: Banking Crises and Partisan Survival 
over the Long Run." 
28 The 21 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. 
29 As suggested by Lewis-Beck and Paldam, "Economic Voting: An Introduction." 
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coalition variable measures the change in support for the sum of the popular vote 
share from the previous general election to t for all parties who were part of the 
government30.  
The main explanatory variables of interest are measurements indicating a country’s 
levels of FDI inflows before the election. Because there is no consensus in the 
economic voting literature on how to model how voters and/or the media process 
information about changes in economic indicators, I opt to operationalize it in three 
distinct possible ways and to assess the consistency of the results under different 
modelling assumptions: First, in the simplest model, I use the value of FDI inflows as 
a share of GDP in the year before the elections31 (see Models 1-4). This model 
corresponds to a view of voters and the media as myopic retrospective evaluators of 
economic information. Second, I calculate the change in average FDI inflows as a 
share of GDP during the term in office of the incumbent at time t in the years 
immediately preceding the election minus the average FDI inflows as a share of GDP 
during the period in office of the previous government (see Models 5-8)32. This 
operationalization is intended to mirror the reasoning process of retrospective but 
fairly sophisticated journalists and voters who compare the performance of the 
incumbent government primarily to the performance of the previous government. 
Third, I calculate the comparative levels of FDI inflows as a share of GDP (see Models 
                                                          
30 All political parties that have at least one cabinet member at the time of the election are classified as 
part of the government. 
31 Note that I use the lagged value of FDI inflows and deliberately ignore FDI inflows in the election 
year itself. 
32 For example, general elections were held in Italy in 1976, 1979 and 1983; in this case, for the 1983 
election the variable ∆𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠(𝑡>𝑖>𝑡−1)−(𝑡−1>𝑖>𝑡−2) captures the average FDI inflows as a share of 
GDP in the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 minus the average FDI inflows as a share of GDP in 1977 and 
1978. Note that, just like before, I am again ignoring FDI inflows in the election year itself. 
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9 to 12). To do so, I measure the distance of the country-specific ratio from the 
sample mean in the year before the election. This operationalization reflects a model 
of political commentators and voters as economic analysts who compare the 
performance of the incumbent government primarily to the simultaneous 
performance of its peer countries (rather than the performance of the previous 
government) 33. 
Furthermore, I include the most important control variables suggested by the 
existing literature on economic voting: To take election cycle dynamics into account, 
I include both the incumbent party’s – or coalition’s (depending on the relevant 
dependent variable) - vote share at the previous election, as well as the ‘swing’ to the 
incumbent party/coalition from the penultimate to the last election to account for 
the ‘overstatement’ of a party’s/coalition’s real base of support34. To control for 
other dimensions of economic developments, I include measurements of economic 
growth – an indicator of economic performance - and inflation – an indicator of 
economic stability. In each model, the economic growth and inflation measurements 
are calculated in a manner that is analogous to the operationalization of the 
respective FDI measurement that is used. 
Note that the annual structure of the data does not allow me to distinguish economic 
developments in the months before or after the general election during election 
years. Therefore - as well as to somewhat reduce the presence of potential 
                                                          
33 As suggested by Powell and Whitten, "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking 
Account of the Political Context." 
34 As suggested in the seminal contribution to the economic voting literature by ibid. In addition, 
Powell and Whitten (1993) also suggest including a dummy variable for minority governments. This 
is omitted here because it is not available in my dataset. 
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endogenous relationships between election results and economic indicators - the 
models only consider economic developments up to the year before the election. 
 
Results 
The main results are presented in Table 5.1. The findings for the control variables are 
broadly consistent with the existing literature. Higher rates of economic growth are 
associated with increases in voter support for incumbent governments in all models 
and the positive relationship is statistically significant in about half of the 
specifications. In alignment with previous studies, the relationship between inflation 
rates and voter support for incumbent governments is less clear. As expected, the 
level of voter support of the incumbent party/coalition at the previous election, as 
well as the vote ‘swing’ from the penultimate to the last election are consistently 
negatively related to the vote share of incumbents at time t. 
The coefficients of principal interest relate to the association of FDI inflows with 
voter support for incumbent governments. Given the hypothesis to be tested, the key 
focus centres on the comparison of the relationship between increases in FDI inflows 
and incumbent’s vote shares before and after 1990. Strongly confirming the 
theoretical predictions, the observed negative association between FDI inflows and 
voter support for incumbent governments is of considerably smaller size in elections 
held after 1990 than before: In the 1970s and 1980s, increases in FDI inflows of one 
percentage point of GDP are associated with a decrease in voter support for 
incumbent governments of between 1.5 and 2.5 percent, but only between 0.2 and 0.7 
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percent in the 1990s and early 2000s. Furthermore, the negative relationship is 
statistically significant in four of six specifications in elections before 1990 and only 
in two of six thereafter. To summarize: a typical close to sample-average 0.2 
percentage point increase (decrease) in FDI inflows as a share of GDP was thus 
associated with a relatively small but consistent decrease (increase) in voter support 
of around 0.3 to 0.5 percent before 1990, while there is ultimately no clear association 
in the 1990s and 2000s. 
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Table 5.1. Main results of the economic voting analysis 
IV FDI inflows/GDP (t-1) Δ FDI inflows/GDP during incumbency Comparative FDI inflows/GDP (t-1) 
Period 1970-1989 1990-2007 1970-1989 1990-2007 1970-1989 1990-2007 
DV Party Coalition Party Coalition Party Coalition Party Coalition Party Coalition Party Coalition 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
FDI inflows/GDP (t-1) -1.53* 
(0.87) 
-1.62* 
(0.91) 
-0.25 
(0.22) 
-0.26 
(0.25) 
        
Δ FDI inflows/GDP during 
incumbency 
    -2.51 
(1.68) 
-2.64 
(1.80) 
-0.15 
(0.20) 
-0.19 
(0.22) 
    
Comparative FDI 
inflows/GDP 
        -1.61* 
(0.85) 
-2.00** 
(0.88) 
-0.69** 
(0.24) 
-0.56** 
(0.29) 
Growth (t-1) 0.55** 
(0.25) 
0.50* 
(0.26) 
0.63 
(0.39) 
1.12** 
(0.48) 
        
Δ Growth during 
incumbency 
    0.34 
(0.28) 
0.18 
(0.32) 
0.89** 
(0.37) 
1.06** 
(0.42) 
    
Comparative growth (t-1)         0.43 
(0.28) 
0.33 
(0.28) 
0.73 
(0.43) 
1.11* 
(0.58) 
Inflation (t-1) -0.004 
(0.116) 
0.005 
(0.12) 
-0.26 
(0.22) 
-0.31 
(0.25) 
        
Δ Inflation during 
incumbency 
    0.09 
(0.13) 
0.12 
(0.16) 
-0.15 
(0.29) 
-0.25 
(0.33) 
    
Comparative inflation (t-1)         0.08 
(0.11) 
0.09 
(0.12) 
-0.20 
(0.24) 
-0.27 
(0.28) 
Vote share incumbent party 
at previous election 
-0.13** 
(0.05) 
 -0.19** 
(0.08) 
 -0.18** 
(0.07) 
 -0.17** 
(0.08) 
 -0.14*** 
(0.05) 
 -0.23*** 
(0.07) 
 
Vote share incumbent 
coalition at previous election 
 -0.11* 
(0.06) 
 -0.09 
(0.07) 
 -0.05 
(0.06) 
 -0.12 
(0.07) 
 -0.06 
(0.05) 
 -0.08 
(0.07) 
‘Swing’ towards incumbent 
party 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
 -0.09 
(0.12) 
 -0.16 
(0.11) 
 -0.17 
(0.13) 
 -0.13 
(0.11) 
 -0.06 
(0.12) 
 
‘Swing’ towards incumbent 
coalition 
 -0.18* 
(0.10) 
 -0.13 
(0.13) 
 -0.25** 
(0.12) 
 -0.14 
(0.14) 
 -0.21** 
(0.10) 
 -0.12 
(0.13) 
N 106 102 100 94 75 73 93 88 112 108 100 94 
R-square 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.18 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.12 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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Discussion 
Although the research design underlying the analysis does not allow making strong 
claims about causal relationships in the data and the findings are not conclusive as 
such, the identified patterns of association are highly suggestive and strongly 
aligned with the theoretical argument elaborated above: before the 1990s, when the 
statist narrative was prominent and foreign ownership of domestic companies was 
framed as a controversial political issue, voters punished incumbent governments for 
relative increases in FDI inflows; in contrast, after the end of the Cold War when the 
narrative of globalization became predominant, taking away a lot of the heat of the 
political debates surrounding inward FDI, voters’ concerns about foreign ownership 
dissipated and, as a result, they largely ignored the sharp increases in FDI inflows 
observed in the 1990s and 2000s, which did not elicit any clear reaction by voters at 
the ballot boxes. 
What do and what don’t these findings imply? It is clear that these results do not 
suggest by any means that FDI inflows are - or ever were – the principal driving 
force of general election outcomes. Even in the heyday of economic nationalism in 
the 1960s, they were only one – and generally by far not the most important – 
consideration that the media and political groups took into account when shaping 
the debates surrounding general elections. Indeed, given the relatively low amount 
of variance in election outcomes that even the most sophisticated models of 
retrospective voting are able to explain, it seems fair to suggest that it is typically 
idiosyncrasies peculiar to each election that normally ‘decide’ elections. But 
nonetheless, at the same time the evidence also clearly suggests that election 
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outcomes do have a systematic component, which has a marginal effect on outcomes 
that can be important. As discussed, a relative increase in FDI inflows as a share of 
GDP of around 0.2 percent typical of the 1970s-80s was systematically associated 
with a loss in incumbents’ vote share of around 0.3 to 0.5 percent. Although this 
effect is relatively small in substantive terms, it can nonetheless be crucial for a 
candidate seeking re-election in a close race. 
Does this imply that ultimately it is voter preferences, which drive FDI policies? 
Again, the empirical record suggests that the dynamics and interactions between 
predominant economic narratives, the media, voters, politicians and policymakers 
are rather more complicated. In general terms, it seems safe to argue that the 
principal driver of the design and implementation of specific inward FDI policies are 
policy specialists; and as long as an issue’s political salience is low, they tend to give 
little consideration to voter preferences1. Accordingly, in times during which the 
media and the wider public – and as a result, politicians - have no peculiar interest in 
the topic of foreign ownership, the key determinants of FDI policies during such 
‘normal’ times are the dynamics of bureaucratic politics and the policy ideas salient 
among these epistemic communities. However, if the political salience of inward FDI 
is high, politicians – keen to gain the attention of voters – have incentives to get 
involved in issues surrounding FDI policy-making and to be responsive to relevant 
trends in public opinion. This does not mean that voter preferences necessarily 
override the preferences of policy specialists if they collide during periods of high 
salience, but it does suggest that public opinion can be an important ancillary force 
                                                          
1 For a similar argument, see Pepper D. Culpepper, Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control 
in Europe and Japan  (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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that can either constrain or encourage the adoption of policies that government 
administrations prefer during such periods. 
Several instances from the period in which the salience of the statist narrative – and 
hence the issue of foreign ownership – was high can usefully illustrate these 
dynamics. For example, in Canadian politics in the early 1970s increased public 
hostility towards foreign companies clearly played a role as a catalyst of the 
implementation of restrictive measures towards FDI. In their account of these events, 
Lawrence LeDuc and Alex Murray emphasize that “the [Trudeau] government was 
slow in adopting a comprehensive policy until it was convinced that public opinion was 
supportive”2 and that, when announcing the new regulations, the government 
spokesman “referred specifically to trends in public opinion, even citing the polls”3. 
In a similar scenario of public opinion as an encouraging force, there is also evidence 
from France suggesting that changes in public mood played an important role when 
the public outrage about the layoffs at large US MNCs in the mid-1960s, in the words 
of Norman Graham, “reinforce[ed] President de Gaulle’s [personal] apprehensions”4, 
encouraging him to adopt the restrictive measures he had been deliberating 
previously. 
On the other hand, policy developments under De Gaulle’s successors - who 
reportedly held relatively more favourable views of the role of inward FDI - are 
helpful to illustrate the function of public opinion as a constraining force. Graham 
                                                          
2 Murray and LeDuc, "Changing Attitudes toward Foreign Investment in Canada," 220. [emphasis 
added] 
3 Ibid. 
4 Norman Graham, "Developed Countries and Multinational Corporations: Threat Perception and 
Policy Response in France and the United Kingdom," ibid., 251. 
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writes that  “[Georges] Pompidou had been a voice for moderation on foreign 
investment within the de Gaulle administration [and] given the needs of the 
economy, he soon [after his election] began a gradual relaxation in the restrictiveness 
of French policy, at least to the degree permitted by public opinion.” Similarly, he 
recounts that the attitudes towards FDI expressed by Valéry Giscard D’Estaing, 
French President from 1974 to 1981, “became much more favourable [during his 
service as Pompidou’s finance minister]. However, after being elected president, he 
maintained a low profile in his public statements on the subject [because] policy on 
foreign investment remained a point of contention with the French left”5. FDI policy-
making processes in the United States in the 1970s-80s suggest the existence of 
similar dynamics as the White House was clearly opposed to restrict FDI inflows, but 
the media’s widespread and alarmist coverage of the relative increases in inward FDI 
enticed politicians in Congress to loudly voice their opposition towards foreign 
ownership. In his intriguing analysis of these events, Eliot Kang underlines the 
importance of public opinion in these regards, arguing that “clearly, what jolted 
policymakers to take stock of the situation was the adverse public reaction to (…) 
foreign purchases of domestic assets”6 thereby making a restrictionist policy stance 
towards inward FDI a highly attractive option for politicians that promised “media 
attention and votes from a broad electoral base with relatively low-cost and symbolic 
                                                          
5 Ibid., 256. 
6 Kang, "Us Politics and Greater Regulation of Inward Foreign Direct Investment." 
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policy measures”7. Ultimately, he comments, “the White House could not suppress 
the policy activism triggered by public anxiety”8. 
 
Conclusions 
Having illustrated the extraordinary transformation of the economic meaning 
attributed to inward FDI flows in predominant economic discourses in Part II and its 
relative reflection in the evolution of public attitudes towards inward FDI in the 
preceding chapter, the analysis presented in this chapter has zeroed in on the 
electoral-political aspects of these developments. As such, it has aimed at illustrating 
and further elaborating the important function that economic narratives play in 
democratic political settings. As I argued in Chapter 1, the wider public plays a 
crucial role in the social construction of economic narratives as co-creators as well as 
part of the audience that they are targeted at. Unlike more scientific types of 
economic knowledge, economic narratives are not only aimed at elites and policy 
specialists, but they also make an important contribution to the definition of the 
principles guiding public economic debates. As I attempted to argue in this chapter, 
their appeal for elites and the wider public alike are a key aspect of economic 
narratives’ political relevance in democratic political environments because they 
simultaneously affect which policy options epistemic communities of policy 
specialists deem as being appropriate as well as the attention and support that the 
latter receive among the wider public. In particular, I have emphasized the role of 
                                                          
7 Ibid., 324. 
8 Ibid., 314. 
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economic narratives as determinants of the salience of specific economic questions in 
public debates. As observed in previous chapters, the statist narrative defined 
foreign ownership as a critical issue for economic development, making it a highly 
salient issue in media and political debates. As a result, voters’ scepticism towards 
foreign companies had some influence as either encouraging or constraining forces 
for the adoption of certain policies and, as the statistical analysis suggested, 
governments’ ignorance of voter preferences could bear real (even if relatively small) 
costs in terms of voter support. In contrast, the globalization narrative portrayed FDI 
inflows in an overwhelmingly positive light and, at the same time, emphasized the 
inevitability of ever further global economic integration. In this sense, the narrative’s 
forceful and repeated emphasis of the lack of plausible alternatives to the acceptance 
of the economic imperatives of globalization processes appears like a critical element 
in the history of global FDI in recent years, which, by constructing foreign corporate 
ownership as a by and large ‘uncontroversial’ economic phenomenon, removed FDI 
inflows from the political spotlight. Thereby the globalization narrative did not only 
contribute to gradually ease public opinion’s reservations about FDI inflows, as the 
previous chapter has demonstrated, but – just as importantly – undermined its 
salience as a political issue per se, making public opinion largely indifferent towards 
FDI inflows, thereby returning FDI policy-making firmly back into the hands of 
policy elites who, following the principles of the globalization narrative, eagerly 
facilitated the unprecedented surge in FDI inflows that unfolded throughout the 
1990s and 2000s. 
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PART IV. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY 
Chapter 6 . SHIFTING FORTUNES: GLOBAL ECONOMIC NARRATIVES AND 
THE NATIONAL INWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT POLICIES OF 
BRITAIN AND FRANCE, 1960s-2000s 
The previous parts of this thesis have shown that the predominant social 
representation of the economic meaning of inward FDI have transformed notably 
from the 1960s to the 1990s and the quantitative tests have shown that this evolution 
was a geographically widespread phenomenon, which could be observed across the 
developed world. However, as Chapters 2 and 3 have also suggested, the timing as 
well as the depth of the observed shift from the regulation to the attraction of inward 
FDI has varied across countries. Some countries, such as the USA and the United 
Kingdom (and to a lesser extent Germany), have imposed relatively few restrictions 
on inward FDI throughout the post-war era, including in the 1960s and 1970s when 
the dominant global economic discourse portrayed them as a threat to long-term 
industrial development. Others, such as France and Japan (and later Canada), 
adopted strict screening mechanisms and carefully monitored FDI inflows in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, but then moved – at different speeds - to relax 
these controls from the 1980s onwards. 
To assess some of these cross-national differences within this process of global 
change, the present chapter performs a comparative case study analysis of the 
relevant developments in the United Kingdom and France. A comparison of these 
two country cases is promising because they find themselves in a structurally similar 
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position within the global economy, but at the same time their relation to the 
evolving economic narratives under investigation is rather different: French elites 
strongly embraced and promoted the statist narrative in the 1960s and 1970s, but – 
although they swiftly implemented many of the associated policy programs – they 
were more reluctant to adopt the narratives of neoliberalism and globalization in the 
1980s and 1990s. In contrast, British elites were somewhat hesitant in adopting the 
narrative and policies of economic statism in the post-war era, but enthusiastically 
embraced the narratives of neoliberalism and globalization subsequently. Due to my 
analytical interest in the rise of the globalization narrative, the UK serves as the 
primary case and France as the secondary or shadow case. That is, the investigation 
primarily aims to assess the impact of the evolution in economic narratives on 
national FDI policy in the UK and, to increase the analytical leverage of this 
examination, compares these insights to the concurrent developments in France. 
Within the broader research design of this thesis, the goals of this comparison are to 
empirically ground the ideational developments that have been theorized and 
described in rather abstract terms in previous chapters and to compare their 
trajectory within two distinct cultural-institutional national economic environments. 
 
ÉTATISME EN VOGUE: FDI POLICIES IN THE ERA OF NATIONAL 
SOVEREIGNTY (1960-1970s)  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the political legitimacy of nation-states was unquestioned 
in the immediate post-war era and extended far into the realm of economics. It was 
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widely accepted – including in communities of professional economists - that the 
state held a responsibility for economic management and the joint principles of 
economic sovereignty and state interventionism were firmly established in post-war 
world culture. These principles resonated well with long-standing French views, 
deeply imbued into French institutions, that the state holds a coordinative 
responsibility for the economy. Accordingly, French policymakers embraced the 
statist narrative in their words as well as actions as the French government 
implemented a prototypical - and for long a time highly successful - program of 
state-led economic management. An integral part of this strategy consisted of the 
careful monitoring of inward foreign direct investments and the selective use of 
incentives and disincentives to manage FDI inflows. In contrast, the economic 
principles of post-war world culture constituted a rather odd fit for liberal British 
economic traditions and its embedded institutions of economic management. 
Having relied on the principle of market coordination for extended periods of time, 
the global turn towards state intervention put the UK’s economic policymakers and 
politicians into an uncomfortable position. Albeit British politicians and 
policymakers did respond to the rise of the statist narrative and economic strategist 
from both political main parties assiduously drew up plans of statist intervention, 
their implementation was half-hearted and perceived to be largely ineffective. In the 
area of FDI policy, these tensions were reflected in a recurring pattern of urgent 
political calls to increase the regulation and monitoring of foreign companies in 
Britain, accompanied by an almost complete inaction on behalf of the responsible 
government agencies, who even failed to collect the most basic statistics on inward 
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FDI flows. The following two sections describe these broad patterns in some more 
detail. 
 
Developments in France, 1960s-1970s: Big Brother’s watching eye 
During the Third Republic (1870-1940), France’s economy was heavily reliant on 
agriculture and small producers and state officials considered it as their 
responsibility to maintain the stability of this system1. The experiences of the Second 
World War, however, delegitimized the old elites and brought a new generation of 
leaders into power. In a radical break with the past, this new elite pushed for fast 
economic growth through state-led industrialization2. The key elements of this 
strategy were the state control of key industries, the centralization of the credit 
system and economic planning. Although often associated with socialist economic 
ideas, French economic planning was implemented by conservative governments 
and built upon unusually strong connections between business elites and state 
officials3, while the labour class was largely side-lined in the process4. Essentially, 
the economic plans identified the priorities for economic development and thereby 
coordinated the expectations of market actors5. While French industrial policy 
focused on the development of entire industrial sectors and fast economic growth in 
general in the 1950s and early 1960s, from the mid-1960s - partly due to General De 
                                                          
1 Hall, Governing the Economy : The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, 139. 
2 Ibid. 
3 The system of pantouflage. See ibid. 
4 Communists and socialists were involved in the adoption of economic planning, but not its 
implementation. See ibid., 168. 
5 What Peter Hall described as a process of socialization. See ibid., 162. 
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Gaulle’s ambition to be a ‘great industrial power’6 - its emphasis shifted gradually 
towards a more selective approach that targeted the building of large and 
internationally competitive individual firms, the so-called ‘national champions’7. 
The French economy outperformed most of its Western European peers in the 1960s 
and the state-led ‘big push’ strategy was widely considered as an immense success. 
From the mid-1970s, however, the French economy started to slow down as the 
growth regime appeared to be running out of steam. 
Given the clear ambitions of French state officials to promote technology and the 
building of strong national firms, policies towards inward foreign direct investments 
played an important role in the pursuit of their overall economic strategy. Until the 
late 1950s, although French policymakers and planners had been carefully 
monitoring capital inflows as part of its exchange controls system, they appeared on 
the whole relatively unconcerned about inward FDI8. After De Gaulle came to power 
in 1958, however, FDI policies gradually turned into an issue of high politics, 
especially during the brief “war against the multinationals”9 in the years from 1963-
66. On the one hand, this shift was driven by concerns that increases in inward FDI 
may further fuel the already high rates of inflation10. On the other hand, the rapidly 
increasing number of US firms in France offered an ideal target for De Gaulle’s 
nationalistic and explicitly anti-American discourse, which resonated well with the 
                                                          
6 Ibid., 167; John Zysman, "The French State in the International Economy," International Organization 
31, no. 4 (1977): 840. 
7 Hall, Governing the Economy : The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, 149. 
8 David Bailey, George Harte, and Roger Sugden, Transnationals and Governments : Recent Policies in 
Japan, France, Germany, the United States, and Britain  (London: Routledge, 1994), 46. 
9 Zysman, "The French State in the International Economy," 869. 
10 in Bailey, Harte, and Sugden, Transnationals and Governments : Recent Policies in Japan, France, 
Germany, the United States, and Britain, 47. 
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French public. In January 1963, the French Finance Ministry summarized its policy 
as follows:  “[A]ll potential investments are scrutinised carefully to ensure that they 
contribute substantially to French technology of business know-how, or promote aid 
to important but expensive lines of research … we just object to anything that looks 
like speculation, a simple takeover, or an investment which France can perfectly well 
handle itself”11. Accordingly, the government used the powers of the Exchange 
Controls Act to systematically block foreign investments, in particular from the US12, 
thereby angering the EC. In response to sustained pressures from the EC, France 
adopted a new Law on Foreign Investments in 1966-67 that formally liberalized the 
rules by shifting from a principle of explicit prior authorisation to a principle of 
formal declaration (similar to those prevalent in other EC member states); in 
practice, this formally significant shift changed little, however, as government 
officials interpreted and used their remaining policy space so generously that it 
allowed them to essentially continue the same policy approach13. While 
policymakers were interested to attract the technological know-how of foreign 
multinationals, they were concerned that the latter would transform their 
subsidiaries into lower-value adding satellites. As a result, all FDI inflows remained 
carefully scrutinized and French authorities regularly imposed conditions on inward 
investments - such as commitments to R&D facilities and technology transfer - and 
rejected a good number of investment projects, some of which were large. After the 
resignation of De Gaulle in 1969, however, the new government under Georges 
                                                          
11 Ibid., 48. 
12 Ibid., 50. 
13 The French Ambassador to the US summarized the changes in investment policies as: “it used to be 
‘no, but …’ and was now ‘yes, but …’“. In: ibid., 57. 
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Pompidou adopted a somewhat more positive approach towards foreign 
multinationals and the number of outright rejections decreased throughout the 
1970s. President Pompidou didn’t hesitate to make it clear that French firms should 
not become “furnishers of hand labour to foreign brains” and that the French did 
“not wish to be the arms of their heads”14. And Finance Minister d’Estaing stated 
that “concentrated investments in a single sector of the French economy are not 
desirable” and that “French solutions” are generally preferable to foreign 
takeovers15. But French policies towards MNCs became increasingly sophisticated 
and began focusing on the use of sticks as well as carrots in order to “make the best 
use” of MNCs rather than to just block inward FDI16. In sum: throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s, FDI inflows to France increased sharply. The successions of French 
presidential administrations were alert of the potential negative consequences of 
foreign ownership. As a result, although gradually relaxing their FDI policy, they 
maintained a sophisticated monitoring system and were determined to use the 
available policy tools in order to make inward FDI an instrument to promote 
national development while avoiding the perceived risks of foreign domination of 
French industrial sectors. 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 in Jack N. Behrman, National Interests and the Multinational Enterprise: Tensions among the North 
Atlantic Countries  (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970). 
15 In Bailey, Harte, and Sugden, Transnationals and Governments : Recent Policies in Japan, France, 
Germany, the United States, and Britain, 70.  
16 Zysman, "The French State in the International Economy," 869. 
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Developments in the UK, 1960s-1970s: I love you, I love you not 
The British economy before the World Wars was structurally and institutionally very 
different from its French counterpart. Rather than an inward-looking economy 
centred on agriculture and small-scale producers, it was a strongly outward-oriented 
declining empire of medium-sized businesses. Unlike in France, the government was 
generally disengaged from industry intending to leave coordination to market 
mechanisms, and the cooperation between the state and businesses followed 
voluntaristic rather than hierarchical guidelines. Nonetheless, despite these 
differences, the Labour government of Clement Attlee elected in 1945 originally 
advocated a ‘big push’ strategy of state-led economic growth not dissimilar from the 
visions of the new leaders in France. Yet, the ambitious plans of nationalization and 
economic planning were quickly moderated and the Labour Party shifted to a 
Keynesian approach of ‘demand management’ instead17. When the Tories were 
elected back into office in 1951, they initially advocated a return to the liberal 
tradition in which the government is “a referee, and not a player” in economic 
affairs18. However, throughout the 1950s economic problems accumulated and the 
sustained under-performance of the British economy relative to its continental 
European peers became increasingly clear. Seeking for a response, the Conservative 
Party gradually moved towards more statist approaches of economic management, 
starting to advocate a more active industrial policy from the late 1950s19. For that 
                                                          
17 Alec Cairncross, The British Economy since 1945 : Economic Policy and Performance, 1945-1995, 2nd ed. 
ed. (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1995). 
18 Stephen C. Young and A. V. Lowe, Intervention in the Mixed Economy : The Evolution of British 
Industrial Policy, 1964-72  (London: Croom Helm, 1974), 12. 
19 Ibid., 122. For example, the Conservative Party’s manifesto for the general elections of 1964 asserted 
that “[i]n contemporary politics the argument is not for or against planning. All human activity 
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purpose, the Conservative government created a forum for economic planning, the 
National Economic Development Corporation (NEDC), in 1962. In the run-up to the 
general elections of 1964, the Labour Party enthusiastically took up these initiatives. 
In a widely celebrated speech held at the 1963 Annual Conference of the Labour 
Party, future Prime Minister Harold Wilson suggested that the “white hot heat of 
scientific revolution” required an interventionist government. In its 1964 Manifesto, 
the Labour Party wrote: “None of these [economic] aims will be achieved by leaving 
the economy to look after itself. They will only be achieved by a deliberate and 
massive effort to modernize the economy; to change its structure and to develop 
with all possible speed the advanced technology and the new science-based 
industries with which our future lies.”20 And in effect, the first Wilson government, 
in office from October 1964 to June 1970, did undertake a series of efforts to adopt a 
more statist approach towards economic management in Britain after its election 
victory. Five days after assuming office, the Labour government announced the 
creation of a new Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) and a dedicated Ministry 
of Technology (Mintech) in order to ‘foster long-term economic planning and 
industrial policy’ and ‘to stimulate a major national effort to bring advanced 
technology and new processes into British industry’21. Soon thereafter, the DEA 
released its first National Plan. As part of the plan, the Industrial Reorganization 
Corporation (IRC) was created as a third key institution for the coordination of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
involves planning. The question is: how is the planning to be done?” See "1964 Conservative Party 
General Election Manifesto: Prosperity with a Purpose,"  
http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1964/1964-conservative-manifesto.shtml. 
20 In: Hodges, Multinational Corporations and National Government : A Case Study of the United Kingdom's 
Experience, 1964-1970, 62. 
21 Ibid., 65-69. 
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government’s industrial policy. The mandate of the IRC was to increase the 
efficiency of British industry through the encouragement of industrial mergers. In 
stark contrast to the French experience, however, the Wilson governments’ successes 
with industrial policy were meagre22. The Tory party that came back to power in 
1970 had abandoned the enthusiasm for industrial policy it had found in the early 
1960s23. They swiftly abolished the IRC, integrated Mintech into the newly created 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and further undermined the industrial 
policy initiatives of the Wilson administration under a program of so-called 
‘disengagement’24. By the time he had been elected back into office in 1974, Harold 
Wilson’s own conviction that Britain needed an industrial policy seemingly had 
fainted too. At the same time, the British economy continued to suffer from a 
lacklustre economic performance throughout the 1970s, which culminated in an IMF 
program in 1976, the ‘winter of discontent’ in the cold months of 1978/79 and 
ultimately the election of the radical Thatcher government in spring 1979. The UK 
government’s half-hearted and inconsistent approach towards industrial policy in 
the 1960s and 1970s is also reflected in the inward FDI policies that it pursued during 
that period and which this chapter now turns to. 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 Hall, Governing the Economy : The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, 88. 
23 Young and Lowe, Intervention in the Mixed Economy : The Evolution of British Industrial Policy, 1964-
72, 122. 
24 Ibid., 9. 
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British inward FDI policy 
As the world’s major outward investor in the 19th and early 20th century, Britain took 
a generally liberal stance towards inward FDI before and after the World Wars. This 
was partly due to concerns that restrictions on inward FDI could lead to retaliations 
against British investors abroad, but also driven by a more general trust in free 
markets that was traditionally widespread among UK policy elites. According to 
Geoffrey Jones, inward FDI was simply not considered as a matter requiring an 
explicit government policy before 194525. After the end of the Second World War, 
American investments in the United Kingdom did turn into a political issue and the 
adoption of the Exchange Controls Act in 1947 in principle provided the Treasury 
and Bank of England with extensive powers to regulate foreign direct investments. 
However, the latter were reluctant to use these powers in the years to come. The 
attention of the officials of the Treasury and Bank of England, and arguably of 
British economic policy more broadly conceived26, was firmly focused on the balance 
of payments rather than industrial development and on these grounds policymakers 
saw little reason to restrict inward FDI27. The Treasury, which under the provisions 
                                                          
25 Geoffrey Jones, "The British Government and Foreign Multinationals before 1970," in Governments, 
Industries and Markets, ed. Martin Chick (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990), 196. 
26 See Stephen Blank, "Britain: The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy, the Domestic Economy, and 
the Problem of Pluralistic Stagnation," International Organization 31, no. 4 (1977); Hall, Governing the 
Economy : The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France. 
27 In defense of inward FDI, Gwyneth Dunwoody, Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, 
summarized these views as follows: “This [employment] is not the only advantage which foreign 
investment brings us, for it brings foreign currency. By producing goods previously imported it also 
helps to reduce our import bill and to introduce new techniques of industrial management. American 
firms have an excellent record as exporters. In 1965, for example, American subsidiaries accounted for 
about 7 per cent, of the total net assets of all United Kingdom companies and for 13 or 14 per cent, of 
our total exports. If we could add to that export achievement the imports which have been saved as a 
result of the new production set up here—not to mention the immediate benefit to the reserves of the 
initial inflow of funds—I think we would find that American investment has made a very substantial 
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of the Exchange Control Act had to formally approve each in- and outflow of capital 
did strictly control outward FDI due to concerns that they contributed to weakening 
Britain’s balance of payments, but generally welcomed inward FDI as long as the 
subsidiaries were financed from abroad, declared not to borrow on local capital 
markets and to minimize the import of intermediate products. Reportedly, the 
Treasury also had some criteria with regards to inward FDI to ensure the ‘national 
economic interest’ and to protect Britain’s ‘strategic industries’28; but these criteria 
were never clearly defined and formal rejections of investment applications by the 
Treasury were very rare29. Lord Bridges, Permanent Secretary of the Treasury in the 
1950s, stated that “[investment from overseas] is generally welcomed because it 
helps our balance of payments and tends to make funds available for our traditional 
role of overseas investment, particularly in the Commonwealth”30. In international 
perspective, Britain’s FDI policy was among the most liberal in the world. Unlike 
most other countries, the UK never adopted a specific law on foreign direct 
investments; its takeover regulations explicitly aimed not to discriminate between 
foreign and domestic investors; and, maybe most remarkably, although consistently 
experiencing some of the highest levels of inward FDI (see Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2), 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
contribution to our balance of payments.” UK Hansard, "Debates in the House of Commons." (29 
January 1968), vol. 757 cc1051-60. 
28 Hodges, Multinational Corporations and National Government : A Case Study of the United Kingdom's 
Experience, 1964-1970. 
29 Hodges (ibid., 79.) counted only five rejections in the three decades from 1945-1974. However, it is 
possible that formal rejection rates notably underestimate the real deterrents because investment 
applications to the Treasury were channelled through British merchant banks, which pre-screened 
investment applications before submitting them to the Treasury. See Jones, "The British Government 
and Foreign Multinationals before 1970." 
30 In Hodges, Multinational Corporations and National Government : A Case Study of the United Kingdom's 
Experience, 1964-1970, 80. 
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the UK government did not undertake any serious efforts to collect systematic 
statistics on the activities of foreign multinational companies until the late 1970s31. 
In the run-up to the 1964 General Elections the Labour party explicitly criticized this 
liberal handling of inward FDI and takeovers. As the Leader of the Opposition, 
Harold Wilson stated in a parliamentary speech that “[we must] distinguish between 
those forms of foreign investment which are and have always been welcomed, 
which introduce ‘know-how’ which we do not possess, or which lead to the creation 
of new industries or new factories and employment for our people on the one hand, 
and, on the other, those which involve a partial or complete take-over of existing 
British firms which are already very well run…”32. After entering office, however, 
the Labour party initially seemed to have lost its interest in inward FDI33. But three 
large take-overs in 196634 started to re-generate some political debate and Wilson 
raised some controversies with his highly sceptical remarks about US investments in 
Europe in his Guildhall speech of 1967 in which he proposed a European 
Technological Community and described the dangers of US investments as follows:  
“There is no future for Europe, or for Britain, if we allow American Business … so to 
dominate the strategic growth industries of our individual countries, that they, and not 
we, are able to determine the pace and direction of Europe’s industrial advance, that we 
are left in industrial terms as the hewers of wood and drawers of water while they, 
because of the scale of research, development and production which they deploy, based 
on the vast size of their single market, come to enjoy a growing monopoly in the 
                                                          
31 See Bailey, Harte, and Sugden, Transnationals and Governments : Recent Policies in Japan, France, 
Germany, the United States, and Britain. 
32 In Hodges, Multinational Corporations and National Government : A Case Study of the United Kingdom's 
Experience, 1964-1970, 175. 
33 Ibid., 122. 
34 Chrysler-Rootes, Philips-Pye Telecommunication, and Litton-Imperial Typewriters. 
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production of technological instruments of industrial advance … This is the road not to 
partnership but to an industrial helotry, which, as night follows day, will mean a 
declining influence in world affairs, for all of us in Europe.”35 
In a debate on American investments held in the House of Commons in January 
1968, several MPs expressed similar concerns. One Labour MP formulated the 
problem as follows: 
“The proud descendants of the Pilgrim Fathers and their friends have been returning in a 
massive procession to our shores over the years, while some of my honourable Friends 
have been gazing across the Channel looking for links with Europe, and during this time 
some of our cousins in the New World have been coming in by the back door into this 
country. They are visitors we welcome, of course, but at times we wish they would not 
always wear their boots when occupying our industrial and commercial beds. (…) 
[U]nless the major modern industries of Europe not yet taken over can be kept under 
European control, Europe will lose its inventive brains and higher technical skills to the 
New World, and will become little more than a provincial production line for American 
industry, and a playground for tourists.”36 
Yet, unlike in France, such vivid concerns did not result in a tighter regulation of 
inward FDI. Instead of restricting FDI inflows, the Labour government opted to 
actively support British industry in order to enable them to meet the ‘American 
Challenge’, primarily through the encouragement of British mergers via the IRC. 
                                                          
35 In Hodges, Multinational Corporations and National Government : A Case Study of the United Kingdom's 
Experience, 1964-1970, 228. Several historians have interpreted Wilsons’ Guildhall speech primarily as 
an (unsuccessful) attempt to flatter General De Gaulle, who strongly opposed Britain’s admission to 
the European Single Market, rather than the expression of real concerns about American domination 
of European industry. On the other hand, however, Wilson repeated similar remarks at several other 
occasions, including speeches with an exclusively domestic audience. See Graham, "Developed 
Countries and Multinational Corporations: Threat Perception and Policy Response in France and the 
United Kingdom." 
36 UK Hansard, "Debates in the House of Commons." (29 January 1968) vol. 757 cc1051-60. 
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This strategy focused in particular on the automobiles and computer industries 
where British policymakers actively attempted to avoid foreign ownership of 
significant market shares and followed French efforts to build national champions. 
The next two paragraphs briefly summarize these efforts. 
 
Government activity in the automobile industry 
The UK’s car manufacturing industry, centred around the ‘Big Five’37, entered into 
crisis in the 1950s when British manufacturers were increasingly challenged by their 
German and French competitors. In 1960 Ford USA made a takeover bid for Ford 
UK, which provoked opposition from the Labour party. Harold Wilson, at the time 
leader of the Opposition opposed the deal: “I want to make it clear that we on this 
side of the House are not against American investment in this country … But we are 
against a major industry being owned by the Americans”38. Ultimately, the Treasury 
approved of the takeover under the conditions that a minimum number of British 
nationals are to sit on its board of directors and commitments by the new owners to 
increase their export targets in order to support the UK’s balance of payments. Six 
years later, when Labour was in office, Chrysler made a bid for Rootes. The 
government raised concerns, but finally approved reluctantly, imposing similar 
conditions to assure the company’s ‘Britishness’. Wedgwood Benn, Minister of 
Technology at the time, explained that “[t]he government consulted the leaders of 
                                                          
37 The ‘Big Five’ were Ford UK [subsequently taken over by Ford USA], Rootes [Chrysler], Vauxhall 
[GM], BMC and Leyland [later merged into BLMC, see below] 
38 In Hodges, Multinational Corporations and National Government : A Case Study of the United Kingdom's 
Experience, 1964-1970, 189. 
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the principal British-owned motor vehicle firms to see whether a viable solution 
designed to enable Rootes to continue as a British-controlled company could be 
devised. No such scheme proved practicable … The take-over of Rootes by the 
British Government, which, of course, was considered (…) was not a practicable 
proposition”39. Nonetheless, alarmed by the disappearance of two of the UK’s 
formerly ‘Big Five’ within six years, the government promptly initiated plans to 
merge BMC and Leyland in order to build at least one wholly British-owned 
company that can compete with the American manufacturers on its home turf. Two 
years later the merger was completed.40  
 
Government activity in the computer industry 
The Labour government pursued a similar approach in the computer industry, 
which it considered to be the industry of the future. At the time, IBM was holding a 
dominant position in world markets and held a large and increasing share of the UK 
market. The Labour government was determined to “preserve a British-controlled 
sector of computer industry”41. Frank Cousins, Minister of Technology in 1965 stated 
that “a flourishing British computer industry is vital to the economic well-being of 
this country”42. And Sir Maurice Dean, Permanent Secretary of Mintech, declared 
that “there are certain points in the economy which must be held … The government 
                                                          
39 In ibid., 204-05. 
40 The resulting BLMC (containing brands such as Jaguar, Rover, LandRover and Mini) was partly 
nationalized in 1975, renamed into Rover Group in 1986, and then gradually disintegrated into its 
constituent parts, which had all been taken over by foreign car manufacturers by the mid-2000s. 
41 Hodges, Multinational Corporations and National Government : A Case Study of the United Kingdom's 
Experience, 1964-1970, 245. 
42 In ibid., 220. 
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has decided that the computer industry is one such point”43. An analysis of the 
problems of the British computer industry led by the Ministry of Technology 
concluded that British computer firms were too small and didn’t have sufficient 
access to capital to be internationally competitive. Therefore, it actively encouraged 
the consolidation of the British-owned computer industry through the merger of the 
three major British producers44 into the newly created International Computers 
Limited (ICL), which was created in 1968 and provided with generous R&D grants. 
At the same time, the Labour government introduced a ‘Buy British’ computer 
procurement policy that applied to national as well as local governments, 
universities and also extended to parts of the private sector. The ILC successfully 
regained market share and operated as a profitable company before running into 
troubles in the early 1980s45. 
 
However, the defeat of the Labour Party in the General Elections of 1970 put an end 
to these efforts. Having abandoned its own plans to devise an industrial policy for 
Britain, the Conservative government of Edward Heath pursued a program of 
‘disengagement’. They discontinued Labour’s merger program in the early 1970s 
and abolished the IRC and the Ministry of Technology, which was integrated into 
the newly created Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). And although the 
Labour Party returned to office in 1974, the macroeconomic difficulties of the British 
                                                          
43 In ibid., 245. 
44 Namely, these were International Computers and Tabulators (ICT),English Electric Leo 
Marconi(EELM) and Elliott Automation 
45 Having developed a range of internationally successful products, the company entered into crisis in 
the early 1980s and was gradually taken over by Fujitsu, which took full ownership in 1998. 
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economy left little room for further experimentations in industrial policy. Instead, 
the economic malaise of the mid-1970s encouraged British policymakers to adopt an 
increasingly positive stance towards inward FDI. Growing unemployment was a 
pressing political issue and, at the same time, ‘under-investment’ was seen as one of 
the principal reasons for Britain’s low productivity and resulting economic 
struggles46. FDI inflows were considered as a potential remedy for both of these 
problems47 and, as a result, the Labour government of James Callaghan finally 
decided to start actively promoting inward FDI and in 1977 created the Investment 
Britain Bureau (IBB) for that purpose. The IBB was one of the first national-level 
IPAs in the developed world and was to undertake modest promotional efforts to 
attract US and Japanese investors48, with a particular focus on increasing FDI inflows 
in “steel closure areas and other areas of high unemployment”49. 
 
 
                                                          
46 For example, John Watkinson, MP for the Labour Party, specified in a parliamentary debate held in 
the House of Commons on 18 February 1975 that “[t] he fuelling power for economic growth is 
investment and our performance has been particularly disappointing over the past five years. I see 
that the figures from the DTI, and, indeed, those from the CBI, indicate a pessimistic trend in 
investment. We are now in the position of consistently under-investing by 10 per cent in relation to 
our European neighbours.” Harvie Anderson, MP for the Conservative Party, concurred: “We need 
more investment. No one doubts that (…) British industry has had drawn away from it all possible 
sources of investment, with the result that it is now at a point where only survival can be thought of.” 
See UK Hansard, "Debates in the House of Commons." (18 February 1975) vol 886 cc1125-258. 
47 See Stephan Dreyhaupt, Locational Tournaments in the Context of the Eu Competitive Environment: A 
New Institutional Economics Approach to Foreign Direct Investment Policy Competition between 
Governments in Europe  (Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitaets-Verlag, 2006), 124. 
48 It has to be noted, however, that the scope of the agency was initially not very ambitious. Although 
it did undertake some advertising efforts (such as the ‘Britain Means Buisness’-campaign of the mid-
1980s), its main function was to operate as some sort of a ‘clearing house’ that forwarded investor 
inquiries to the regional IPAs, which were particularly active in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. Only in the early 1990s it was scaled up and transformed into an institution that proactively 
targeted prospective investors and provided aftercare services. See Dreyhaupt 2006:124. 
49 Nicholas Edward, Conservative Party member and Secretary of State for Wales, in UK Hansard, 
"Debates in the House of Commons." (22 November 1979) vol 974 cc308-9W 
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Elite surveys on attitudes towards foreign MNCs in Britain and France 
Overall, the UK government elites’ stance towards inward FDI was thus seemingly 
relatively more favourable than those of their French counterparts. Although British 
governments clearly did adopt the statist narrative in the late 1950s and 1960s, their 
enthusiasm for industrial policy and economic planning was less pronounced and 
relatively short-lived. Even though British policymakers undertook efforts to build 
strong British-owned industries, they were seemingly less inclined than their peers 
on the other side of the Channel to consider inward FDI as a ‘threat’ undermining 
such plans. 
Elite surveys conducted by John Fayerweather50 and Norman Graham51 in the early 
1970s reflect these patterns. Fayerweather and Graham reportedly used identical 
questionnaires in order to systematically examine the perceptions of foreign 
multinationals among politicians, civil servants, labour and business leaders in the 
UK, France and Canada in 1970 and 1975. Table 6.1 summarizes their findings for 
their respondents’ view of the ‘overall effect’ of foreign MNCs. Out of all groups 
surveyed, UK civil servants expressed the most positive assessment of the role of 
inward FDI - the view that inward FDI are ‘rather good’ reached a near-consensus in 
the 1975 UK survey (shortly before the creation of the IBB, see above) -, while labour 
union leaders were markedly more divided on the issue. Among British MPs, on 
average two out of three representatives considered the presence of foreign MNCs as 
‘a rather good’ thing. The views of labour and business leaders in France were 
                                                          
50 Fayerweather, "Elite Attitudes toward Multinational Firms; "Elite Attitudes toward Multinational 
Firms: A Study of Britain, Canada, and France," International Studies Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1972). 
51 Graham, "Developed Countries and Multinational Corporations: Threat Perception and Policy 
Response in France and the United Kingdom." 
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similar to those observed in the UK. In stark contrast, French civil servants and MPs 
expressed clearly more sceptical views of inward FDI than their UK counterparts. 
The findings also suggest a very dramatic deterioration in predominant views 
expressed by French MPs and civil servants from 1970 to 1975. The degree of this 
change over such a short period is somewhat puzzling and the authors do not 
explicitly address questions to what extent this measured drop in support for FDI in 
France may be influenced by methodological choices. Nonetheless, in broad terms 
the patterns are consistent with the qualitative investigation so far presented in this 
chapter. 
Table 6.1. British and French Elite Perceptions of the Overall Effect of MNCs 
(percentages) 
 
Question: In your opinion, what is the overall effect on Britain [France] of the activities of 
foreign-owned multinational companies in Britain [France]? 
 Rather good Neutral Rather bad 
Britain MPs 1975 
MPs 1970 
62.4 
59 
4.7 
20 
31.2 
22 
Civil servants 1975 
Civil servants 1970 
94.5 
81 
5.6 
7 
0 
12 
Labour Leaders 1970 41 22 37 
Business Heads 1970 69 12 18 
France MPs 1975 
French MPs 1970 
26.2 
68 
24.6 
9 
49.2 
22 
Civil servants 1975 
Civil servants 1970 
29.6 
66 
29.5 
18 
41 
26 
Labour Leaders 1970 43 13 44 
Business Heads 1970 71 17 12 
SOURCE: Adapated from Fayerweather (1982) and Graham (1982). Data from 1970 survey is from 
Fayerweather (1982); Data from 1975 survey is from Graham (1982). The authors used identical 
questions. 
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Figure 6.2 summarizes the results from a similar question from the same surveys 
which asked respondents to assess, on a continuous scale ranging from 1 to 7, 
whether foreign MNCs ‘give more than they take’ or ‘take more than they give’.  
Figure 6.2. British and French Elite Perceptions of Net Economic Result of MNCs 
(average scores) 
Question: What do you believe is the net economic result of the operations of foreign-owned 
multinational companies in Britain [France]? They give more than they take = 1; They take more than 
they give = 7 (Neutral = 4). The chart shows average scores by groups of respondents. 
 
SOURCE: Adapated from Fayerweather (1982) and Graham (1982). Data from 1970 survey is from 
Fayerweather (1982); Data from 1975 survey is from Graham (1982). The authors reportedly used 
identical questionnaires. 
 
Most responses range around the median value of 4, suggesting that dominant elite 
views in the 1970s may be best summarized as somewhat ‘ambiguous’. Furthermore, 
consistent with previous results, business leaders from both countries and British 
civil servants appeared to be most sanguine about FDI, while Labour leaders and 
French civil servants and MPs expressed the most sceptical views. Furthermore, in 
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accordance with the observations made in previous sections of this chapter, for 
nearly all groups in both surveys UK respondents expressed on average a more 
positive view of inward FDI than their French counterparts.  
 
Finally, the findings from elite interviews with UK policymakers conducted by 
Michael Hodges in 197152 nicely complement these results. Investigating the reasons 
why elite groups have a positive or negative view of inward FDI, Hodges reports 
that in a series of interviews with 28 UK civil servants, the most frequent answers to 
the open-ended question ‘What are the main benefits of FDI inflows?’ were (in order 
of frequency): 1. Access to technology, 2. Benefits to the balance of payments, 3. 
Employment, increased efficiency and productivity, management skills. The most 
salient perceived disadvantages of FDI were: 1. Companies could take decisions 
inimical to UK interests, 2. Domination by US MNCs of important British industries, 
3. Technological dependence, and 4. Monopolistic behavior of MNCs. Similarly, 
another survey conducted by Hodges with a random sample of 120 UK senior civil 
servants and 355 businessmen conducted in 196953 found that 79% of the 
respondents agreed that US MNCs brought technological know-how to Britain, 77% 
agreed that the capital which FDI brings is ‘a very good thing for the British 
economy’ and 67% agreed that it brings much-needed competition to inefficient 
domestic firms. However, on the downside, 43% of the respondents agreed that ‘the 
independence of business throughout Europe (…) is being threatened by American 
                                                          
52 See Hodges, Multinational Corporations and National Government : A Case Study of the United 
Kingdom's Experience, 1964-1970, Chapter 4. 
53 See ibid., 147ff. 
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take-overs’ (with only 25% disagreeing with the statement, 18% indicating to be 
neutral and 11% not giving an answer), and only 6% felt that ‘the Government 
should encourage (…) American take-overs of British firms’ (24% indicating that it 
should be discouraged and 61% stating ‘neither encouraged nor discouraged’). 
Although the insights gained from the comparison of historical surveys conducted in 
different countries at different points in time faces some obvious limitations, these 
results are nonetheless useful indicators of several trends observed in the qualitative 
investigation: overall, elites’ assessment of the role of inward FDI in the 1970s was 
fairly ambiguous, but generally more positive in the UK than in France. 
 
THE WORLD IS FLAT (AGAIN): FDI POLICIES IN THE ERA OF 
‘GLOBALIZATION’ (1980s-2000s) 
As described in Parts I and II, the economic difficulties of advanced economies in the 
1970s led to a gradual rethinking of the principles of economic management towards 
a more liberal stance that supports the use of market mechanisms in place of state 
coordination. The dramatic political and technological developments of the late 
1980s and early 1990s then ingrained this approach with a strong internationalist 
view of the working of the world economy, which resulted in a very prominent 
transnational narrative of globalization that altered the réferentiel of economic policy 
thinking, providing new scripts for the analysis of economic, and in particular 
industrial policy. The UK was one of the first and most enthusiastic supporters of 
these emerging narratives. In a break with the statist narrative, the Thatcher 
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government turned to consider international competition as largely beneficial and 
something that British firms have to be exposed to rather than protected from. 
However, at the same time, the Thatcher administration still upheld beliefs that the 
nationality of ownership matters and that it is important to have British-owned 
industries in key sectors. From the late 1980s onwards, such considerations became 
gradually less important and the British governments in the 1990s and 2000s 
strongly encouraged inward FDI, aggressively promoted Britain as a place for 
foreign investments and granted generous tax reliefs and financial incentives to 
MNCs. Concurrently, inward FDI flows turned into a matter of ‘national pride’. 
Politicians from both main parties started to boast about the comparatively high 
levels of FDI inflows, interpreting them as a sign of the UK’s economic success and 
the confidence of global markets in the UK economy. In stark contrast, the reception 
of the globalization narrative was more reluctant in France, where a profound 
scepticism towards market coordination is more deeply ingrained in the material 
and discursive institutional structure. Although the French economy was liberalized 
dramatically from 1983 onwards, the political elite upheld a globalization-sceptical 
economic discourse. This divergence led to an increasing disconnect between French 
policy elites’ words and actions, as the French FDI policy pursued during that period 
illustrates. Although France removed almost all restrictions on inward FDI, 
significantly liberalized its national take-over regime and also created a complex 
structure of government agencies dedicated to the attraction of FDI, politicians 
continued to publicly denounce the evils of globalization and foreign ownership, 
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leading to some high-profile interventions to protect a handful of French firms from 
foreign takeovers in an otherwise largely liberal and open economic environment. 
 
Developments in the UK, 1980s-2000s: Globalization to the rescue 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, important sections of the Conservative Party 
started to abandon their support for corporatism and interventionist industrial 
policy that had emerged only a decade earlier. The evident failure of demand stimuli 
in the aftermath of the crisis of 1973 delegitimized the principles of Keynesian 
demand management and further emboldened the voices within the Conservative 
Party that called for a return to a more clearly market-based approach to economic 
policy. Finally, the strikes during the long ‘winter of discontent’ of 1978/79 led to a 
more widespread popular dissatisfaction with the idea of corporatism, paving the 
way for Margaret Thatcher’s victory in the general election of May 1979. As is well 
known, Thatcher was a staunch advocate of free markets and a monetarist economic 
policy that focuses on the control of inflation rates and public spending. Not 
surprisingly, Thatcher was sceptical of industrial policy. She opined that significant 
“[p]ublic funds could be saved and industry rendered more competitive if the 
nationalized industries were forced to make a profit or reprivatized, and grants to 
‘lame ducks’ in the private sector were abolished”54. And with Sir Keith Joseph she 
duly appointed an ardent advocate of governmental laissez-faire as the Secretary of 
State for Industry, instructing him to embark on an ambitious program of 
‘reprivatization’. The Thatcher administration was firmly committed to re-impose 
                                                          
54 In Hall, Governing the Economy : The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, 110. 
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the laws of the market on the British economy. Privately, the Conservative 
leadership around the ‘Iron Lady’ welcomed the high exchange rate valuation and 
the temporary recession in the UK economy in the hope that they “would force all 
firms to become more competitive and weed out the weak from the strong”55. In the 
same vein, they considered international competition as ‘a good thing’ that ought to 
be welcomed in the domestic market in order to force British firms to be more 
competitive. According to Peter Middleton, Permanent Secretary of the Treasury 
from 1983-1991, the Thatcher government’s goals were simple: “to liberalise the 
economy (…) and really thrust the UK into the wider world where ministers wanted 
it to be”56. To that end, they abolished the Exchange Controls Act in an early key 
decision in the summer of 1979, thereby establishing the principle of free flows of 
capital into and out of the United Kingdom. In the same vein, the reprivatisation 
program was to be fully open to foreign participation57 and the Thatcher 
government undertook some efforts to attract foreign firms, primarily through the 
provision of generous tax breaks58. Yet, despite its embrace of international 
competition, the Thatcher administration’s internationalism was more restrained 
than the version to be pursued by her successors. Thatcher upheld Labour’s 
industrial policy in high-technology sectors59 and her government still attached great 
value to the ‘nationality’ of firm ownership. Although Thatcher explicitly 
                                                          
55 In ibid., 131. 
56 In Michael David Kandiah, "Witness Seminar Ii: The October 1987 Stock Market Crash," 
Contemporary British History 13, no. 1 (1999): 108. 
57 The ‘golden share provision’ limiting the holdings of any one investor to 15 percent applied equally 
to foreign and domestic investors. See Safarian, Multinational Enterprise and Public Policy : A Study of 
the Industrial Countries, 35. 
58 Colin Wren, "The Industrial Policy of Competitiveness: A Review of Recent Developments in the 
Uk," Regional Studies 35, no. 9 (2001): 120. 
59 Hall, Governing the Economy : The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, 113. 
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encouraged fostering international competition in the domestic market, the ultimate 
goal of this policy remained to strengthen ‘British’ firms. The evolution of the 
government’s thinking about foreign ownership under Thatcher and beyond is best 
illustrated with the example of the ‘Big Bang’, the liberalization of the City of 
London in 1986. 
 
Tough Love and a Big Bang: The deregulation of the City of London 
UK market access for foreign banks had traditionally been severely restricted. 
Although by 1977 300 foreign banks had been authorized to deal foreign exchange in 
the UK, none of them was a clearing bank and only very few had established 
domestic branches60. In 1981, when the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation attempted to secure control of the Royal Bank of Scotland, the Bank of 
England was strongly opposed. It reasoned that RBS should remain ‘British’ and the 
deal was ultimately vetoed by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission61. Yet, only 
fifteen years later, nearly all British banks had been taken over by foreign owners 
and almost no one was complaining. What had happened?  
The process of the liberalization of the City of London starts in 1974 when, for 
reasons that are unclear until today62, the London Stock Exchange curiously missed 
the deadline to apply for exemptions from the new regulations on restrictive 
practices established through the new Fair Trading Act. Because the systematic 
                                                          
60 Safarian, Multinational Enterprise and Public Policy : A Study of the Industrial Countries. 
61 Ibid., 353. 
62 In the ex post judgment of the responsible officer, the Stock Exchange would probably have been 
granted with significant exemptions, if it had applied. See Kandiah, "Witness Seminar Ii: The October 
1987 Stock Market Crash." 
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protectionist policies of the system of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’63 were well known 
and no exemptions had been applied for, it emerged in the late 1970s that the Office 
of Fair Trading had started investigating the Stock Exchange. After the victory of 
Margaret Thatcher in 1979, the City’s traders were relieved, expecting that she 
would shelter them from the restrictive practices accusations64. Yet, the bankers had 
misplaced their bets. Somewhat surprisingly, the ‘Iron Lady’ decided not to protect 
one of her most powerful constituents that had just helped her win the general 
elections. Instead, her government fully supported the cause of the investigation. 
Nigel Lawson, Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, stated that “unless the City 
was exposed to the invigorating effects of competition, London would become a 
backwater in the global, highly competitive securities market”65. Since exchange 
controls had already been removed, the Conservative government strongly believed 
that foreign competitors should be allowed to enter the City in order to stifle 
competition, as well as to increase the world market share of London’s international 
financial sector66. Ultimately, the government forced the Stock Exchange to open up 
in 1983 through an agreement in which it declared to drop the restrictive practices 
investigation if the Stock Exchange committed to abolish the monopolistic system of 
fixed commissions and to remove the barriers to foreign entry. To allow the British 
financial institutes to prepare for this major shock, the so-called Goodison-Parkinson 
agreement was to enter into force three years later on 27 October 1986, the day of the 
‘Big Bang’. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that the government firmly 
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believed that the agreement would strengthen, not eliminate, the British-owned 
investment banking industry. In December 1983, a minister responsible for the 
agreement stated that “[i]f we want to maintain London as a prominent market, I 
think it is very important that the Stock Exchange and the majority of the institutions 
here should remain very firmly in British hands”67 and the Financial Times observed 
that “[t]he authorities are anxious to see the emergence of strong British securities 
firms, capable of competing with the big Wall Street and Japanese houses”68. As late 
as in 1987, a provision was included in the new Banking Bill to allow the Bank of 
England to veto foreign takeovers and the Bank pledged to use these powers to 
ensure “a strong and continuing British presence in the banking system”69, while at 
the same time actively encouraging the formation of conglomerates of British banks 
that closely combine commercial and investment banking70. Peter Middleton 
explained that the Treasury was interested in “getting some large, well-capitalised 
British organisation into this. (…) We thought this was a business in which the UK 
had some real expertise and if the market was going to be here, in order to keep it 
here we really did need some British players here as well”71. Yet, as the bankers had 
misplaced their bets on the Thatcher government, so did the government misjudge 
the consequences of the removal of the barriers to entry. On the one hand, they 
underestimated the first-mover advantage of Wall Street banks, which since May 
Day 1975 had had plenty of time to become familiar with the workings of a 
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deregulated financial system. On the other hand, they didn’t fully account for the 
immense opportunities to ‘cash in’ that the Big Bang would create for the partners of 
UK banks – which were selling “at huge multiples (…) due to excess competition”72 - 
as well as the latter’s willingness to ‘sell and retire’73. In the shatters of Black 
Monday, Big Bang initially seemed to have little impact on the UK investment 
banking industry. Yet, after Wall Street had refilled its war chests during the 
subsequent bull market, all major UK investment banks had gone in a matter of 
years. 
Unlike the preceding Labour government, the Thatcher administration thus 
embraced international competition. Yet, at the same time, the Conservative Party 
under Thatcher still voiced some concerns about the nationality of ownership. In the 
judgment of some experts, Thatcher considered FDI “[n]either as important to secure 
[n]or important to repel”74. Her liberal stance towards inward FDI and takeovers 
primarily derived from her general commitment to the principle of free flow of 
capital rather than a positive assessment of inward FDI in particular. 
Yet, towards the end of the Thatcher era, the UK government’s view of inward FDI 
moved gradually from a neutral to a more positive position, as concerns about the 
nationality of ownership were increasingly seen as irrelevant. While Sir David 
Walker, Governor of the Bank of England from 1982-1993, explicitly “wanted to see 
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some major British players emerge in the new market”75, his successor Sir Edward 
George, arguing that companies had lost their national identities due to the 
globalization of clients and shareholders, didn’t think that ownership still 
mattered76. Pressed upon the issue of waning British ownership in the City of 
London, he reportedly urged his audience not to worry by recalling the Wimbledon 
Tennis Championships: “held in Britain, staffed by locals, dominated by foreigners 
but still generating bags of prestige and money for the UK. The City [will] be the 
same: safe as Europe’s financial capital and a strong environment in which Britain’s 
investment bankers could work”77. What matters, in his view, are not nationality of 
ownership or control, but simply the presence of economic activity78. 
 
The Rise of the Competitiveness Agenda 
After John Major, who had emerged as the new Prime Minister from a leadership 
contest that had ousted Thatcher in 1990, was re-elected in 1992, he appointed 
Thatcher nemesis Michael Heseltine79 as secretary of state for trade and industry, 
indicating a broader shift in policy. Heseltine’s views explicitly differed from the 
Conservative Party’s commitment to non-intervention. At a Conference of the 
Conservative Party in 1992 he jokingly announced: “If I have to intervene to help 
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British companies (…), then I tell you I’ll intervene before breakfast, before lunch, 
before tea and before dinner. And I’ll get up the next morning and I’ll start all over 
again.”80 The type of intervention he had in mind, however, differed markedly from 
traditional industrial policy. Heseltine argued for an active state; but the state’s 
economic intervention should not focus on ‘picking winners’ but on the provision of 
an attractive business environment81. Under his leadership, the Department of Trade 
and Industry released a series of reports on UK competitiveness, outlining a 
horizontal industrial policy approach to ‘get the environment for business right’. The 
competitiveness agenda strongly emphasized the importance of relative productivity 
levels and the increasing salience of the economic competition between nations. As 
such, it emphasized the importance of the quality of economic activity rather than 
the nationality of industry ownership. Heseltine claimed that nationality of 
ownership doesn’t matter, stating that “any company operating in the United 
Kingdom” is a British company82. And Tim Eggar, Minister for Energy and Industry, 
assured in a parliamentary debate that “[o]nce overseas companies come to the 
United Kingdom, they are not foreign companies, they are British companies that 
happen to have foreign owners, and we shall fight for those companies … as hard as 
we fight for directly British-owned companies”83. Due to this perceived irrelevance 
of the nationality of company ownership and the shift in industrial strategy from 
creating strong national industries to fomenting the most productive and high-value 
adding economic activities, the attraction of inward FDI gradually turned into “the 
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dominant aspect of British industrial policy”84 and the government-led investment 
promotion activities coordinated through the IBB were scaled up significantly from 
1993 onwards85. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the Labour Party, which had undergone a remarkable 
transformation from 1989 onwards86, enthusiastically took up this shift in industrial 
policy. The new Labour leadership under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, which 
fostered strong connections with Bill Clinton’s ‘new’ Democratic Party87, strongly 
emphasized the importance of inter-national economic competition and the 
‘imperatives of globalization’88. For example, in their manifesto for the 1992 general 
elections, the Labour Party ascertained that “Britain is in a race for economic 
survival and success. Faced with intense competition, companies and countries can 
succeed only by constantly improving their performance”89. According to the 
globalization narrative, they portrayed the new global economy as a regime in which 
the prosperity of a nation depends on the willingness of footloose companies to 
invest90 and Brown assured investors that “[w]e understand that in a global market 
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place, traditional national economic policies – corporatism from the old left – no 
longer have any relevance”91. 
Having achieved a bipartisan consensus on the changed nature of the global 
economy, the symbolism of inward FDI in political debates transformed 
dramatically. While inward FDI had primarily been conceived of as a threat or 
challenge to British industry in the 1960s-1970s, it now came to be reinterpreted as 
the main indicator of the confidence of global markets in the British economy and a 
symbol of economic success. Inward FDI flows came to be framed as “[o]ne of the 
best indicators of competitiveness”92. It was argued that “multinational businesses 
are free to choose where to invest”93, that “international investors are the most 
objective of all investors”94 and that “all those foreign business men can’t be 
wrong”95 in their judgements. Accordingly, in the run-up to the 1997 General 
Election, the Conservative Party emphasized again and again its success at 
increasing inward FDI. Inward FDI figures play a prominent role in the Tories’ party 
manifesto for the 1997 general elections, in which they referred to levels of FDI 
inflows as “[h]ard economic evidence” in order to defend their economic record: 
“Britain attracts nearly forty per cent of all the American and Japanese investment in 
Europe. Our aim now is to safeguard these achievements and build on them, so 
Britain becomes the unrivalled Enterprise Centre of Europe.”96 One Minister called 
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“inward investment … one of the Government’s and this country’s greatest success 
stories”97 and another Conservative MP claimed it to be nothing less than “the single 
most dramatic and furthest reaching economic and industrial success story for any 
Government in the post-war period”98. Interestingly, in these debates Labour MPs 
did not contest this meaning or the very desirability of inward FDI, but only the 
causes of the inflows. While Conservative members attempted to interpret it as the 
outcome of the Party’s controversial decision to opt out of the EU’s social chapter, 
the Labour Party claimed it to be a confirmation of the world’s positive assessment 
of Britain as a ‘manufacturing nation’. Beyond these partisan tussles, it becomes clear 
that by the mid-1990s a cross-partisan agreement had crystallized, which conceived 
of FDI inflows as an unambiguously ‘good’ thing. 
The election of the ‘New’ Labour government in 1997 further enhanced these views. 
Tony Blair underlined his strong support for inward investment99 and committed 
not to intervene against foreign takeovers. Government efforts to attract inward FDI, 
further encouraged through the decentralization of industrial policy to the Regional 
Development Agencies, increased markedly during the Labour administration100. In 
the 2000s, the UK experienced an exceptional takeover boom, in which many major 
British companies in sectors that are generally considered to be highly sensitive – e.g. 
public utilities, defence, stock market – were acquired by foreign investors. If such 
events would without any doubt have caused a major political outcry two decades 
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earlier, now, instead, Tony Blair “boasted” that even 10 Downing Street sourced its 
water and electricity from French and German suppliers101. Quite remarkably, the 
opposition to this takeover boom was nearly mute. The Conservative Party fully 
agreed with Labour’s non-interventionism and Vince Cable, deputy leader of the 
Liberal Party, simply commented that ‘[t]here is no room for nationalism and 
protectionism in a modern economy’102. Guardian commentator Tom Bower 
observed in February 2007 that “[e]very week, a bland announcement confirms the 
sale of another major British institution to a foreign predator and, bizarrely, no one is 
complaining”103. Indeed, foreign takeovers gradually became a political ‘non-issue’ 
as the data collected by Helen Callaghan104 on the number of debates in UK 
parliament that use the term ‘takeover’, represented in Figure 6.3, illustrates: despite 
a marked increase in the FDI stock in the British economy in the 2000s, the word 
‘takeover’ was rarely ever used in British parliamentary debates after the year 2000. 
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Figure 6.3. The number of debates on takeovers in UK parliament and the UK FDI 
stock over time 
 
NOTE: The number of debates indicates the number of debates in the House of Commons and House 
of Lords that contained the term ‘takeover’ or ‘take-over’ at least five times. SOURCES: Number of 
debates from Callaghan (2015), based on UK Hansard; FDI stock from various sources (pre-1980) and 
UNCTAD (post-1980). 
 
The reception of the emerging discourse of globalization and competitiveness in the 
UK was thus nothing short from enthusiastic. Thatcher’s government had decidedly 
abandoned most projects of government intervention in industry. In accordance 
with her beliefs in the positive effects of market competition and the free flow of 
capital, she reinvigorated a neutral policy of ‘benign neglect’ towards inward FDI. In 
the 1990s, a clear cross-partisan consensus on the desirability of inward FDI emerged 
and the governments of John Major and Tony Blair turned towards a markedly more 
positive policy of active FDI attraction. The nationality of industry ownership was 
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increasingly considered to be unimportant compared to the quality of economic 
activity that foreign-owned industries can bring. The very high inflows of FDI into 
the UK throughout the 1990s and 2000s were widely considered as a ‘good thing’ 
and raised very little resistance. Accordingly, Britain was generally considered to 
pursue a coherent, dedicated and effective FDI policy approach. The French 
response to globalization was rather different. 
 
Developments in France, 1980s-2000s: Mondialisation? Merci, non merci. 
In contrast to the UK, the state had traditionally played an important role in the 
French economy and national sovereignty was highly valued in the political 
discourse in France. As a result, rather than enhancing the domestic institutional 
arrangement as in the UK, the increasing embrace of market-based economic 
coordination and international competition in the global economic policy discourse 
put the French national institutional legacy under strain. Dissatisfaction with 
‘globalization’ was widespread in France. Hubert Vedrine, French Foreign Minister 
from 1997 to 2002, openly expressed his view that “[g]lobalization develops 
according to principles that correspond neither to French tradition nor to French 
culture”105. As a matter of fact, struggling with sustained economic difficulties, the 
French elites opted to adopt many of the market-friendly and internationalist 
economic policies advocated by the competitiveness discourse. But, in contrast to the 
UK, they did so somewhat reluctantly and political elites failed to adapt a public 
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discourse to justify this rather dramatic rupture with their institutional legacy and 
traditional state-society relationships106. In consequence, the cleavage between the 
material and the discursive institutions in France grew throughout the 1980s-2000s, 
leaving the French populace increasingly dissatisfied and the legitimacy of the 
political-economic elites undermined, while at the same time generating an 
incoherent economic policy strategy that sends conflicting signals, as the case of 
inward FDI policies demonstrates. 
The first significant steps towards the gradual liberalization of the French economy 
were undertaken under the government of Giscard d’Estaing in the late 1970s107. 
These efforts, however, were brought to a sudden halt when François Mitterrand, 
who had campaigned on a platform advocating a ‘break with capitalism’ and 
‘socialism in one nation’108, won a landslide victory in the 1981 presidential elections. 
After initiating an ambitious program of nationalizations109, his coalitions’ pledges to 
pursue an expansionary economic and social policy were, however, soon thereafter 
undermined by the world recession and the growing economic difficulties in France. 
Finally, faced with the expulsion of France from the Exchange Rate Mechanism, 
Mitterrand opted for a radical turn to economic liberalism in 1983. A cabinet 
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reshuffle empowered the economically conservative Laurent Fabius and Pierre 
Bérégovoy, which subsequently led an ambitious program of economic liberalisation 
that included fiscal austerity, the privatization of state-owned companies, and the 
liberalization of the stock market as well as takeover regulations110. Similarly to the 
developments in the UK at the time, French policymakers gradually came to belief 
that French companies had to become accustomed of more intense international 
competition in order to succeed111 and - despite their official placement on the 
opposite end of the ideological spectrum - they pursued a policy program that was 
on the whole not dissimilar from Thatcher’s agenda112. However, in stark contrast to 
Thatcher’s (and later Blair’s) enthusiastic discursive embrace of market competition 
and globalization, French elites struggled to justify their moves towards a free 
internationally integrated market economy. Carrying a distinct discursive and 
ideational baggage, their discourse remained hostile towards free markets, liberal 
measures were generally presented as “necessary, if slightly distasteful, response[s] 
to the imperative of the global economy”113 or, at best, as the lesser of two evils (such 
as when European integration in the 1990s was primarily justified as a ‘shield’ 
against Anglo-Saxon globalization114). As a result, the economic-political realities of 
the French economy, on the one hand, and the discourse on economic policy, on the 
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other, grew apart, leaving the political elites ‘rhetorically entrapped’115. The 
paradoxical outcome is a society in which “[m]arkets and market power now set 
expectations in a wide array of fields, while French governments on the left and the 
right continue to assert their distaste for the market society”116, leaving France as “a 
nation in search of a new vision”117. This tension and its tendency to lead to 
incoherent policy strategies – recalling in some ways the UK’s half-hearted efforts at 
industrial policy in the 1960s – is strongly reflected in the development of France’s 
inward FDI policy in recent years. 
France’s system of prior authorisations and sectoral restrictions was gradually 
opened up. To comply with EU law, the requirement of prior authorisation was 
abolished for EEA-investors in 1986, and finally for all investors in 1996 when France 
moved to an ex post notification regime118. At the same time, the corporate 
governance laws regulating takeovers were also gradually opened up to foreign 
participants. In the 1980s and early 1990s, this opening up was accompanied by a 
deliberate creation of a cross-shareholding structure - the so-called ‘noyaux durs’ - to 
protect major French companies from hostile takeovers119. But the system was 
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dismantled in the late 1990s, leading to sharp increases in foreign ownership in the 
French economy. In fact, the FDI stock as a share of GDP in France was equal or 
above the observed levels in the UK in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Simultaneously, the French government started to actively promote inward 
investments through its embassy network from the early 1990s. In 2001, it 
centralized and enhanced these activities through the creation of a national IPA, the 
Invest in France Agency. However, while French government elites had gradually 
adopted the views and policies suggested by the globalization narrative, the public 
political debate about globalization and inward FDI was notably different. French 
politicians portrayed FDI inflows less as a symbol of economic success than a 
pragmatic choice to increase employment. As such, French politicians repeatedly 
emphasize the importance to distinguish ‘productive’ (i.e. greenfield) from 
‘financial’ (i.e. takeover) FDI. While generally welcoming the former, they remained 
sceptical of the latter, which led to several high-profile government interventions to 
block foreign takeovers in the 2000s120. At the same time, in 2005 the government 
attempted to re-introduce a system of prior authorizations for inward FDI in eleven 
sectors deemed to be of ‘national interest’, which was subsequently watered 
down121. In the aftermath of the financial and ensuing protracted economic crisis in 
Europe, and especially after François Hollande’s own U-turn in 2014, the 
government of the new Prime Minister Manuel Valls started to embrace inward FDI 
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flows more explicitly by declaring ‘investment attractiveness as a government 
priority’ and the creation of a conseil superieur l’attractivité. In a parliamentary debate, 
Minister of Trade Nicole Bricq declared fiercely: 
 “You want to know what we have to do? You will know it on 17 February when the President 
of the Republic will congregate the Conseil supérieur de l’attractivité. Yes, France is an attractive 
land, and we understand it very well to keep our place in Europe! We know that the fight with 
Germany is hard, as well as the fight with the United Kingdom where Mr Cameron is rolling 
out the red carpet for investors; we also know that we have the ability to take on this challenge. 
One thousand foreign direct investment projects per year, that’s the new goal, instead of the 
seven hundred we are receiving now. We will make it!”122 
And yet, only a few weeks later, to the great dissatisfaction of the EC, the same 
government issued a new decree that substantially extended the number of 
business sectors in which the government authorities are allowed to monitor and 
restrict foreign investments through the re-introduction of a system of prior 
authorization including a wide variety of economic sectors such as energy, 
transport, water, public health and telecommunications123. France’s ‘foreign affair’ 
is, it seems, still a complicated one. 
 
 
 
                                                          
122 Les Archives de l'Assemblee Nationale, "Question Au Gouvernment No 1606," in Journel Officiel 
(2014). 
123 Fried Frank, "French Decree Extends List of Foreign Investments Requiring Government Approval 
in Strategic Business Sectors," (2014). Reportedly the primary motivation was to protect Alstom from 
the bidding from Siemens and General Electric. 
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Public opinion data from France and the UK 
Finally, in this last section, I assess the extent to which these trends and evolutions 
are reflected in public opinion data. A small number of studies have collected data 
on individual attitudes towards FDI in recent years. For a variety of reasons – such 
as differences in sampling strategies and the framing of survey questions – it would 
be problematic to compare the evolution of public opinion across different sets of 
surveys. Instead, the analysis pursued here focuses on differences within surveys 
rather than across them. More specifically, I analyze the relevant data from the UK 
and France in public opinion surveys from two well-respected sources: the data from 
the ISSP surveys on national identity used for the quantitative analysis presented in 
Chapter 4, and a large cross-national survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 
2014. In contrast to the elite surveys from the 1970s presented above, these surveys 
aim to measure public opinion towards FDI; that is, their samples are supposed to 
represent the national population as a whole rather than its elites. In general terms, 
as discussed in Chapter 4, there are good reasons to believe that the attitudes 
towards globalization of the former tend to be somewhat more negative than those 
of the latter. 
I first analyze the ISSP data. Following the logic of the public opinion analysis 
presented in Chapter 4, Table 6.4 shows the proportion of respondents from the UK 
and France expressing negative views of inward FDI, separated by the birth cohort 
groups born before 1964 (i.e. individuals who completed their prime period of 
socialization before the rise of the globalization narrative) and those born after. In 
accordance with the findings from the quantitative analysis presented above, I find 
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that younger cohorts express consistently more favourable views about the role of 
inward FDI than older cohorts. At the same time, consistent with the qualitative 
analysis presented in this chapter, I also find that for all subgroups public opinion in 
the UK is significantly more favourable towards FDI than in France. Moreover, the 
data suggests that the changes towards a more favourable view of FDI from 2003 to 
2013 were much larger in the UK where the globalization narrative was highly 
prominent in political debates than in France where the public discourse remained 
sceptical of globalization. 
Table 6.4. Percentage of respondents indicating to agree or strongly agree with the 
statement that ‘[l]arge international companies are doing more and more damage 
to local businesses in [COUNTRY]’ in the UK and France, separated by birth 
cohorts 
 Respondents’ 
year of birth 
2003 survey 2013 survey 
UK After 1963 62.03 [n=266] 52.67 [n=393] 
 Before 1964 70.09 [n=535] 64.41 [n=399] 
France After 1963 78.04 [n=469] 74.74 [n=784] 
 Before 1964 79.51 [n=981] 79.84 [n=982] 
 
SOURCE: ISSP (2003, 2013) 
 
Similar differences are also observed in the Pew survey. An interesting feature of this 
survey is that it asks respondents not only about their views about foreign 
companies in general, but distinguishes between their views of greenfield (‘foreign 
companies building new factories’124) vs. M&A FDI (‘foreign companies buying local 
companies’). The main results, presented in Table 6.5, confirm that the UK 
                                                          
124 The term ‘factories’ is somewhat distorting because it evokes manufacturing FDI, which accounts 
for only about one quarter of total FDI in developed economies. See Chapter 3. 
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population expresses generally more favourable views of both types of FDI inflows. 
But at the same time, the survey also reveals stark differences in public opinion 
towards greenfield vs. M&A FDI: while majorities in both countries consider cross-
border M&As as ‘bad’, greenfield FDI is welcomed by large majorities in the UK as 
well as France. 
Table 6.5. Responses to Pew Survey Questions 31 and 32: In your opinion, when 
foreign companies (Q31) buy (survey country) companies – (Q32) build new 
factories in (survey country), does this have a very good, somewhat good, 
somewhat bad, or a very bad impact on our country? 
 Perceived impact of foreign 
companies buying local companies 
Perceived impact of foreign 
companies building new factories 
Very good or 
somewhat good 
Somewhat bad 
or very bad 
Very good or 
somewhat good 
Somewhat bad 
or very bad 
UK 39 53 82 15 
France 32 68 75 25 
NOTE: Numbers do not necessarily add up to 100 due to non-responses. SOURCE: Pew Research 
Center, September 2014, “Faith and Skepticism about Trade, Foreign Investment” 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The primary aim of the comparison of the evolution of discourses and policies 
towards inward FDI in the UK and France presented in this chapter was to 
empirically ground the theoretical claims, descriptions and patterns of cross-national 
correlations observed in preceding chapters. As a whole, the chapter suggests an 
interesting ‘reversal of fortunes’ of some sorts: In the 1960s and 1970s, when 
concerns about economic sovereignty were widespread in dominant economic 
narratives, politicians and policymakers in Britain and France both undertook efforts 
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to regulate FDI inflows. Yet, the embrace of these policies was much firmer in 
France, whose statist legacy was in accord with the economic narrative predominant 
at the time. French policymakers carefully monitored FDI inflows, restricted foreign 
takeovers and imposed conditions on many FDI projects; an approach that 
contemporary observers described as coherent and effective125. In contrast, the 
regulatory policies pursued by Britain, whose liberal legacy was at odds with the 
statist transnational discourse, were half-hearted at best. Politicians loudly spoke 
about the need to regulate American companies, but failed to implement a coherent 
set of policies to do so and, most tellingly, even failed to collect systematic statistics 
on inward FDI until the mid-1970s126. Economic policymakers did impose conditions 
on a few high-profile foreign takeovers, but subsequently failed to monitor whether 
the conditions were actually met, etc. Not surprisingly, contemporary observers 
perceived British FDI policy in that period as contradictory and ineffective127. Yet, as 
the global discourse moved towards liberalism in the 1980s and an increasingly 
international version of liberalism in the 1990s, these fortunes started to shift. Both 
countries significantly opened up their FDI policy regimes in the 1980s and 1990s, 
created state programs to actively attract greenfield FDI and liberalized their 
takeover regulations, but it now was Britain, which was considered to be pursuing a 
coherent and successful strategy, while French FDI policy was judged as hesitant 
                                                          
125 See Zysman, "The French State in the International Economy; Simon Reich, "Roads to Follow: 
Regulating Direct Foreign Investment," ibid.43(1989); Bailey, Harte, and Sugden, Transnationals and 
Governments : Recent Policies in Japan, France, Germany, the United States, and Britain. 
126 Max Steuer, "Policy Options for the Uk," Intereconomics 9, no. 3 (1974). 
127 See Blank, "Britain: The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy, the Domestic Economy, and the 
Problem of Pluralistic Stagnation; Simon Reich, "Roads to Follow: Regulating Direct Foreign 
Investment," ibid.43(1989); Bailey, Harte, and Sugden, Transnationals and Governments : Recent Policies 
in Japan, France, Germany, the United States, and Britain. 
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and full of contradictions128. As such, the comparison powerfully illustrates that 
economic narratives that are predominant at the transnational level at any specific 
point in time do not directly impose themselves upon national policymakers. Rather, 
to affect domestic politics, transnational norms have to be heard, adopted and 
translated by domestic actors. And the receptivity of such norms seems to depend 
crucially on the institutional and cultural environment that determines the 
‘translatability’ of external ideas129. In some sense, I thus find that the 
transformations in transnationally predominant economic narratives are mirrored in 
a great variety of contexts, but that the clarity of the mirror depends on the local 
cultural-institutional legacy. An in-depth examination of the causal mechanisms, 
which determine how the principles advocated in transnational economic narratives 
interact with the preferences of domestic actors and the cultural-institutional 
environment in which they operate is beyond the scope of this thesis, but remains a 
promising avenue for future research. 
 
                                                          
128 See Callaghan and Lagneu-Ymonet, "The Phantom of Palais Brongniart: Economic Patriotism and 
the Paris Stock Exchange; Callaghan, "Something Left to Lose? Network Preservation as a Motive for 
Protectionist Responses to Foreign Takeovers; Schmidt, "The Politics of Economic Adjustment in 
France and Britain: When Does Discourse Matter?; "Trapped by Their Ideas: French Elites' Discourses 
of European Integration and Globalization." 
129 See Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and 
the End of the Cold War."; Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization 
and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Existing studies in IPE and the social sciences more broadly have given little 
consideration to the economic meaning commonly attributed to inward FDI. Instead, 
dominant approaches have generally conceptualized FDI inflows simply as a brute 
material fact: a physical inflow of capital with clear economic and political 
consequences. Although this conceptualization is not wrong per se, it is incomplete. 
By focusing only on the ‘real’ effects and consequences of FDI inflows, the existing 
literature on the politics of FDI largely brackets out questions of how policymakers, 
analysts and the wider population perceive inward FDI and what they believe their 
effects and consequences to be. If the latter were mere reflections mirroring the 
former, this oversight would be of little consequence. However, as this thesis aimed 
to argue theoretically as well as to demonstrate empirically, the perceptions of FDI 
inflows and the economic meaning that is commonly attached to them can go far 
beyond the observed ‘real’ trends and transformations in FDI flows’ underlying 
material reality. 
Although the nature of FDI has certainly undergone some structural changes over 
the past five decades, as I have argued throughout this thesis, the simultaneous 
transformations in dominant perceptions of inward FDI have been far more 
dramatic than any such underlying material changes could possibly justify: whereas 
FDI inflows were widely considered – even among internationalist sections in liberal 
economies - as a potential threat for the long-term industrial development of an 
economy and a sign of economic weakness in the 1960s and 1970s, they came to be 
re-interpreted as the exact opposite, namely a symbol of competitiveness and 
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economic success, in the policy discourses emerging in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. 
The first key goal of this research project has been to make sense of these 
transformations. In an attempt to do so, I have situated the rather stunning observed 
changes in the predominant social representations of inward FDI within broader 
ideational evolutions. In particular, I have focused on the concept of economic 
narratives as socially widespread cognitive frameworks that individuals use to make 
sense of the complex economic systems that surround them, and I have aimed to 
show the close alignment of the changes in the social representations of inward FDI 
with the evolution in predominant economic narratives during the post-war era. 
The second key objective of the research was to assess whether and to what extent 
these ideational transformations matter. To address these questions, I have 
conducted both quantitative and qualitative investigations. Examining data on 
public opinion towards inward FDI and results from general elections in cross-
national samples of advanced economies, I have found consistent evidence that 
public attitudes towards FDI as well as voter reactions to increases in FDI became 
notably less hostile with the rise of the globalization narrative. Tracing policy 
developments in the UK and France, I observed a widespread and significant re-
framing in the interpretation of the meaning and significance of FDI inflows among 
policymakers and corresponding changes in inward FDI policies that closely 
followed the evolution of predominant narratives. 
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As a whole, I hope that by integrating these nonmaterial considerations in a 
systematic manner into the analysis of the politics of FDI the thesis makes a 
substantial contribution to better understand the developments of FDI policies in 
recent years. Although a rapidly growing stream of literature has enlightened how 
competitive pressures have pushed governments to remove regulations on inward 
FDI1, to sign international agreements granting greater legal protections to foreign 
investors2 and to pursue ever more aggressive FDI attraction policies such as the 
provision of generous incentive packages3, the underlying question why 
governments want to increase FDI inflows in the first place has received little 
attention. Arguably, the desirability of FDI inflows and governments’ willingness to 
attract them have been largely taken for granted. However, as I have shown, 
reviewing the numerous empirical investigations of the effects of FDI inflows or 
taking a more historical perspective on the developments of FDI policies and the 
relevant policy discourses throughout the post-war era are both fruitful ways to 
realize that policymakers’ enthusiasm for FDI is in fact far less ‘obvious’ than it may 
seem and not simply something that explains, but also something that needs 
explaining. In a nutshell, the investigation pursued here has suggested that it derives 
to a significant extent from a transformation not in the material structure of the 
world economy, but in the perceptions thereof, which in turn was a critical 
                                                          
1 Strange, Stopford, and Henley, Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares; Oman, 
Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Competition among Governments to Attract Fdi. 
2 Simmons, Guzman, and Elkins, "Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 1960-2000; Barthel and Neumayer, "Competing for Scarce Foreign Capital: Spatial 
Dependence in the Diffusion of Double Taxation Treaties." 
3 Thomas, Competing for Capital; Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital. 
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development to make the ‘race for FDI’ first a possibility and then a largely 
uncontroversial political reality. 
 
Extensions of the argument 
Albeit FDI flows are an intrinsically global phenomenon, in order to keep the project 
manageable, the focus of the investigation was limited to advanced economies in the 
period lasting from the 1960s until 2007 without giving due consideration to the 
concurrent developments in non-OECD economies or the trends in the aftermath of 
the Financial Crisis of 2007-08. Without undertaking a full-fledged examination of 
these issues, the two following sections discuss the degree to which the argument 
can be extended geographically and chronologically in these directions in more 
general terms. Finally, the last paragraph will conclude by briefly considering some 
of the policy implications of the findings of this research. 
 
Simultaneous developments in non-OECD economies 
On the face of it, patterns of concurrent developments in predominant economic 
narratives and inward FDI policies in non-OECD economies are similar to those 
observed among advanced economies. In the 1960s-70s, nearly all developing 
countries pursued strategies of economic development that can be described as 
‘statist’ and typically included the adoption of strong measures to monitor, restrict 
and regulate FDI inflows. Subsequently, as it is well known, a majority of 
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developing countries moved – to different degrees4 - towards the adoption of a more 
liberal economic stance, including the adoption of a more welcoming attitude 
towards foreign companies. 
Among the many nuances and qualifications in these developments that a fuller 
treatment of these issues would undoubtedly need to consider, two key differences 
to concurrent developments in OECD economies stand out. Firstly, the embrace of 
statist economic policies was typically firmer in developing economies than in 
advanced economies and attitudes towards foreign multinationals were generally 
more explicitly hostile, making the subsequent shifts in policy appear even more 
abrupt than in advanced economies. In particular in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
acts of expropriations of foreign firms in developing countries – almost unheard of 
among advanced economies – turned into a fairly frequently occurring event in 
international affairs5. From the mid-1970s onwards, expropriations became less 
common, but a majority of developing country governments continued to maintain 
strong regulatory measures6. A number of reasons can account for developing 
country governments’ generally more hostile attitudes towards foreign 
multinationals than those of their peers in advanced economies. Most importantly, 
                                                          
4 Admittedly, the degree of these changes varies considerably, ranging between the extremes of Hong 
Kong and North Korea. 
5 See Stephen J. Kobrin, "Foreign Enterprise and Forced Divestment in Ldcs," International 
Organization 34, no. 1 (1980); "Expropriation as an Attempt to Control Foreign Firms in Ldcs : Trends 
from 1960 to 1979," International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 3 (1984); "Diffusion as an Explanation of Oil 
Nationalizations: Or the Domino Effect Rides Again," Journal of Conflict Resolution 29, no. 1 (1985); 
Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of Us Enterprises, The Harvard 
Multinational Enterprise Series (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971); In the Hurricane's Eye: The 
Troubled Prospects of Multinational Enterprises  (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1998). 
6 Inward investment regimes of developing countries were typically at least as restrictive as those of 
the most restrictive advanced economies such as France, Canada and Japan. Cf. Golub and Koyama, 
"Oecd's Fdi Regulatory Restrictiveness Index: Revision and Extension to More Economies." 
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the prolonged struggles for decolonization had naturally raised their sensitivity to 
issues of foreign control and made them value national independence and economic 
sovereignty particularly strongly. At the same time, popular doctrines in economic 
development policy debates at the time – in particular the so-called ‘dependency 
school’ theory – was highly sceptical of the development benefits of FDI and the 
promise of global economic integration as a development strategy more generally, 
instead strongly advocating government intervention aimed at building nationally-
owned industries (a strategy known as ‘import substitution industrialization’). 
A second notable difference to the concurrent developments in advanced economies 
consists of the relatively greater role played by international institutions, such as the 
IBRD/World Bank Group and UNCTAD, which strongly encouraged the re-
thinking of government policies towards foreign multinational companies in 
developing countries through their policy advice as well as the provision of financial 
incentives. As it is well known, while the World Bank had been broadly supportive 
of statist approaches to economic development throughout the 1960s and 1970s7, it 
subsequently turned into a strong advocate of a liberal development policy 
paradigm whose principal traits John Williamson (in)famously defined as the 
‘Washington Consensus’ and which explicitly included the ‘Liberalization of Inward 
Foreign Direct Investments’ as one of the ten key reforms8 “more or less everyone in 
Washington would agree were needed more or less everywhere”9. Similarly, 
UNCTAD’s stance on industrial policy shifted remarkably from an emphasis on 
                                                          
7 See Ravi Kanbur, "The Co-Evolution of the Washington Consensus and the Economic Development 
Discourse," IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc (2009).  
8 Point 7 in John Williamson, "A Short History of the Washington Consensus," in From the Washington 
Consensus towards a new Global Governance (Barcelona2004), 3. 
9 Ibid., 1. 
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governments’ “right to nationalization”10 of foreign-owned companies’ assets in the 
1970s to its general advice to liberalize inward FDI policies from the early 1990s 
onwards11. 
Acknowledging such differences in the political processes in which the ideational 
transformations in the conceptualization of inward FDI played out in non-OECD 
economies, the broad patterns of the change in predominant narratives from a 
discourse of economic statism towards a narrative of globalization is also observable 
among policy elites and public opinion in developing countries. This being said, 
without elaborating the great heterogeneity among non-OECD economies in any 
detail, it also remains clear that these dynamics have played out differently in 
various contexts and not all developing countries have embraced FDI inflows to the 
same extent. Cross-national public opinion data from the Pew Research Center’s 
Global Attitudes Survey indicate some interesting patterns in these regards. A 
survey conducted in 44 countries in 2014 suggests that respondents in developing 
countries express generally more favourable views of FDI than respondents in 
advanced economies and among the former respondents from lower-income 
economies express relatively more favourable views than respondents from middle-
income economies12. Specifically, the survey found that 74 per cent of respondents 
from advanced economies expressed a positive view of greenfield FDI compared to a 
similar 70 per cent in middle-income economies, but 85 per cent in lower-income 
                                                          
10 See the ‘Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order’, adopted by the 
UN’s General Assembly in 1974. UN Resolution A/RES/S-6/3201. 
11 See Walter and Sen 2009: 195. Tagi Sagafi-nejad, The Un and Transnational Corporations : From Code of 
Conduct to Global Compact, ed. John H. Dunning and Howard V. Perlmutter (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2008). 
12 Pew Research Center, "Faith and Skepticism About Trade, Foreign Investment," 13-14. 
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economies; and while only 31 per cent of respondents in advanced economies 
expressed a favourable view of M&A FDI, 44 per cent did so in middle-income 
economies and 57 per cent in lower-income economies13. With regards to regional 
differences, the 2014 survey as well as an earlier survey conducted in 2003 similarly 
suggest that respondents from Africa and East Asia have particularly positive views 
of multinational companies, followed by Latin Americans while respondents from 
South Asia and the MENA region tend to express the most negative views 
(including more negative views than those of respondents from advanced 
economies) 14. 
 
Trends since 2007 
A wide range of commentators have suggested that the Financial Crisis of 2007-08 
and its widespread consequences marked an inflection point in the history of the 
global economy, fostering a partial reversal of globalizing trends15. According to 
several analysts, the evolution of inward FDI policies after 2007 lends further 
support to such hypotheses. For example, in a report entitled Global FDI Policy: 
Correcting a Protectionist Drift16, the Council on Foreign Relations warned in 2008 of the 
                                                          
13 Ibid., 13. 
14 Ibid., 14; "Views of a Changing World," (2003), 97. See also Marcus Noland, "Popular Attitudes, 
Globalization and Risk," International Finance 8, no. 2 (2005). 
15 In particular the increase in economic importance of states pursuing state-led economic 
management strategies such as China and Russia, the international expansion of state-owned or state-
influenced companies and investment funds and the rise of globalization-skeptical political parties in 
Europe and the United States are frequently cited as evidence for such trends. 
16 Marchik and Slaughter, "Global Fdi Policy: Correcting a Protectionist Drift." 
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rise of ‘investment protectionism’ arguing that “calls to restrict investment are 
growing louder in many countries.”17  
Although the underlying observation that a variety of countries adopted new 
restrictive measures on inward FDI in the mid-2000s – particularly on the grounds of 
‘national security’ - is accurate, these developments must be put into perspective. A 
large share of these measures were related to the dramatic but (with hindsight) 
short-lived increases in commodity prices in the mid-2000s and the rise of new types 
of investors, such as state-owned companies from emerging markets (especially 
China) and sovereign wealth funds. While the former were largely opportunistic 
moves, the latter – mirroring in some ways the reactions to the rise of American FDI 
in Europe in the 1960s and the concerns about Japanese FDI in the USA in the 1980s 
– are the result of uncertainties about new specific types of investments rather than a 
more sceptical stance towards FDI in general. 
A more objective evaluation of the general trends in national FDI policies seem to 
point rather in the opposite direction of a sustained movement towards greater 
openness: in fact, between 70 and 85 per cent of the changes undertaken to national 
FDI policies in each year since 2007 tracked by UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Monitor 
Database consisted of regulatory moves towards the liberalization and promotion 
(rather than the restriction or increased regulation) of FDI18. And in some sense, the 
prolonged economic crisis might even have increased policymakers’ desire to attract 
                                                          
17 Ibid., v. 
18 UNCTAD, "World Investment Report 2016: Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges," (Geneva: 
United Nations, 2016), 90-91. For a more detailed discussion of the (absence of) an effect of the 
Financial Crisis on global FDI policy, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, 
"Foreign Direct Investment in Times of Crisis," Transnational corporations 20, no. 1 (2011). 
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FDI as part of their efforts to stimulate economic growth. For example, suggestive of 
such dynamics, some of the Southern European countries hardest hit by the crisis 
(such as Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal) who had traditionally shown less interest 
in the attraction of FDI than most other OECD economies were among the first ones 
to openly court state-owned companies and investment funds from China19. 
Similarly, at least in the area of FDI, there is little evidence to support the frequently 
made claim that the Financial Crisis of 2007-08 led to increased popular 
dissatisfaction with economic globalization. In effect, the results from the International 
Social Survey Programme’s cross-national surveys on national identity (referred to 
extensively in Chapter 4) suggest otherwise: in no less than 19 out of the 23 surveyed 
countries, respondents’ views of the impact of FDI for the local economy were more 
positive in 2013 than they had been in 200320. Although increases in migration and 
the political power of supranational institutions – such as those of the EU – have 
become controversial political issues throughout the developed world in recent 
years, it is not clear that attitudes towards economic aspects of globalization have 
deteriorated in the same way. 
 
 
                                                          
19 See the Financial Times’ “Silk Road Redux” series published throughout October 2014, available 
online: http://www.ft.com/indepth/silk-road-redux [last accessed: 18 July 2016]. For an overview of 
the series, see Jamil Anderlini, "Chinese Investors Surged into Eu at Height of Debt Crisis," Financial 
Times, 6 October 2014. 
20 Interestingly, the ISSP surveys suggest a similar positive evolution in attitudes towards 
international trade, while public opinion during the same period tended to become more hostile 
towards immigration and international organizations. At the least, these patterns suggest that a more 
thorough analysis of the evolution of public opinion towards globalization would have to 
differentiate between various dimensions of the phenomenon of ‘globalization’. 
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Policy implications 
Having elaborated some of these extensions of the argument, this final paragraph 
will reflect upon the more ‘practical’ implications of the findings of this research 
project.  
Primarily, they relate to the notable symbolic value that has come to be attributed to 
FDI inflows in current policy discourses and to which previous studies have given 
little (if any) consideration. As I have suggested throughout this thesis, economic 
narratives – a key function of which is to simplify things in order to make them 
intelligible – tend to systematically overemphasize certain aspects of economic 
reality while downplaying others. Thereby they can inadvertently blur otherwise 
rational and pragmatic policy analyses with the normative or symbolic elements that 
underpin those narratives. As we have seen, while the statist narrative tended to 
exaggerate the negative implications of FDI inflows and underrate its potentially 
positive aspects in the 1960s-70s, there are strong indications that currently 
predominant FDI policy discourses, linked to the globalization narrative, instead 
tend to overemphasize FDI’s beneficial effects. 
In particular, the rise of the globalization narrative has led to a very strong 
discursive association between FDI inflows and national levels of ‘competitiveness’, 
suggesting that increases (decreases) in inward FDI are an indication that an 
economy is doing well (poorly).Yet, although this connection seems to be intuitively 
compelling, its foundations are far from being obvious21: While some analysts seem 
                                                          
21 See Lukas Linsi, "Less Compelling Than It Seems: Rethinking the Relationship between Aggregate 
Fdi Inflows and National Competitiveness," Columbia FDI Perspectives (Forthcoming). 
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to suggest that FDI inflows are a clear cause of higher levels of productivity because 
internationally competitive firms bring know-how to its host economies, the extent 
and the conditions under which this is the case is strongly debated in the literature 
examining the empirical effects of inward FDI, as we have seen22. Although it is very 
well possible that such dynamics can play out if the economic environment is 
conducive to them, the available empirical evidence strongly suggests that they are 
by no means automatic and shouldn’t be taken for granted. Similarly, other 
commentators conceptualize FDI inflows as an outcome of a competitive economic 
environment, suggesting that the decisions of internationally mobile firms to locate 
in a specific host economy indicate that its economic environment is competitive in 
international comparison. Again, this may very well be true for specific types of FDI 
projects, but is not necessarily the case. For example, a large number of FDI projects 
are motivated by corporate strategies seeking access to consumer markets or natural 
resources rather than the most competitive economic environment. At the same time, 
many mergers and acquisitions are arguably driven by considerations that target 
companies are under-performing and, in this sense, the associated FDI inflows may 
even be a sign of economic weakness rather than strength, etc. In short, although 
specific FDI projects are certainly related to considerations about host economies’ 
levels of productivity and competitiveness, this is not generally the case (and 
certainly not at the high level of abstraction at which aggregate FDI statistics are 
collected).  
                                                          
22 Cf. Discussion in introduction chapter. 
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In this sense, it seems fairly clear that governments’ enthusiasm for FDI derives not 
solely from their observation of real positive effects associated to FDI inflows. 
Instead, as the findings of this research strongly suggest, the establishment of 
ambitious FDI attraction programs may be as much the result of policymakers’ 
determination to follow the script to ‘compete with other nations’ that the 
globalization narrative provides – as well as the close correspondence of the 
structure of the global market for FDI with the zero-sum logic underlying the 
narrative - as it is the result of careful analyses concluding that the country’s 
economy would benefit from additional FDI inflows of a specific type23. 
This is not to suggest by any means that FDI inflows are ‘bad’ and that governments 
are wrong trying to attract them. Instead, this thesis constitutes a call for an 
undogmatic approach to economic policy, which is wary of the power of the 
language we use and the symbolic-normative underpinnings that are inherent to it 
and which is able to accept that FDI is neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ per se, but a complex 
and highly specific economic transaction with many potential implications but, 
ultimately, very little meaning. 
 
                                                          
23 I owe this suggestion to Rawi Abdelal. 
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APPENDIX 
CHAPTER 3. 
Table A-3.1. Cumulative total FDI inflows (in million current USD) from 1970-
2013 by country 
 
 
TOTAL FDI 
INFLOWS, 1970-
2013 
PERCENTAGE OF 
TOTAL WORLD FDI, 
1970-2013 
CUMULATIVE 
PERCENTAGE 
United States 3774264 16.5 16.5 
United Kingdom 1629715 7.1 23.6 
China 1476748 6.5 30.1 
Belgium* 1133397 5.0 35.1 
France 946330 4.1 39.2 
China, Hong Kong 863295 3.8 43.0 
Germany 805038 3.5 46.5 
Canada 759382 3.3 49.8 
Spain 654472 2.9 52.7 
Netherlands 639838 2.8 55.5 
Brazil 613209 2.7 58.2 
Singapore 561138 2.5 60.6 
Australia 533941 2.3 63.0 
Russian Federation 499411 2.2 65.2 
British Virgin Islands 459335 2.0 67.2 
Mexico 456082 2.0 69.2 
Sweden 354981 1.6 70.7 
Italy 331556 1.5 72.2 
India 293492 1.3 73.4 
Switzerland 290848 1.3 74.7 
Ireland 255967 1.1 75.8 
Saudi Arabia 224653 1.0 76.8 
Chile 204523 0.9 77.7 
Poland 184142 0.8 78.5 
Korea, Republic of 173781 0.8 79.3 
Argentina 170059 0.7 80.0 
Cayman Islands 165500 0.7 80.8 
Norway 160046 0.7 81.5 
Luxembourg 155869 0.7 82.1 
Turkey 151825 0.7 82.8 
Malaysia 146692 0.6 83.4 
Austria 142501 0.6 84.1 
Thailand 139454 0.6 84.7 
Colombia 131377 0.6 85.3 
Denmark 129910 0.6 85.8 
Japan 123560 0.5 86.4 
Rest of the World 2996536 13.6 100 
SOURCE: UNCTAD Stats. NOTE: *From 1970 to 2001, the data for Belgium includes FDI flows to 
Luxembourg, thereafter they are recorded separately  
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CHAPTER 4. 
Figure A-4.1. The Percentage of respondents expressing a negative view of foreign 
companies by country 
 
SOURCE: International Social Survey Programme 2003 and 2013 
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